Archived Transcript for 18 January 2002: Pages 201 to 238

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1 solution until child protection officers could receive

2 full detective training, is that a summary of what you

3 are saying?

4 DAC GRIFFITHS: No, it is not. I have said that I do not

5 think child protection officers need full detective

6 training. What they need is fit for purpose detective

7 training. Because the other document that I had was the

8 training needs analysis, which spelled out very clearly

9 that they did not need the whole course, so we

10 commissioned the writing of a bespoke course. That

11 course is being delivered today. DCI Shirley Tellett(?)

12 was tasked with energising that and taking it forward.

13 It was nine months of effort for someone who had a very

14 busy day job and I commend her for it. She did

15 a marvelous job of pulling the right people together,

16 including the colleague who had written the child

17 analysis to ensure the child protection officers got the

18 actual training that was fit for purpose.

19 MS GIBSON: How long is it, how many weeks would that course

20 last for and how does it compare with the detective

21 foundation course?

22 DAC GRIFFITHS: I believe it is three weeks. The detective

23 training course, foundation course was five. We have

24 moved it to six to be in line with the national police

25 training programme because we are delivering the

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1 training at Hendon under licence, so to speak from the

2 national police training. So it is now a six week

3 course. But the bespoke course is three weeks, I think

4 it may be four but it certainly meets their needs.

5 MS GIBSON: Given the complexity that we have heard of of

6 what child protection officers have to deal with, not

7 only investigating some of the most serious crimes that

8 are available, that exist, or also having to deal with

9 interagency working and the complexities of that, it

10 seems somewhat surprising that their foundation course

11 should be half that of the detective course.

12 DAC GRIFFITHS: That may be surprising but I do not find it

13 problematic because the partnership working component of

14 their training is, I think, built into it.

15 Secondly, the place you receive the partnership

16 training surely is locally because there are different

17 arrangements in different boroughs and we do have to

18 acknowledge that. I do not think the Metropolitan

19 Police, much as we would like to, can impose a way of

20 working on every borough in London because they are

21 all -- have different arrangements. So, it behoves us

22 to acknowledge that in the way in which we deliver the

23 joint working training.

24 MS GIBSON: Is it not though in part that that decision is

25 based on resource matters, as much as it is about

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1 delivering appropriate training? You make a shorter

2 bespoke course rather than committing to more places on

3 a longer training course?

4 DAC GRIFFITHS: If it were an either/or decision I would

5 probably agree with you but it is not an either/or

6 decision. The best course for them is the course that

7 has been designed for them following a very

8 comprehensive training needs analysis. To give them

9 training that is not necessary for them is actually

10 wasting their time and wasting public money if we drive

11 other colleagues who need that course from going on it.

12 MS GIBSON: It was Detective Superintendent Copson's view in

13 one of the reports he wrote that perhaps there could be

14 nothing in the detective foundation course that was not

15 applicable to the work of Child Protection Team

16 officers. That is a view again of a senior police

17 officer, however it seems that you differ from that.

18 DAC GRIFFITHS: Well, I do. Gary Copson is entitled to his

19 view but I do not believe he has been trained -- I do

20 not believe he was involved in the training needs

21 analysis. He cannot have studied it in any depth

22 because if he had he would see the bespoke course that

23 has been delivered is actually fit for purpose.

24 Now I take the point entirely that the generic

25 skills of a detective flow through the course. You know

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1 this training is not delivered in lumps, the skill of

2 interviewing witnesses for example will feature

3 throughout. So it is very difficult to separate out

4 from where he sits that that is not to do with child

5 protection, if you take my point.

6 What we have done is take out the components that

7 they do not need. For example, they do not need to

8 study burglary to do child protection work. You know,

9 just take those components out and give them the same

10 skill base through the training with the specific

11 knowledge base that they need for their particular area

12 of work.

13 MS GIBSON: How does that relate however to the problems

14 that we have already identified in relation to CPT

15 status, the problem of attracting existing detectives

16 into child protection teams? If you have a different

17 course for child protection officers, it would tend to

18 increase their isolation, and in terms of career

19 development, it is very difficult for a child protection

20 team detective to move on if they wanted to vary their

21 career.

22 DAC GRIFFITHS: That is one way of looking at it but of

23 course the people we are training are not detectives.

24 We are training those that are not detectives. So we

25 are giving them what they need. The detectives already

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1 have it so they do not need a CPT course, they need the

2 technical skills: the memorandum interviewing and they

3 need the partnership working. And that is what they

4 get.

5 Any colleague who is working in child protection who

6 then wants to go into the more general CID role will

7 then get a bolt-on course that will expose them to the

8 other elements of general CID work, and of course they

9 will be very skilled in most aspects of general CID work

10 if they have done child protection investigations.

11 MS GIBSON: So it may not be particularly attractive to

12 someone thinking about joining a CPT to know that they

13 will not get the full training, it may enhance

14 recruitment if they were aware that they would receive

15 that training and not have to have any further training?

16 DAC GRIFFITHS: That may be a perception, Chairman. I do

17 not dismiss it but I would want to explain to any

18 colleague that held that view that actually that was

19 quite a daft way of looking at it and I do not mean any

20 disrespect by that comment. I just do not see it as

21 logical to see it in that way.

