Archived Transcript for 18 December 2001: Pages 101 to 150

101



1 MR SINGH: Yes.

2 MR GARNHAM: So at the time that the review was being

3 conducted, the Social Services and Housing departments

4 were being run as a single directorate?

5 MR SINGH: Surely.

6 MR GARNHAM: But there was already in the offing plans to

7 split them?

8 MR SINGH: Yes.

9 MR GARNHAM: You tell us correctly, paragraph 19 of your

10 statement if you want to see it, that the Joint Review

11 was full of praise for the joint directorate and the

12 Joint Review identified a number of benefits to service

13 users of a combined directorate. Go to page 28 if you

14 will in that bundle.

15 MR SINGH: Sorry, which bundle?

16 MR GARNHAM: 15A.

17 MR SINGH: I have got my statement.

18 MR GARNHAM: You have also been given I hope 15A. Page 28

19 first of all. 15A/028 is the cover sheet for the Joint

20 Review. Will you go to page 92. Paragraph 4.7, first

21 sentence:

22 "An impression gained throughout the fieldwork was

23 the value of a combined Housing and Social Services

24 Directorate."

25 MR SINGH: Yes.

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1 MR GARNHAM: Then if you go down to the last bullet on that

2 page they set out some of the examples of the benefit of

3 a combined directorate and in the last bullet:

4 "Finally and most tellingly there have been two

5 independent valuations of Housing and Social Services

6 interfaced by District Auditor and Bristol University on

7 behalf of DTR. Both report on the benefit to the users

8 of a merged Social Services and Housing directorate with

9 complimentary housing investment strategies and

10 community care plans and effective joint planning

11 supporting joint commissioning and collaborative

12 operational policies. Both reports identify areas for

13 improvement but mainly refer to the positive benefits."

14 MR SINGH: Yes.

15 MR GARNHAM: Over the page, paragraph 4.8, we have the

16 description of redirecting the work of the service. Do

17 we find there any reference to the plan to split the two

18 directorates?

19 MR SINGH: No is the answer to that.

20 MR GARNHAM: While we are looking --

21 MR SINGH: I do not think so.

22 MR GARNHAM: I have not seen it but may have missed it.

23 MR SINGH: It has been a long time since I looked at this

24 report.

25 MR GARNHAM: Go back to page 45. I am looking at the middle

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1 paragraph, the one that begins:

2 "The service is in the throes of significant

3 organisational change. The rationale for such change

4 has been explained. In the view of the Joint Review

5 team it is entirely appropriate."

6 They describe that in some detail, then at the end

7 of that paragraph:

8 "Equally important to acknowledge are the benefits

9 of a combined Housing and Social Services Directorate.

10 There was evidence throughout the review of how joined

11 up services prove beneficial to individual service users

12 as well as being supportive of wider strategic

13 initiatives."

14 I have not seen anything but I could easily have

15 missed it where the Joint Review acknowledge that it was

16 the intention of Haringey to split Housing and Social

17 Services and that in a report that repeatedly points out

18 the benefits of the two departments working together.

19 Can you help us with why that should be so?

20 MR SINGH: I cannot actually. I cannot tell you why the

21 Review did not look at that. Presumably the matter

22 logically was not raised with the Review. That is the

23 only conclusion I can arrive at.

24 MR GARNHAM: That was the conclusion I was inching towards.

25 MR SINGH: But I cannot help you as to how that happened.

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1 MR GARNHAM: It is curious, is it not, that during the

2 course of the review process, and particularly because

3 I imagine there had been a feedback session at the end

4 of the review, there normally is?

5 MR SINGH: Yes.

6 MR GARNHAM: That when the reviewers were making so much of

7 the benefits of the joint department that no one said to

8 them actually we are going to split them up.

9 MR SINGH: I was in fact debriefed by the lead inspector for

10 the review with the leader of the Authority and whilst

11 we had a very useful discussion the principal focus of

12 that from our concern was much more about what are the

13 weaknesses that we need to address. We did not get into

14 a real discussion about their perceived benefits of the

15 merger of the two departments.

