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Paragraphs: 15.47
- 15.58 | 15.59 - 15.63 | 15.64
- 15.75
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15.47
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One of the principal problems I met in seeking to determine who
was ultimately accountable for the state of the CPTs in north west
London in 1999, was the conflicting evidence of senior officers
as to whose job it was to ensure that the teams were adequately
staffed and equipped. There would seem to be two potential candidates:
the commander of the crime Operational Command Unit (OCU) in whose
area the CPT was located, and the 'strategic portfolio holder' with
responsibility for maintaining an overview of CPTs across London.
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15.48
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The portfolio holder up to February 1999 was Commander Kendrick.
His evidence did little to convince me that he had much direct knowledge
or understanding of the manner in which CPTs were operating during
the period he was in post. In 1998, some three years after he assumed
responsibility for the CPT, he commissioned an inspection of CPTs
across London as a whole. The results echoed many of the findings
that I have recorded above: teams were understaffed with poorly
trained officers and lacked basic equipment. Prior to this inspection,
however, Commander Kendrick told me that he thought that the MPS
was providing the CPTs with adequate resources and appropriately
trained and qualified staff.
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15.49
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In my view, Commander Kendrick could not have held this view throughout
the three years or so prior to the inspection unless he was anything
other than seriously out of touch with the condition of CPTs on
the ground. The situation in which they found themselves at the
time Victoria's case came to be dealt with was not one which, in
my view, could have arisen overnight, and I suspect that the conclusion
of DCS Kelleher in his September 2000 report that the CPTs had suffered
"ten years of neglect" is sound.
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15.50
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On the assumption that the deficiencies revealed by his 1998 inspection
had been present for some time, Commander Kendrick was asked why
there had been no mechanisms in place to bring them to his attention.
He replied that mechanisms should have existed within the relevant
crime OCUs for identifying and addressing such matters. He told
me that he was not seeking to "pass the blame" for the neglect of
CPTs to area commanders, but did invite me to conclude that such
commanders should be seen as having a degree of "operational responsibility"
for the state of the CPTs in their OCU.
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15.51
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For five years leading up to March 1999, the commander (crime)
for the OCU which included both Brent and Haringey CPTs was Malcolm
Campbell. It was plain from his evidence that he regarded the adequate
resourcing and training of CPT officers as the responsibility of
Commander Kendrick as the portfolio holder. He told me, "David Kendrick
already had meetings, I am not sure of the frequency of these, with
the DIs from child protection teams. He was their champion, as it
were, to improve their lot, to gain them better resources." When
asked if he accepted that he had failed to take sufficient steps
to address issues of training and resourcing within the CPTs, he
replied, "No, I brought them to the notice of Commander David Kendrick."
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15.52
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The problem is clear. The two officers who ought to be taking responsibility
for ensuring that the CPTs were properly staffed and equipped had
inconsistent views as to their respective responsibilities in this
regard. Put simply, each thought that the other was doing more than
was in fact the case. The inevitable consequence was that not enough
was done by either.
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15.53
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My view is that Commander Campbell, as the commander (crime) for
the OCU in which Brent and Haringey CPTs were situated, was responsible
for the performance of those teams. As such he should have made
sure that he was properly informed about the condition of the teams
and the quality of their work. I find that he did not do this, and
that he demonstrated precious little understanding of the state
of the CPTs in his area or the problems that they faced. This, in
my view, amounts to a fundamental gap in the knowledge and awareness
of a senior officer in Commander Campbell's position. The work of
CPTs is of central importance to all police forces. It is vital
that senior officers have an understanding of that work and an appreciation
of the challenges faced by the teams. In order to increase that
understanding, I make the following recommendation:
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Recommendation
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The Home Office, through Centrex, must add specific training relating
to child protection policing to the syllabus for the strategic command
course. This will ensure that all future chief officers in the police
service have adequate knowledge and understanding of the role of
child protection teams.
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15.54
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Commander Campbell was succeeded in April 1999 by Commander Michael
Craik, who held the post of commander (crime) throughout the period
that Victoria was alive in Brent and Haringey. The timing of his
appointment was such that, even if he had wished to make radical
changes to the CPTs, he could have achieved little in time to help
Victoria. However, it is fair to say that, whatever the explanation,
Commander Craik's level of awareness about the state of the CPTs
under his operational command at the time Victoria's case was being
dealt with, was little different to that of his predecessor.
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15.55
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Commander Craik accepted from the outset of his evidence to the
Inquiry, that he was responsible for the operational performance
of the CPTs in the north west London area during his time in post.
When asked by Counsel for the MPS to what extent he personally accepted
responsibility for police failures that may have contributed to
Victoria's death, Commander Craik candidly replied, "My officers
let Victoria and her parents down. I was responsible for those officers.
I was the commander. By anybody's definition - you can go through
job descriptions as much as you like - I was the boss in the organisation.
If they let the family down and Victoria down, I let them down,
and I would like to apologise to them for that." This was refreshing
to hear. I was impressed by Commander Craik's evidence, and the
manner in which he gave it.
