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Paragraphs: 15.17
- 15.26
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15.17
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It would appear that, following Victoria's death, some consideration
has been given by the MPS to the number of detectives working on
CPTs. D Supt Copson expressed shock at what he found. He said, "I
do not think I am easily shocked but it certainly shocked me to
discover how few there were when I went round looking and counting."
These sentiments were echoed by DAC Griffiths, who took over the
child protection portfolio from Commander David Kendrick in February
1999. He told me that reading a survey about the distribution of
detectives among the CPTs soon after he came into post had been
a "shock and revelation" to him.
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15.18
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However, the problem was shared by other units within the force.
I was told that many borough CID offices were also operating with
few trained detectives during this period. Much of the explanation
for this state of affairs would seem to lie in the combination of
an unusually high murder rate in the year in question, and the transfer
of a large number of detectives to murder teams following the report
of Sir William Macpherson into the death of Stephen Lawrence. Indeed,
Commander Carole Howlett, in her statement to the Inquiry, went
as far as to say, "Anecdotal information would suggest that following
the Macpherson Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence, child
protection teams were plundered in order to increase the numbers
of personnel on murder investigation teams."
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15.19
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I do not wish to underestimate the scale of the challenges faced
by the force in the period with which I am concerned. Nonetheless,
the speed and apparent effectiveness of the measures it took to
improve child protection policing in London following Victoria's
death suggests to me that more could and should have been done at
the time.
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15.20
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I was told that the MPS tried very hard after Victoria's death
to improve the practices and composition of CPTs in the capital.
Energetic new managers, such as Commander Howlett and Detective
Chief Superintendent (DCS) Derrick Kelleher, were given the task
of making sweeping changes. As a result, a new department called
SO5 (the Child Protection Command Unit) was created, bringing all
the CPTs in London under centralised control.
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15.21
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Much work has also been done to improve the status of child protection
work within the force. A number of officers, including D Supt Copson,
told me that there was a significant amount of "macho nonsense"
in the force concerning the work of CPTs, which were sometimes referred
to in a derogatory way such as "cardigan squads". One of the consequences
of this low status was that the best detectives would be put off
from applying to join these teams.
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15.22
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Among the initiatives that have been taken to address this problem
is the designation of all CPT officers as "branch detectives". I
cannot accept the utility of what is basically a cosmetic gesture
that fails to address (and may even mask) the lack of real detectives
on the teams, but I do welcome the sentiment behind it. Strong efforts
must be made throughout the police force to raise the profile and
status of child protection work to a level that its importance deserves,
thereby encouraging high-calibre officers to apply.
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15.23
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It may, of course, prove to be the case that even after such efforts
have been made, the number of detectives who voluntarily apply for
postings on CPTs is insufficient. In those circumstances, I have
considerable sympathy with the view of Commander Craik. He told
me that in such circumstances, a degree of coercion might be required:
"Sorry, you work for the police. We like to have committed volunteers,
but if the need was great I would put people in there.
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15.24
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It is easy to state that there should be some detectives on CPTs,
but it is harder to say how many. My view is similar to that shared
by DAC Griffiths and Commander Kendrick. They said that a one-to-one
ratio of "uniform background" officers against detectives was the
aspirational target, but that at least one detective to every two
"uniform background" officers was a realistic minimum. Drawing on
the considerable experience of these officers, and in light of the
evidence in Victoria's case, I make the following recommendation:
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Recommendation
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Chief constables must ensure that officers working on child protection
teams are sufficiently well trained in criminal investigation, and
that there is always a substantial core of fully trained detective
officers on each team to deal with the most serious inquiries.
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15.25
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In addition to containing a suitable number of detectives, it is
also important to ensure that CPTs are led by officers of sufficient
rank and experience. In this regard, Commander Kendrick told me
that, in his view, CPTs ought to be headed-up by detective inspectors.
However, he acknowledged that during the period with which I am
concerned, this was not the case in nine out of 28 London CPTs -
a situation he considered "unacceptable".
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15.26
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This is indicative, in my view, of the general state of CPTs in
London in 1999, and it shows the priority they were accorded by
the MPS as a whole. It would seem that the force was content to
allow these teams to perform the vital work of protecting children
with, in many cases, insufficient numbers of detectives and inadequately
qualified managers.
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