16 MR GARNHAM: You did not realise their emphasis on that

17 until you got the report?

18 MR SINGH: Yes.

19 MR GARNHAM: It is interesting that they see as one of the

20 key strengths of the department, page 46 in our bundle,

21 one of the key strengths under "Managing Resources" is

22 Housing and Social Services Directorate planning

23 together to benefit service users. It all sounds

24 splendid, whereas the truth is you were going to split

25 them up.

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1 MR SINGH: Split them up, yes. I mean all I can say to this

2 Inquiry is my understanding of what the intentions were,

3 and the intention was to split the two departments up.

4 It was principally driven as I have said about the need

5 for investment, although I think subsequently the

6 Government may have changed the rules on that and there

7 may therefore be further changes to that but the key

8 driver for that change was actually the need to invest.

9 MR GARNHAM: Two questions spring from looking at this

10 report as far as my questioning of is you concerned.

11 First of all why did the Council press ahead with the

12 decision to split the two departments when the Joint

13 Review was acknowledging the benefit of keeping them

14 together?

15 MR SINGH: Because there was imperative to invest in stock

16 and if you have got --

17 MR GARNHAM: And that is more important, was it, than

18 maintaining the benefit identified in this review of the

19 two being together?

20 MR SINGH: The reality is that you have to weigh up the

21 benefits of both. You have to say on the one hand these

22 are the benefits of a merged organisation, which were

23 clearly matters which the Council had accepted as long

24 ago as 1993 because that is why it merged the two

25 departments, but on the other hand there was this

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1 imperative to secure investment in public sector housing

2 stock and --

3 MR GARNHAM: It might sound like it was the need for cash

4 driving over the benefits of an arrangement that was

5 producing benefit.

6 MR SINGH: No, I think you have got that completely wrong.

7 There were no financial benefits accruing to the

8 department's revenue position arising out of stock

9 transfer. Might I say that absolutely clearly. As far

10 as I am concerned there were no financial benefits to

11 the Authority.

12 MR GARNHAM: So the benefits were purely to tenants, were

13 they?

14 MR SINGH: The benefits were investment in the physical

15 fabric of the stock. Now, clearly all of that was

16 dependent upon tenants actually agreeing that was

17 a sensible way to proceed, but I may have it wrong but

18 it is not my understanding that there were any benefits

19 whatsoever around stock transfer.

20 MR GARNHAM: It was not a prerequisite of stock transfer

21 that there should be two departments, was there, because

22 Ealing for example appeared to have managed it with

23 a single department. Was it a prerequisite?

24 MR SINGH: No. There is no prerequisite for that but if you

25 are actually wanting to develop a strategy which says

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1 let us try and set up an arms length company to begin to

2 manage this as an option, then that would have to be at

3 arms length and it could therefore not be part of

4 a joint Housing Association department. Now, much of

5 this was early thinking in those days I have to admit.

6 The thinking was not sufficiently developed. It was an

7 intention in 1999 to move in this direction if stock

8 transfer was going to happen. The Council had already

9 taken a decision that stock transfer was inevitable but

10 the proposals were then still being worked out, but even

11 at the time that I left there was no absolute conclusion

12 to that.

13 MR GARNHAM: The second question that occurs to me from this

14 brief look at the Joint Review is whether you are able

15 to help us and show where it is that we can see that the

16 Joint Review were informed of the Council's intention

17 about splitting the two departments.

18 MR SINGH: I mean, I cannot. Unless it is actually within

19 the submission to the Review. I cannot recall but

20 I mean that is the only place -- well, that is at least

21 one potential place where that could actually be.

22 MR GARNHAM: I persisted with this question because normally

23 when I find myself in ignorance of this sort of matter

24 my learned friend Miss Lawson is on her feet to correct

25 me and point out where my error lies. She has not done

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1 so as yet.