22 Now, perception might be different and we need to

23 explain it and communicate more effectively.

24 MS GIBSON: Looking now at information technology. Again,

25 Otis, as you say, was a long-term project but the

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1 location of child protection teams had left them out of

2 the loop as far as that was concerned and they were

3 fairly low down on the list of priorities for delivery

4 of Otis. Again that tends to indicate that child

5 protection teams were undervalued, does it not?

6 DAC GRIFFITHS: Chairman I cannot agree with that

7 proposition either because the Otis programme -- again

8 I need to give a rather long answer because I know you

9 have commented from time to time that you cannot get to

10 the bottom of some of these questions. Well, what I can

11 explain is this: that Otis is an infrastructure by which

12 the Met will communicate. Now I have already explained

13 the size and the scale and the scope of the Metropolitan

14 Police. We have delivered more than 11,000 terminals,

15 hundreds of miles of cabling to provide police officers

16 with the tools they need to do their job. It was an

17 essential project.

18 I know Sir Paul Condon was surprised by the lack of

19 IT right across the piece. He advanced the CRIS

20 programme, for example. I know he brought that forward.

21 It had been in preparation for about ten years and he

22 gave it a good kick and made it happen and we were very

23 glad of it because it gave us a crime system. The

24 choice he and his policy board colleagues made was to

25 invest heavily in this programme. Now, you can see it

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1 was going to be a five year programme. Where do you

2 start? Well, in line with his philosophy, which is the

3 customer-facing end of the business will get -- I am

4 trying to turn this organisation on its head so the

5 provisioning departments understand that the front line

6 of 24-hour policing is where the resources need to be

7 and that is where those resources went in the beginning.

8 You have to start somewhere in a five year

9 programme. Its entirely logical to start at police

10 stations because that is where you want to build up

11 from.

12 Now, CPTs -- we are not saying that they are second

13 line, they are a very important part of the business,

14 but they do not operate 24 hours a day, seven days

15 a week, they operate in core hours because that matches

16 what they do. And also the fact that they do not have

17 the numbers to run a 24-hour service so we need police

18 officers 24 hours a day who can deal with child

19 protection issues in extremis. Those are the colleagues

20 that need the infrastructure first and you build it up.

21 I think it has already been said here that the second

22 stage of the programme would be area headquarters. Not

23 Scotland Yard, area headquarters. Child protection

24 teams are part of area headquarters.

25 Now had they been located in a division they would

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1 have had an opportunity to be on the Otis network

2 through being given a terminal or two by the division.

3 Most divisional colleagues acknowledged their need and

4 provisioned them in that way. Some for some

5 unaccountable reason to me did not see the need and

6 perhaps have not looked after them. But the challenge

7 was there to then provision in stage 2 and stage 2

8 I think -- if you look at my second statement -- was

9 provisioned for in about 1999/2000 deliberately by

10 policy board. Money was put aside. They put more money

11 in that year to do it and this was now a fast rollout.

12 Within that, it is a decision probably taken by the

13 top team of the area "who gets what". Now I remember

14 the business manager explaining to me, on my area, that

15 the difficulty we would have would be with satellite

16 places that were not actually wired into the Met phone

17 system which was our network of secure lines. We had to

18 have secure lines. After all, you cannot leave data in

19 insecure conditions, especially data about children and

20 suspects. So we had to protect the cabling and so on.

21 The places where child protection teams tended to

22 work were isolated from police buildings and there are

23 good and valid reasons for that which are to do with

24 children should not be exposed -- it is better if they

25 are not exposed to sort of policing environment because

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1 they get frightened.

2 Let me give you an example. When I was at Carter

3 Street Police Station which is the division that covers

4 this area, so it happens, I remember approving the plans

5 for the new Walworth Police Station which is now in

6 Manor Place, and I took particular trouble to ensure

7 that there was a separate entrance built that led you

8 into the Child Protection Team accommodation that was

9 going to be built and having brand new accommodation and

10 their facilities, and we actually did that.

11 MS GIBSON: Thank you. I think everyone would understand

12 the reasons for that, but the problem with --

13 DAC GRIFFITHS: Can I finish my example --

14 MS GIBSON: -- CPTs being remote is perhaps there was

15 a greater need for a link there than generally.

16 DAC GRIFFITHS: Just to finish that example.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Only if it is relevant. You have given your

18 answers very, very fully.

19 DAC GRIFFITHS: I am aware of that Chairman and I am

20 conscious I do not want to be wasting your time, but

21 that Child Protection Team eventually moved out, just to

22 reinforce the point that police stations are

23 inappropriate, so that point.

24 The provision of IT to those places was overcome.

25 They all had CRIS, so they had a database on which all

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1 of their work was recorded. They had telephones. They

2 had fax. They had their own databases and some of them

3 and I believe Highgate had access to an Otis terminal.

4 MS GIBSON: Do you think now looking back that the rollout

5 of Otis to CPTs was sufficiently prioritised, because as

6 I have said they were not linked up because of their

7 geographical location, because they were not contained

8 in police stations, all the more need for them to have

9 that sort of information technology to diminish their

10 remoteness from the rest of the force?