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15.56
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I will say one more thing about Commander Craik, which applies
equally to DCS David Cox. Following Victoria's death, it was essential
that her killers were identified and successfully prosecuted. The
crime OCU managed by these two senior officers, which let Victoria
down so badly when she was alive, appears to have carried out a
highly professional and detailed murder investigation, which resulted
in the conviction of both Kouao and Manning. It is right to give
the MPS, and the North West Crime OCU, credit for that successful
investigation.
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15.57
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I recognise the difficulty faced by senior officers in the MPS
in maintaining an accurate picture of the standards of work carried
out by individual police units operating across the capital. I was
reminded during the course of the Inquiry that the MPS is an organisation
with 40,000 employees operating from more than 100 sites. One of
the principal challenges posed by the management of large organisations
such as this, is to be able to retain a feel for life on the 'shop
floor'. I do not underestimate the scale of that challenge.
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15.58
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In order to be able to meet it, it seems to me that senior officers
need regular and reliable intelligence from their junior staff.
In view of this, I turn now to consider the level of awareness of
the condition of the CPTs demonstrated by officers further down
the chain of command who gave evidence to the Inquiry.
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Paragraphs: 15.47
- 15.58 | 15.59 - 15.63 | 15.64
- 15.75
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15.59
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I start with DCS Cox, who took considerable trouble in both his
written and oral evidence to ensure that I was aware of the context
in which he and his officers were working in north west London in
1999. Of particular relevance, I was told, was the unusually high
murder rate. Put briefly, his area of London had the misfortune
to be the scene of 92 murders during the course of that year. This,
apparently, is equivalent to the total number of murders dealt with
in a typical year by the whole of Greater Manchester Police plus
West Midlands Police plus any other county's police force.
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15.60
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The fact that there were a large number of murders occurring in
north west London in 1999 cannot explain or excuse the individual
failings of the officers who had direct contact with Victoria's
case. However, it may help in understanding why more senior officers
in the OCU failed to give the CPTs the attention they deserved.
Whatever the explanation, it was clear from his evidence that DCS
Cox was not aware of the true state of the CPTs for which he was
responsible. Much of his evidence is summarised well by the following
answer: "I realised, certainly, the situation on the murder teams
was out of control. I do not think I realised the situation on the
CPTs was as desperate as it was. I thought they were in better shape."
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15.61
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Regardless of the murder rate, the CPTs were a critical part of
the OCU for which DCS Cox was responsible. Therefore, it was essential
that he took the necessary steps to find out whether they were operating
in a satisfactory manner. It is plain to me that he either had no
mechanisms in place for keeping abreast of the state of his CPTs,
or that those mechanisms were inadequate. My overall impression
is that DCS Cox, like many of his senior colleagues, actually paid
little regard to the CPTs under his command in 1999 because he did
not see them as a high priority.
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15.62
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It is possible that DCS Cox drew some comfort from the fact that
his deputy, D Supt Akers, was herself a former child protection
detective inspector, and appeared to take a keen interest in that
side of the work. Of the three detective superintendents working
in the crime OCU, she was the one who, for most of the relevant
period, had specific responsibility for managing the CPTs. DCS Cox
plainly thought that D Supt Akers was keeping a close eye on the
teams. He told me, "Child protection was always a topic which Sue
had on her lips, so I felt that she was doing that, and she had
a good grasp."
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15.63
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D Supt Akers's view was somewhat different. She said that although
she had nominal responsibility for the CPTs, the huge bulk of her
work was with the murder squads. Once again, there appears to have
been some confusion between senior officers as to the extent to
which their colleagues were monitoring and taking responsibility
for the work and condition of the CPTs. In my view, this further
supports the conclusion that CPTs in the period with which I am
concerned had slipped a very long way down the MPS's agenda.
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Paragraphs: 15.47
- 15.58 | 15.59 - 15.63 | 15.64
- 15.75
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15.64
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I deal finally with DCI Wheeler, the most senior officer in the
crime OCU who was not heavily engaged in murder inquiries in 1999.
As I have stated above, it is vital that senior managers in large
organisations of any sort receive accurate intelligence from their
subordinates as to the state of affairs on the 'shop floor'. Within
the context of the CPTs, someone had to have the job of 'drilling
down' into the individual teams to ensure that they were carrying
out proper investigations and were adequately equipped for the task.
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15.65
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All the senior officers to whom this question was addressed were
clear in their recollection that the person whose job it was to
fulfil this function was DCI Wheeler. Unfortunately, DCI Wheeler
did not agree. He told me that he was in no way responsible for
the operational management of the CPTs and that his function was
an administrative one only. Specifically, when asked if DCS Cox
had expressly told him that this was to be the extent of his role,
he replied, "He did indeed. I went and spoke to him after one of
the reports and he said, 'Do your best, do the best you can' and
it is simply administrative, and that is all."
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15.66
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This seems to me to be a critical matter. Either there was a senior
officer responsible for determining whether the CPTs with which
I am concerned were doing a good job or there was not. If there
was, then he or she will inevitably bear some responsibility for
the shortcomings evident in Victoria's case. If not, then one is
left facing the remarkable conclusion that nobody in the MPS was
charged with the operational management of the north west London
area CPTs.