2 MISS LAWSON: Try 15/152.

3 MR GARNHAM: Volume 15. You had better have this as well.

4 This is the part of the Haringey's position statement

5 which we have heard mention of already this morning.

6 I am looking first of all for where I find it here.

7 MISS LAWSON: "Are there any major ..." and the first bullet

8 point under 1.

9 MR GARNHAM: I am grateful to my friend. We see reference

10 there to "restructuring programme boards to align with

11 departments, three core strategic responsibilities for

12 community care, children and housing." Does that mean

13 splitting? It is not crystal clear to me.

14 MR SINGH: It is not crystal clear.

15 MR GARNHAM: It is not crystal clear to you either Mr Singh.

16 MR SINGH: I am under oath and therefore I have to say yes,

17 it is not crystal clear.

18 MR GARNHAM: Splendid. I do not know whether my learned

19 friend had another page she wanted me to take you to.

20 148 was it? 247. We are invited to look at:

21 "...~continuing to look for ways to maximise the

22 benefits of joint Housing and Social Services

23 Department."

24 Not immediately obvious why that supports the point

25 my learned friend was suggesting.

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1 MR SINGH: It is nearer.

2 MR GARNHAM: It is?

3 MR SINGH: Well.

4 MR GARNHAM: "... continuing to look for ways to maximise

5 the benefits of the joint Housing and Social Services

6 Department." I would have thought it points in

7 precisely the opposite direction.

8 MR SINGH: I accept that point.

9 MR GARNHAM: In any event it may be that others are better

10 able to deal with this than you or me but certainly

11 neither of us can find a reference that establishes that

12 the Joint Review were informed that the plan of the

13 Council was to split these two departments and it would

14 have been a little odd, would it not, if they had

15 proceeded on that understanding and then made no mention

16 of it in their report when they were discussing the

17 benefits of a unified department?

18 MR SINGH: Yes.

19 MR GARNHAM: Next topic, consultation as part of the

20 restructuring process. You tell us that a comprehensive

21 programme in a programme of briefings and consultations

22 with staff followed the decision to initiate this

23 restructuring process.

24 MR SINGH: Yes.

25 MR GARNHAM: Why did you regard that as necessary?

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1 MR SINGH: I mean, I think that there were two or three

2 general caveats for any restructuring. One is general

3 ownership by the Management Team itself to the

4 restructuring proposals. 2, ownership by members,

5 clearly they need to own the changes in structure which

6 are being proposed, but thirdly in a very serious

7 consultation with the whole organisation and the trade

8 unions because that I think is the only sensible way to

9 really get change delivered and you can talk about the

10 management of change.

11 MR GARNHAM: This is hearts and minds, is it?

12 MR SINGH: Yes, it is about consulting, selling the

13 proposals, informing staff accordingly, to ensure that

14 the levels of anxiety which inevitably flow from any

15 restructuring are actually ameliorated.

16 MR GARNHAM: There are two obvious benefits of proper

17 consultation. One you might get them on your side,

18 secondly if they you do not they will at least be

19 informed and prepared.

20 MR SINGH: Sure.

21 MR GARNHAM: Were you content with the consultation exercise

22 that was conducted in Social Services?

23 MR SINGH: I was content with that which I was informed was

24 actually happening and essentially I mean my

25 understanding at the time was that there was detailed

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1 team briefing, also the cascading system of team briefs,

2 through the whole organisation, that there were

3 individual team meetings through line management around

4 the restructuring proposals, that the Director and the

5 Assistant Directors themselves would actively go out to

6 talk to groups of staff, collective groups of staff,

7 that there were -- that there was a newsletter produced

8 service matters, there was even a staff survey going out

9 about the restructuring process. So in a sense there

10 appeared to be a series of activities proposed which

11 I felt dealt with the restructuring, the communications

12 issue.

13 MR GARNHAM: Was the impression that you gave that the staff

14 were happy that they were being consulted properly?

15 I am not suggesting they were necessarily happy about

16 the proposal but did you understand they were happy that

17 they were being properly consulted?