11 DAC GRIFFITHS: There are two reasons why I do not accept

12 that. One is it is illogical to have a network that

13 they cannot take the benefit from because you have to

14 build bottom up, that they were not frontline 24/7

15 services. They are very important but they are not

16 frontline 24/7. Secondly, I think they had sufficient

17 for them to be able to do their job. The intelligence

18 network was available to them through one telephone

19 call. They could contact Scotland Yard, it is one of

20 the benefits that we introduced immediately after the

21 Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report, was to set up a 24-hour

22 bureau where one telephone call could get you access to

23 the entire intelligence system, CRIMIT, 24 hours a day.

24 That was published in notices. So, any colleague

25 dealing with a serious crime could get access 24 hours

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1 a day. So I think we gave them enough to get on with

2 it.

3 MS GIBSON: Can I ask you lastly about the formation of SO5.

4 We see that in December 1999 a paper was prepared for

5 you by Detective Superintendent Copson and it is right

6 to say that was an idea you were keen on. About for

7 what length of period had that change in structure been

8 mooted over?

9 DAC GRIFFITHS: Difficult to actually pinpoint the start of

10 thought processes but during the 1999 phase I think

11 Michael Craik has described a bit of a holding pattern.

12 During that time there were lots of discussions about

13 what the future shape of the Metropolitan Police would

14 be and there were some sensitivities about that because

15 the new Commissioner had not been identified, there had

16 not been a process to appoint a new Commissioner,

17 although it was very obvious that Sir John Stevens, as

18 the deputy as he was there, would be a very likely

19 contender, but there were clearly sensitivities about

20 moving until a new Commissioner was appointed.

21 Once he was appointed then there were discussions

22 about what was the best way to deliver those kind of

23 services but it was more in the general: should we have

24 an area structure at all? Now on virtually the day he

25 was appointed he announced the removal of the area

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1 structure. I was appointed to lead what I then came to

2 call the Serious Crime Group, but it was the five Crime

3 OCUs and three OCUs at Scotland Yard, and I was told

4 look at a structure that will deliver those services and

5 in quick time.

6 Now, we got very busy on that during February, and

7 there was a meeting on 16th February with all the

8 commanders that had by then been appointed to assist me.

9 We had a vision, we developed our vision -- we did not

10 have a vision, we developed a vision. We developed how

11 we would deliver and I invited Commander Howlett to lead

12 on child protection issues including what the structure

13 should look like. That was on 16th February and that is

14 a definite date and I have brought that material here

15 today, Chairman. Because when David Cox said the other

16 day that it was an underage football team running around

17 the pitch, I felt I had to challenge that because that

18 is not how it was.

19 MS GIBSON: Thank you very much, Mr Griffiths. If you wait

20 there.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Thwaites?

22 MR THWAITES: Just one or two matters if I may, please.

23 Mr Griffiths, you were asked in the course of

24 questioning by Ms Gibson what are you accepting

25 responsibility for on behalf of the organisation and

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1 I think it was rolled up with other matters which you

2 did answer and I do not think the Inquiry has had an

3 answer to that specific part. Could you address that

4 for us, please?

5 DAC GRIFFITHS: Please forgive me Chairman if I have given

6 overlong answers. It is in an attempt to provide you

7 with information and insight into the operating context.

8 The Metropolitan Police are acknowledging that there

9 were errors and omissions in the way in which Victoria's

10 case was handled but the collective responsibility is

11 that the checks and balances that should have been in

12 place to detect when things go wrong did not function

13 adequately.

14 MR THWAITES: Yes, thank you. How much of a disadvantage,

15 in your view, was it for child protection officers not

16 to have Otis available to them in doing their job?

17 DAC GRIFFITHS: Chairman, I do not believe that the

18 provision of resources such as IT, vehicles and so on

19 are actually a reason for not doing your job. Clearly

20 it is desirable for everyone to have the tools they need

21 to do their job but these were not tools that would

22 prevent an officer performing simple, straightforward

23 tasks that are to do with the core role of policing. So

24 whilst I accept the desirability, I do not accept that

25 it is a reason for failing in your duty.

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1 MR THWAITES: Mr Craik expressed the view that the basic

2 fault here was that nothing was done in circumstances

3 that demanded police action. Do you agree with that

4 analysis?

5 DAC GRIFFITHS: Chairman, in the A to Z of an investigation,

6 that investigation did not get to B. Therefore I do

7 adopt Michael Craik's analysis.

8 MR THWAITES: You made reference to a meeting of

9 16th February and I think, sir, that the Inquiry have

10 documents brought by Mr Griffiths today and I hope that

11 has not caused any inconvenience, but it may illustrate

12 a point that I know has interested you, which is this.

13 By reference to the objective sheets and the agenda, do

14 you have the document available to you, Mr Griffiths?

15 There were three documents this morning, first

16 a two-page document consisting of a list of those

17 invited to the meeting with the objectives of the

18 meeting at the bottom of the first page. It is then

19 followed by what I think are bullet points of the

20 matters discussed at the meeting, a kind of informal

21 minute. Then after that there is a letter that you sent

22 to all staff, dated 22nd February.

23 DAC GRIFFITHS: Yes.

24 MR THWAITES: The point of interest here I think, sir, is

25 when, by reference to the tragic events surrounding the

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1 death of Victoria Climbie, did the police make the

2 decision to form a new department for child protection?