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15.67
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Furthermore, the practical result of this confusion would seem
to be that nobody properly managed the CPTs of Haringey or Brent
from within the crime OCU. DCI Wheeler said that he never visited
those CPT offices during the relevant period because he did not
see it as his role, and the respective detective inspectors confirmed
that they hardly ever saw him. This is, frankly, disastrous management
on the part of the MPS. For example, had a senior officer taken
the trouble to visit Haringey CPT in the months leading up to Victoria's
death, there is every chance that he or she would have discovered
the same deficiencies in practice highlighted in the two reviews
of the team conducted after Victoria's death. Had they done so,
then steps could have been taken to remedy the situation in time
to have helped Victoria. In view of the seriousness of these matters,
I deal with this conflict of evidence in some detail.
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15.68
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Commander Craik was asked what his understanding of DCI Wheeler's
role was in terms of the operational supervision of the CPTs. He
replied, "I would expect him to have the capacity to get down and
dip sample at that level, as well as checking what the inspector
said and checking that the inspector was doing exactly the same
thing, looking into the work and quality checking. I would expect
him [the inspector] to be able to do some of that himself and verify
it. But I would say Mr Wheeler would be the last point in that chain.
Mr Wheeler could certainly do it for the number of officers under
his command.
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15.69
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D Supt Akers was equally clear when she was asked if DCI Wheeler
had responsibility for operational matters or whether his post was
purely concerned with administrative matters. She answered, "both".
When informed that DCI Wheeler's evidence was that DCS Cox had assured
him that his (DCI Wheeler's) role with regard to the CPTs was purely
administrative, D Supt Akers replied, "I find it incredible to believe
that Mr Cox would have said that because his view, like my own,
was that CPTs needed more than administrative support." When it
was put to her that the differences between her and DCI Wheeler
on this issue were irreconcilable, and that if her evidence is correct
it must mean that DCI Wheeler is lying about what he was told by
DCS Cox, D Supt Akers replied, "Yes, I am afraid it does."
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15.70
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For completeness, I should record that DCS Cox was adamant in his
oral evidence that he never told DCI Wheeler that his (DCI Wheeler's)
role was restricted to the administrative management of the CPTs
and that he fully expected him to take operational responsibility
as well.
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15.71
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I have to make a judgement about whether DCI Wheeler knew he was
the operational line manager of the CPTs, or whether, as he put
it, he was simply asked to look after their administration. I am
satisfied not only that he was the operational line manager for
the CPT detective inspectors, but also that he knew his role was
to oversee the work of their teams and ensure they were operating
to a high standard. He chose not to discharge that function, with
the result that the CPTs with which I am concerned operated throughout
1999 without the benefit of any adequate operational supervision.
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15.72
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In reaching this conclusion, I have been influenced to some degree
by the fact that I find it inconceivable that DCS Cox would have
said to DCI Wheeler that he was just to act as an administrator.
Even if that had happened, I would have expected DCI Wheeler immediately
to point out that the result of such an arrangement would be the
CPT detective inspectors operating unsupervised - a plainly unsatisfactory
state of affairs. When this was put to him, DCI Wheeler replied
that he did not do so because he did not see it as part of his function
to bring such matters to the attention of his superiors. I reject
his evidence in this regard. As a senior officer within the crime
OCU it would plainly have been his responsibility to bring any inherent
defects in the management structure to DCS Cox's attention. I find
it inconceivable that he would have chosen to keep such matters
to himself, had he indeed been given the wholly inappropriate role
he claims.
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15.73
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The resolution of this issue has been far from easy but I was assisted
to some extent by the insight into DCI Wheeler's working practices
provided by D Supt Copson, who took over as his line manager in
late 1999. He said of DCI Wheeler, "I think he was hard-working
within his own definition and hard-working according to his own
priorities, but his priorities were not my priorities, and they
are not the priorities he should have had. Phil Wheeler was probably
the most difficult supervision case I have had in 23 years' service
and I tried hard for a long time to find a way of reaching him and
persuading him that he ought to do things differently, and the conclusion
I was forced to, was that he did not want to be managed.
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15.74
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The lack of supervision by DCI Wheeler was, in my view, a crucial
factor in Haringey and Brent CPTs being allowed to deteriorate to
the state they were in by the time they came to deal with Victoria's
case. In the absence of any indication from him to the contrary,
it was possible for more senior officers, when they thought about
the CPTs at all, to think that all was well. The evidence that I
have heard, together with the findings of the reviews of Haringey
CPT carried out after Victoria's death, demonstrates precisely the
opposite.
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15.75
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In my view, DCI Wheeler, given his operational responsibility for
the CPTs involved, should have been aware that they were struggling
to provide an adequate service. He should then have brought this
information to the attention of more senior officers so that the
deficiencies in the composition, resourcing and practices of the
teams could have been addressed. His failure to do so means, in
my view, that he must assume a great deal of responsibility for
the flawed investigations that were carried out by those under his
command.
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