18 MR SINGH: In the absence of being told that they were not

19 unhappy I made the assumption they were. Perhaps that

20 is a wrong assumption.

21 MR GARNHAM: I want to test that assumption a little because

22 the evidence we have heard is that they most certainly

23 were not. Let me show you one or two of the documents,

24 28A first please, page 178.516. Memo of 24th June from

25 all staff at North Tottenham to Mary Richardson and

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1 copied to Dinos Kousoulou and Carol Wilson. The

2 information that is in this memo is at least reaching

3 the level beneath you. First paragraph:

4 "We are writing to express our dismay and distress

5 at the proposals that are being made to restructure this

6 department, proposals that we believe to be unnecessary,

7 shortsighted and potentially dangerous for the people to

8 whom we offer a service."

9 Over the page, 517, first full paragraph on that

10 page:

11 "Sadly the workers in this district office have

12 experienced at least two incidents where children have

13 died. Inquiries that have been held subsequent to these

14 deaths have pointed towards issues where improvement

15 could be made in both practice and procedure. We recall

16 very clearly one recommendation that was made from one

17 of these inquiries which stated that any change in the

18 structure of the department should be well organised and

19 should not occur during the summer months. Envisaged

20 that this would cause least disruption to staff, would

21 prevent low morale and provide supportive and safe

22 working environment for practitioners, ensuring that

23 mistakes are not made. It seems to us that the current

24 proposals are going completely against this. Not only

25 are we not being kept fully informed of what is

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1 happening but it appears that as each week passes

2 further cuts in posts are being recommended despite

3 workers having previously been reassured that their jobs

4 would not be affected."

5 On any view the expression of extremely serious

6 worry and unhappiness. Do you know about it?

7 MR SINGH: No.

8 MR GARNHAM: Would you not have expected to have been

9 informed by Mary Richardson of this sort of expression

10 of disquiet?

11 MR SINGH: Mary Richardson I mean did convey to me some

12 general concerns about staff in relation to

13 restructuring and there is no doubt about that.

14 MR GARNHAM: What were they?

15 MR SINGH: They were mainly the sort of levels of concern

16 which one would normally expect when you are promoting

17 change. Some people were unhappy, there were levels of

18 anxiety but it was nothing above and beyond that which

19 you would reasonably expect if you were restructuring

20 a department of this size.

21 MR GARNHAM: This is above and beyond that, is it not?

22 MR SINGH: I have not seen this before.

23 MR GARNHAM: But it is above and beyond what you would

24 normally expect to occur from a reasonably sensible

25 group of staff members in the course of an ordinary

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1 restructuring?

2 MR SINGH: I would expect clearly a director to look at this

3 with some serious concern and engage in a discussion

4 with the staff to establish what their concerns really

5 are.

6 MR GARNHAM: Page 169, same volume please. Memo two weeks

7 later from senior practitioners and team managers at

8 North Tottenham to Mary Richardson:

9 "We are writing to express our dismay and distress

10 at the proposals that are being made to restructure this

11 department. We believe the process of these proposals

12 are potentially dangerous and detrimental to the people

13 to whom we offer a service."

14 More or less precisely echoing the words of the

15 previous one, this one written two weeks later from

16 senior practitioners and team managers. It sounds as if

17 this is more than a transitory set of concerns.

18 MR SINGH: Yes.

19 MR GARNHAM: 178.501. That is about 10 pages forward in the

20 bundle, 26th July, so about another fortnight later,

21 letter from Union, Peter Lewington to Carol Wilson.

22 Last paragraph on page 501:

23 "It has to be said that these proposals have

24 generated a considerable amount of confusion, anger and

25 even distress in most quarters and I think there are

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1 good reasons for this. In situations such as this much

2 is often made of people not welcoming change usually by

3 management. Personally I do not accept this and I do

4 not think it becomes any more true by the frequent

5 repetition. I believe that people generally can and do

6 accept change quite readily and even embrace it given

7 the right circumstances", and he goes on to set out what

8 they are.