3 I know that is a question that you have been asked about

4 on a number of occasions. And I think that by

5 coincidence, Mr Griffiths, in relation to the death of

6 Victoria, these documents show that that matter was

7 discussed on 16th February, under cover of the first

8 document, "Meeting of the ACPO Command Team and advisers

9 to consider the way forward for the new grouping". This

10 is a change in organisation again, is it not; back to

11 the centre, in part --

12 DAC GRIFFITHS: Yes.

13 MR THWAITES: -- in anticipation of the way that the new

14 Commissioner was going to go forward. And under the

15 objectives of the meeting, point number 1:

16 "To develop a shared understanding of the mission,

17 vision and values for the new command."

18 If we go to the second document, do we find there

19 that on the fifth page, the penultimate page in the

20 bundle, that Commander Howlett was requested under CPT,

21 including early view of the future structure of the

22 CPTs, that was she requested to examine the viability of

23 the creation of a new department that has become SO5?

24 DAC GRIFFITHS: She was, Chairman.

25 MR THWAITES: We know that that was carried forward I think

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1 if you go to the following page, we see you had weekly

2 business meetings in connection with this project. Is

3 that right?

4 DAC GRIFFITHS: Yes, we set up that we would meet every week

5 and pursue all of the projects that we had initiated.

6 MR THWAITES: You informed all staff in the letter of 22nd

7 February of changes afoot but not in detail, but of the

8 fact that there were new developments and structures but

9 it should still be business as usual.

10 DAC GRIFFITHS: Yes.

11 MR THWAITES: And that new department was launched in July

12 of 2000?

13 DAC GRIFFITHS: It was.

14 MR THWAITES: So the Inquiry understands the context,

15 although work on that was no doubt accelerated and

16 properly accelerated following the death of Victoria,

17 the concept had been agreed prior to her death and work

18 was in hand, by extraordinary coincidence very close to

19 the day she died. It may represent too little to help

20 her but it was something the police were actively acting

21 on.

22 DAC GRIFFITHS: Chairman I obviously adopt that analysis but

23 the point is that we had a game plan around servicing

24 child protection across London in the new structure and

25 I think that is entirely consistent with the plan that

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1 we already had as crime commanders. There is an

2 exception, which is Haringey CPT, and to some extent

3 I believe North West OCUs with its different structure.

4 But otherwise, the Met was fully committed and I think

5 this demonstrates that commitment.

6 MR THWAITES: Thank you very much Mr Griffiths, it is all

7 I want to ask.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Just a couple of points from me, please.

9 Have you read all of the evidence from the officers in

10 the Metropolitan Police that have been before us so far?

11 DAC GRIFFITHS: Chairman I have attempted to keep up by way

12 of briefings but it has not been possible for me to read

13 every word of evidence, but I have a very good

14 flavour --

15 THE CHAIRMAN: You have a gist of it?

16 DAC GRIFFITHS: I have sir, yes.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: I ask that question because I am so old now

18 that I know in most organisations there is a gap often

19 between what the senior staff think is the reality of

20 life and what the junior staff think is the reality of

21 life. I have to say that your evidence strikes me as

22 rather more than a gap between what the junior officers,

23 more junior officers have given to this Inquiry and what

24 you are saying is the Metropolitan Police in respect of

25 child protection. Can you explain why there is what

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1 I think is a huge difference?

2 DAC GRIFFITHS: It is self-evidently very different from

3 what the people working, the colleagues in Highgate were

4 feeling, from what I have described to you. Now what

5 I have done is describe the strategic intention,

6 I believe, of the restructuring, the way the

7 Commissioner set up policy portfolios, Mr Johnston and

8 so on.

9 But I have also given you a benchmark I hope of what

10 was happening in another quarter of London and I think

11 I invite you to make a comparison there, because I think

12 what was happening in my part of London -- because

13 I cannot really speak for what they actually did in

14 north west London. I was not working there and I do not

15 know any of the colleagues who came up in this Inquiry.

16 It is very different and I would point to the fact that,

17 if you had similar discussions from colleagues coming

18 from that part of the London, you may have had

19 a different response. But there is a fundamental point

20 of how we communicate what is going on and I think we

21 are all guilty of not disclosing enough what the game

22 plan is to junior colleagues and I think we have got

23 a lot better at that. That is why I put that letter to

24 you, you see, this morning.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: I am grateful to you. Are you familiar with

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1 a report that Detective Chief Superintendent Kelleher

2 produced on 14th September 2000? If you would like to

3 see it I can direct your attention to it. There is one

4 bit of it I want to read to you.

5 DAC GRIFFITHS: Of course I am familiar with it because

6 I commissioned it. There will be a dichotomy there, but

7 please read the passage and I will deal with it.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: He says:

9 "Child protection teams have become the Cinderella

10 of the Metropolitan Police Service ... they have been

11 under-resourced ..."

12 He goes on to say at one stage: "child protection

13 teams have suffered ten years of neglect."