9 The impression that I suggest we should take from

10 this series of three memos is the repeated expressions

11 of serious unhappiness, serious worries about the

12 direction in which these restructuring proposals were

13 taking the department? Were you aware of them.

14 MR SINGH: No.

15 MR GARNHAM: Should you have been?

16 MR SINGH: It depends very much on how widespread the

17 concerns were. I have clearly seen those documents and

18 I am actually reading them. Therefore I do not know the

19 context of it. Nor do I know how management responded

20 to these three letters or memos.

21 MR GARNHAM: They did not always get replies.

22 MR SINGH: I mean, in the absence of not knowing how

23 widespread and in the absence of not knowing what sort

24 of response it is difficult to know whether -- you see,

25 I mean in theory there may well have been a response to

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1 this which was then accepted. Now, you are presumably

2 going to say "No, that is not the case" and most

3 certainly having read the stuff on the website that is

4 the case.

5 MR GARNHAM: You can see where I might get such a question

6 from.

7 MR SINGH: Absolutely right, but I mean most certainly if

8 this sort of issue were to remain as an issue of concern

9 within the department then clearly I would expect to be

10 informed about it.

11 MR GARNHAM: Because this at least on what you have seen so

12 far has the capacity to turn into a festering sore, does

13 it not?

14 MR SINGH: Yes.

15 MR GARNHAM: Which if not properly treated is likely to

16 cause real significant problems in a team.

17 MR SINGH: Yes.

18 MR GARNHAM: At which point if management are not dealing

19 with it quickly and efficiently locally it ought to come

20 up to you.

21 MR SINGH: Yes.

22 MR GARNHAM: Sir, I am about to move on to a related but

23 slightly discrete topic. I wonder whether this would be

24 a convenient moment to break.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed. This would be

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1 a very convenient moment to break. Mr Singh, the same

2 arrangements, you are not allowed to discuss your

3 evidence during this break. Ladies and gentlemen we

4 will break until 10 minutes to 2.

5 (1.05 pm)

6 (The short adjournment)

7 (1.50 pm)

8 MR GARNHAM: Mr Singh, before we pick up where we reached

9 this morning I wonder if I could just ask you to look

10 again at a memo I showed you this morning. 28A, please,

11 page 169. This is a memo to Mary Richardson from the

12 senior practitioners and team managers I showed you

13 before. Can you remember we were discussing the extent

14 to which you should have been made aware of this?

15 I think I ought to and omitted to show you the second

16 page, 28A/170. It begins:

17 "This matter [as described before] and the lack of

18 clarity is beginning to have an impact on the staff

19 morale and service users. Therefore, we are requesting:

20 (1) Written clarification of the details of the

21 proposals, clear time scales, clarifications on

22 department managers job description, scale, grade.

23 Clarification of the outcomes of people who are

24 unsuccessful in interviews. What options are available

25 for people who are not successful? What are the

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1 implications for the grade and salary of the

2 unsuccessful candidate? What are the implications for

3 managers and senior practitioners who have been in

4 temporary acting up positions?"

5 This is the sort of material, is it not, that ought

6 to have been conveyed to staff at an early stage in this

7 consultation process?

8 MR SINGH: Yes.

9 MR GARNHAM: They should not be having to ask questions

10 about this later on, should they?

11 MR SINGH: I say yes because -- but I do not know what

12 information was provided to staff.

13 MR GARNHAM: If it was not provided it should have been?

14 MR SINGH: You would expect a level of detail in this.

15 MR GARNHAM: Next preliminary point, 12A, page 186. You

16 remember, Mr Singh, telling me that after the Dobson

17 letter the KPIs were amended to incorporate the Dobson

18 material. I am just wondering whether this document,

19 the Children Strategy Board performance indicators

20 April/June 1989, was the document to which you were

21 referring?

22 MR SINGH: This is some of it. I thought it was more

23 specific.