14 That is not the message you have tried to give the

15 Inquiry this afternoon.

16 DAC GRIFFITHS: Derek Kelleher has written a report which is

17 meant to be as demanding as it can be. I think it is

18 accurate with respect to the fact that they have not

19 grown, the feeling in some parts are of a Cinderella

20 organisation. What I do not accept is that that was the

21 totality of it. Now that report was clearly meant to

22 generate impetus around getting more resources for child

23 protection. You know, he is charged with setting up

24 a new department. He knows about Victoria's death by

25 this time, he knows that there is a fault line in at

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1 least one part, and my task to him was that we have to,

2 you know, get things for this new department. So, you

3 know, I think he has painted the gloomiest picture

4 possible.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Is it possible that you have painted the

6 rosiest picture possible?

7 DAC GRIFFITHS: It is entirely possible, Chairman but I am

8 here before you on oath. I have integrity. I have

9 described accurately what I believe to be the position.

10 I would consider my position if you felt that I had

11 misled you in any personal way.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: It is just that -- I am not suggesting you

13 have mislead me, I am just trying to reconcile things

14 that may, on the face of it, be irreconcilable. I am

15 not sure you are familiar with the evidence that is to

16 come before us from Miss Howlett but if I can just quote

17 a little section of her evidence, she says:

18 "Following the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, child

19 protection teams were plundered in order to increase

20 numbers of personnel on murder investigation teams."

21 And she sets out what she believes was the extent of

22 the plunder.

23 DAC GRIFFITHS: As Commander Howlett, she was reporting to

24 me, so yes, we have discussed this. What we did not do

25 was prepare our evidence together, so you are going to

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1 get differences and different perspectives. Now she was

2 told that they had been plundering. I have said where

3 is the evidence of that, and I cannot find it. She

4 tells me it is anecdotal and she can tell you personally

5 how she came by that evidence but I have looked at the

6 figures, I cannot see plundering. Certainly not because

7 of Stephen Lawrence, because if there was plundering it

8 was of divisions.

9 Several hundred detectives were moved from divisions

10 into murder investigation. They were not moved from

11 child protection into murder investigation. Now what

12 may have happened is because this was an open

13 invitation, equal opportunities and all of that, some

14 colleagues may have applied for those jobs. So the

15 perception may be that they have moved because of the

16 growth, but I would like to think that those posts were

17 then replaced. What we cannot do is nail down where

18 this has occurred.

19 Now I am very responsible about this and if it were

20 the case I would acknowledge it. I have described to

21 you the cuts that went in. It may well have affected

22 numbers in a small way but plundering does not describe

23 what went on in my opinion.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Fine. You said that the Metropolitan Police

25 deserved credit for pioneering a great deal in child

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1 protection teams and in protecting them in the time of

2 substantial cuts and that the work of child protection

3 teams was very highly valued in the force, but you have

4 also said in answer to Mr Thwaites that the

5 investigation in the case of Victoria, did not get from

6 A to B. How would you explain that?

7 DAC GRIFFITHS: I cannot explain why a constable might not

8 perform the duty that we expect them to perform. That

9 is a matter for the constable concerned. Of course

10 I have to look at this in the strategic way. If we

11 accept that error can occur with individuals, then we

12 must build systems that the -- checks and balances that

13 are going to detect the error. My perspective is that

14 the checks and balances were not evident or were

15 defective at that team. The mechanisms above that, the

16 field manager role with the DCI, the accountability role

17 of the Detective Chief Superintendent, the drilling down

18 role of the Commander, have clearly not picked up the

19 potential risk of officers who clearly do not understand

20 how to go about the core role of investigating crime.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: And how could that have happened?

22 DAC GRIFFITHS: The problem with that question, Chairman, is

23 that I asked myself exactly the same question when

24 I heard, because it shattered everything I understood to

25 be in place. So I am as interested in the answer to

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1 that question as this Inquiry is, I am sure. What

2 I have done is to look at what were the sort of events

3 that were sort of simultaneously moving along that

4 conspired to make this happen.

5 The three things I did -- well, I initiated

6 Operation Blue Martin. I needed to understand what had

7 happened. That was a factual report which could not

8 interview the officers. On the basis of that

9 I commissioned and instigated a discipline

10 investigation, and internal Inquiry, and that is

11 ongoing. So I am in some difficulty about making

12 judgments there. I initiated the strategic review by

13 Mrs Howlett right across the police and said look at

14 detective mix because I am very concerned about that and

15 that is in the minute I wrote to her.

16 The third thing I commissioned was the review of the

17 work for the whole of Haringey because I needed to know

18 have they got a regime of incompetence or was this an

19 aberration? Now that report does not fill me with much

20 joy because clearly there were serious problems with at

21 least one individual and that was not picked up by those

22 that are meant to pick these things up. How that

23 happens, it may be something to do with the structure of

24 that CPT, the mix of that CPT, the leadership of that

25 CPT, or a combination of those things. I wish I knew

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1 the answer.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: All right then. Well, what do you think of

3 the performance of the Brent CPT?

4 DAC GRIFFITHS: I have concerns about the performance there.

5 We did not know about Brent until a little while later

6 so those reviews that I put in were -- I did not

7 encompass Brent. Once we knew that Victoria had come

8 into the purview there we of course looked at that.

9 That was again indicative. I do not think -- I do not

10 want to make a value judgment -- I will not make

11 a judgment. It is an error.

12 Everyone must be seen as a victim, every crime scene

13 visited certainly when it comes to assaults. Things

14 happened that should not have happened. There were

15 perhaps some mitigating factors around that case but

16 nevertheless that suggested to me that the area

17 structure had some faults in it and I have highlighted

18 appendix O to this Inquiry.

19 I do not know if this Inquiry had spotted it before.

20 I had not and it is a matter of personal regret that

21 I had not because had I seen the ratio of detective to

22 uniform in North West, I would have done something about

23 it. I would have brought it to the attention of that

24 area and I would have brought it to the attention of my

25 Assistant Commissioner who could have spoken to his

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1 fellow Assistant Commissioner. I think the mix and

2 structures had some risks inherent in them. I do not

3 know if that would have made a difference either way but

4 I certainly spotted risk there.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: You see if you put together the officers

6 involved in the Brent CPT and the officers involved in

7 Haringey CPT, there are quite a number of officers. You

8 cannot legislate for an individual not getting something

9 right but organisationally it is a matter of concern, is

10 it not?

11 DAC GRIFFITHS: Of course it is Chairman. We want to know

12 what is being done. We have taken some measures.

13 Clearly we are not going to wait for your conclusions

14 we, are moving to what needs fixing. We have to fix

15 those things for day-to-day policing, day-to-day care of

16 children. We have put those fixes in. But I also say

17 I do not see it has condemned every child protection

18 officer working in Haringey nor every child protection

19 officer working at Brent. Nor has it condemned as

20 I understand it either of the officers who had dealing

21 with Victoria, condemned them out of sight.

22 I think overall people were working diligently,

23 working very hard, under a lot of pressure. Those

24 pressures may have contributed to their decision-making

25 that went in. I mean, clearly they were not good

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1 decisions that were taken. Was that on the basis of

2 assumptions that they had made? Clearly that is the

3 case with Brent; assumptions were made that were not

4 checked and tested. That is the high risk area of

5 decision-making and there was no information sought

6 about what they did not know.

7 Now that is a generic problem that we have to fix

8 and we are doing that through critical incident

9 training. We are training everybody to challenge again,

10 to look very hard at these early decisions that

11 Michael Craik talked about treating meningitis. I think

12 it is a very good model. It is a model that we have

13 used because how do you spot the one that needs to get

14 hold of, the one that is risky and dangerous for the

15 individual?

16 THE CHAIRMAN: My questions are, and the questions that have

17 been put to you this afternoon, are about gaining an

18 understanding, not about condemning individuals or the

19 organisation, but it is hard to understand and I think

20 that you referred to Mr Craik and guess you were here

21 while Mr Craik gave his evidence. Mr Craik described

22 the process that should have followed in both child

23 protection teams as, if I remember the phrase not quite

24 rightly, but "standard cop work".

25 DAC GRIFFITHS: These were grave crimes but we must not

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1 confuse gravity with complexity. I think grave crimes

2 can become complex but the basic ingredients of assault

3 are very easy and straightforward to deal with. You

4 want the victim, the victim's account, you want the

5 medical evidence that supports the account, you want to

6 visit the scene and retrieve evidence there and then you

7 move on to suspects and so on. These are basic steps

8 that are probably taught in lesson two at recruit

9 school: First steps at the report of a crime.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Absolutely.

11 DAC GRIFFITHS: That is what troubles us, about whether they

12 were trained, whether they had detective skills or

13 whatever, that they could and should have done their

14 basic policing job.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: That is what I am struggling to understand as

16 to why the basics, not the sophisticated, not the

17 overcomplicated but the basics were not addressed by the

18 Metropolitan Police in the case of Victoria.

19 DAC GRIFFITHS: There is a fundamental flaw in the way in

20 which those officers were operating. There is a fault

21 line there and I think in the opening it would say

22 something about Haringey CPT. There may well be

23 something that makes it different from the way other

24 CPTs were and are operating, and it may be that quite

25 large proportions of that CPT were operating

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1 effectively. I have questions in my mind about it but

2 I do not condemn everyone who works there.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: No, neither do I but you will understand that

4 I am also interested in Brent CPT.

5 DAC GRIFFITHS: I am aware of that, Chairman, and there are

6 other symptoms there which you are entitled to draw the

7 conclusion that this was systematic, this was not an

8 aberration. You are entitled to draw that conclusion.

9 What I say about that is: there was this difference

10 in north west London. I have had some thoughts about

11 why it is like that, if you would like me to assist you,

12 but I am conscious of the fact I am giving full answers.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: The difficulty is, is it not, that I have to

14 make my judgment about phase 1 of this Inquiry on what

15 actually happened to Victoria and to try and understand

16 why it has happened.

17 DAC GRIFFITHS: Of course, I do understand that Chairman and

18 I want to assist that process as best I can. If I can

19 enlighten you in any way, because I am probably the one

20 person coming here who has all this corporate memory,

21 and I have perhaps elaborated on it too much for your

22 taste but it is important that the Inquiry has an

23 understanding of what was going on, the operating

24 context and so on.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: I have put my questions. If there is

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1 anything more you would like to say that you think might

2 help me in trying to reconcile some of these issues, of

3 course I will be glad to hear from you.

4 DAC GRIFFITHS: Sir, before the 1994 restructuring the Child

5 Protection Team that covered Haringey was sited at

6 Southgate. They were a skills mix of CID and uniformed

7 officers on a 1 to 2 basis that was common throughout

8 London, because the staff inspection in 1992 shows that.

9 When the restructuring came in one of the boundary

10 changes that came in was the difference between Area 2

11 and Area 3 ran through between Enfield and Haringey.

12 That meant that that team had to be split. It looks to

13 me as if the detective stayed at Enfield, the other

14 colleagues went to Highgate. That may have been

15 something to do with personal preferences and so on, but

16 of course somebody should have looked at that.

17 I think they had one detective when the 1998

18 inspection went in. Once that detective moved on there

19 were not any. And please believe me that I am not

20 ascribing cause and effect to the absence of a detective

21 to this tragedy. I am not saying that, but I am saying

22 it is an ingredient you might want to consider.

23 Now I have been curious about that and that is what

24 made me look at appendix O in some detail. I did my

25 sums and you can see that the ratio is 1 to 10 in North

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1 West Area. Accounting for that, that takes you back to

2 when that OCU was set up, what the legacy that they

3 inherited and what then happened to the mix, the way

4 they deployed detectives on that area.

5 Now the fact that it is different perhaps should

6 have been picked up. I certainly have asked myself why

7 did I not pick it up and I feel personally very

8 conscious of that. You know, I did not read that

9 appendix and I may have done something.

10 I am not saying it would have made a difference at

11 all, but the way we used to approach this on Area 4 is

12 that there are lots of freedoms now with devolvment and

13 that is how it should be; which is to say, tight on

14 what, loose on how. Because the way in which you

15 deliver has to be local choice, but the "what" is

16 determined by the centre. You have lots of freedoms but

17 it is only the freedom to succeed. And part of my role

18 was drilling down, constantly looking, reading across,

19 I would be visiting, I would be calling for thematic

20 reports, I would send the inspectors in, I would be

21 listening all the time to pick up trouble. You cannot

22 rely on junior colleagues to tell you what is wrong, you

23 have to go and find it, in my opinion.

24 It is about tone and style of leadership. Now that

25 may have been different, I do not know, I did not work

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1 there.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Griffiths for

3 that. Ms Gibson?

4 MS GIBSON: Yes, I have no further questions. If

5 Mr Griffiths could be released now.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Griffiths.

7 MS GIBSON: I should mention that Miss Lawson has indicated

8 that she has one very short submission to make in

9 relation to Gina Adamou's evidence from this morning.

10 MISS LAWSON: Yes, sir. As you know, I know how to make

11 myself popular on a Friday afternoon.

12 I am concerned about some of the questions that you

13 put to Mrs Adamou this morning, suggesting there was

14 a level of disharmony between senior officers in

15 Haringey which had a negative impact on the delivery of

16 Children's Services during the relevant period.

17 You made the point that if that were the case it

18 would be a very serious matter and intimated that you

19 would draw an inference that that was the case from the

20 way that Miss Adamou answered your questions.

21 All of the relevant officers involved have now given

22 their evidence to this Inquiry. Mr Singh and

23 Miss Richardson were asked about the relationship

24 between the Management Team and spoke about it in very

25 similar terms to Mrs Adamou i.e. that there were

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1 obviously disagreements from time to time but no more

2 than you would expect from people fighting their corner.

3 But this serious and very different matter was not,

4 I think, raised with any of them nor with any of the

5 other officers involved so as to give them the

6 opportunity to deal with it. Indeed, I do not think it

7 has been suggested that that was the case in this

8 Inquiry until today.

9 I am not aware that there has been any written or

10 oral evidence so far to suggest that that was the case.

11 I am perfectly prepared to acknowledge that I may have

12 missed it or it may indeed be that there is further

13 evidence which has yet to reach us.

14 If not then my request to you, and I would ask in

15 the interest of the fairness to which you have so often

16 said you are committed, that the factual basis for such

17 a serious allegation ought to be both transparent and

18 capable of being tested on Haringey's behalf and

19 I therefore request that if there is any information

20 upon which those questions were based, that it could be

21 supplied to us as soon as possible.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I think, if I remember rightly

23 but I will check this, that I asked both Mr Singh and

24 Miss Richardson about the nature of the relationships in

25 Haringey.

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1 MISS LAWSON: Yes, you did, and they gave you the answers.

2 The answer from Mr Singh was that it was:

3 "Generally a positive one, although clearly

4 inevitably in a local authority where resources are

5 tight there is competition for resources and that ...

6 people clearly seeing their budgets cut and other

7 budgets not being cut, there is always difficulties.

8 Whilst ... I mean the whole philosophy of the authority

9 has been to manage its affairs the way corporate

10 management groups and directors are meant to be

11 operating corporately. ... But I do not think that was

12 in any way out of line with that which you would expect,

13 given those circumstances."

14 And when you asked Miss Richardson the question,

15 "What were the relationships like in the chief officer's

16 Management Team at the time", she said:

17 "Mixed I think would be the fair description. In

18 the sort of situation that we were in there was a fair

19 amount of trying to protect the territory, and I think

20 that is not unusual in corporate management teams, and

21 make sure that your group and staff were not treated

22 disproportionately poorly or whatever else. There were

23 clearly some tensions around the Education agenda. But

24 in broad terms, the one thing that I think we agreed

25 about is that we had to sign up to the step change in

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1 performance that Haringey needed to make. I do not

2 think there was anybody in that Management Team that did

3 not believe that that was important and what was needed

4 to be done."

5 I simply make the point, sir, that you never moved

6 beyond that to the suggestion that there was

7 a disharmony which had an impact on the Children's

8 Services.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: And I would not have done so this morning had

10 the response from the witness been along the tip of the

11 lines that you have indicated from the other witnesses.

12 But I felt that the witness was actually having some

13 difficulty in answering the question so I was wanting to

14 try and find out why that difficulty was, and in the end

15 I had to say: "Well, I will have to make my own judgment

16 on that matter."

17 MISS LAWSON: Yes, sir. As I say, I make quite clear: if

18 the matter rests where the evidence that we have already

19 had rests, then so be it. But I was very concerned that

20 you seemed to be implying something which, as I say, you

21 yourself described as a very serious matter in respect

22 of which there appeared to me to have been no evidence.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Well I am grateful to you for your help,

24 Miss Lawson. What I will say is: I have a very strong

25 commitment to ensuring that whatever is in the report is

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1 supported by the evidence that has been given to the

2 Inquiry and I will try to hold very much to that.

3 MISS LAWSON: I am obliged, sir.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I think that you had some other

5 business, did you, Ms Gibson?

6 MS GIBSON: Yes. There are just four statements to read, at

7 the risk of making myself incredibly unpopular on Friday

8 afternoon.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: I would be grateful if you did it and then we

10 will be able to rise.

11 MS GIBSON: These are the four statements from the NSPCC.

12 Firstly, Neil Hunt's statement which appears at

13 volume 3, page 133.601.

14 He is currently the Director of Child Protection at

15 the NSPCC and during 1999 he was the Programme Director,

16 Child Protection. In his statement he sets out the

17 history of the NSPCC's involvement with the Tottenham

18 Family Centres and outlines his involvement once he

19 became aware that Victoria had been referred to the

20 Family Centre. He states that during the criminal trial

21 of Manning and Kouao a further search of NSPCC records

22 was carried out which showed that Victoria had been

23 referred to the NSPCC.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

25 MS GIBSON: Next, Anna Ieronimou's statement which appears

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1 at volume 3, page 134.

2 During 1999 she was employed as a Family Centre

3 Officer, Moria Close. She recalls that the centre was

4 always under pressure to take on more work. She took

5 the telephone referral on 5th August 1999 and she says,

6 from looking at the form there was nothing to suggest

7 the referral was urgent. She wrote "IA" on the form

8 which signified that she recommended an initial

9 assessment. She had no further involvement with the

10 case.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

12 MS GIBSON: Next, Barry Graham. He has provided two

13 statements to the Inquiry. His first statement appears

14 at volume 3, page 118.501. He is the Director of

15 Education and Community Services at the NSPCC. His

16 statement deals with the actions taken by them,

17 following Victoria's death. Following identification of

18 their involvement with Victoria, an urgent management

19 review was conducted. It became apparent that there

20 were a number of problems with the database used by the

21 Family Centre, in that it did not allow searches to be

22 made across misspellings or state precisely when opening

23 and closing of the case occurred. A new database is

24 being constructed to resolve these issues. He goes on

25 to deal in detail with the background to the operation

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1 of the Tottenham Family Centres and interagency

2 relationships. In the light of what happened in this

3 case the NSPCC has taken action to review all its

4 service level agreements. He states that the way in

5 which Victoria's referral was taken did not fall within

6 NSPCC agreed principles. Clarification of the referral

7 should have taken place within 24 hours of receiving the

8 original message. The statement concludes with

9 a section on lessons learned.

10 Then turning to his second statement, that appears

11 at volume 3, page 118.510. He deals with the Inquiry's

12 request for further information regarding documents

13 which arose during the course of evidence on

14 20th December last year. He states that original NSPCC

15 documents were anonymised in February 2001 as part of

16 the NSPCC's management review of the Society's

17 involvement with Victoria. That was done in such a way

18 as to preserve the integrity of the original documents.

19 He states that he was told that the original documents

20 were lost, possibly destroyed. However, following

21 Sylvia Henry's assertion in evidence that she had seen

22 both versions, he made some telephone calls and was able

23 to obtain the original documents. He clarifies that the

24 NSPCC's involvement became clear when a search was made

25 against the address 267 Somerset Gardens rather than

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1 against the name Manning. He exhibits various entries

2 from the Centre's database. One of those entries was

3 amended and marked "no further action" on 15th March

4 2000. Mr Graham believes this was part of the file

5 closure process, leading up to the closure of the Moria

6 Close centre.

7 Thank you sir.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed, Ms Gibson, that

9 is very helpful. I am most grateful to you. Ladies and

10 gentlemen, we will now --

11 MS GIBSON: Yes, resume on Tuesday.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: -- adjourn the proceedings until 10 o'clock

13 on Tuesday morning. I am very grateful to you indeed.

14 Thank you very much.

15 (4.00 pm)

16 (Hearing adjourned until 10 am on Tuesday,

17 22nd January 2002)

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