24 MR GARNHAM: That was what I was going to ask you because

25 this, although it refers to some of the matters raised

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1 in the Dobson letter, certainly does not cover them all.

2 MR SINGH: It may well be that I have it wrong, that

3 I simply thought it covered the Dobson question or that

4 it is somewhere else. I do not simply know but it may

5 well be that I have that wrong.

6 MR GARNHAM: It would have been prudent, at the least, would

7 it not, for attempts to have been made to inform

8 councillors about the material raised in the Dobson

9 letter?

10 MR SINGH: It is my understanding that that is what actually

11 happened and that is why I am surprised the point is not

12 here.

13 MR GARNHAM: It does not appear to be here, although in part

14 this covers the odd points from the Dobson letter. But

15 it does not seem to cover it all and it may be that

16 I can invite Haringey solicitors to find this in any

17 other document to which you are referring.

18 MR SINGH: Sure.

19 MR GARNHAM: Thank you for that. Let us return then to the

20 restructuring process that we were discussing before.

21 How long was the restructuring process meant to take?

22 I suspect you will say it depends which bit I am talking

23 about.

24 MR SINGH: No, I think the -- it was meant to be phased over

25 a period of time. That is my recollection; that it was

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1 not going to be in one hit, it was going to be phased

2 over time. But the front end of it, the decisions about

3 the second tier and the third tier would be made --

4 I thought -- they were meant to have been made either

5 before the summer recess or immediately after the summer

6 recess.

7 MR GARNHAM: That had been the understanding of staff when

8 first they heard this but the matter appears to have

9 been pushed back and these sort of things do happen.

10 MR SINGH: Yes.

11 MR GARNHAM: But then it was pushed back so that the final

12 interviews that we have heard about did not take place

13 until the 20th December, in respect of Rose Kozinos.

14 But the bulk of the interviews appeared to be happening

15 in September/October time. That is a rather

16 protractural period, is it not?

17 MR SINGH: I do recall a discussion with the Director about

18 the whole question of timing, saying, "Look, what is the

19 pace at which we are moving to at least implement the

20 top level decisions?" And you know I did at one stage

21 express some disappointment at the speed at which it was

22 happening but there appeared to be legitimate reasons at

23 that time. I cannot say much more than that it was

24 a passing discussion.

25 MR GARNHAM: The consequence of that was the sense of

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1 uncertainty that was felt amongst social workers and

2 senior practitioners and team managers at

3 North Tottenham was prolonged throughout much of 1999

4 and that happens of course to be the period, principal

5 period when Victoria was in touch with that department.

6 We have been told on a number of occasions about the

7 consequences of this: the managers worried about their

8 jobs, whether they were going to lose their jobs,

9 managers having to spend time revising for interviews,

10 not being available to supervise, team managers

11 unsettled, loss of confidence in themselves, junior

12 members not having confidence in the team managers

13 because they do not know whether they are going to be

14 their team managers in six months time. Lots of junior

15 members uncertain whether their posts, in particular

16 senior practitioner posts were going to be affected or

17 not. This is a very unfortunate state of affairs to

18 allow a department to get into, is it not?

19 MR SINGH: Clearly any process which if it becomes

20 protracted has the potential clearly to lead to all the

21 sorts of things you are talking about. But I am not

22 sure what were the particular reasons or the

23 circumstances which led to that protraction. It may

24 well be there were perfectly legitimate serious reasons,

25 but I was not privy to an understanding of those.

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1 In a sense, my own sort of general involvement in

2 the departmental restructuring would actually be at the

3 top level: what are we actually doing about the overall

4 structure of the department, what is the overall vision

5 which underpins what we are trying to do, and what are

6 we doing at AD level? Beyond that, frankly, whilst

7 I would want to be kept generally informed about

8 progress, the details of it I really did not have.

9 Perhaps I should have done but I did not have.

10 MR GARNHAM: One can understand why you cannot be concerned

11 about the details on a daily basis at that sort of

12 level, but is it not essential that you are aware if

13 things are not going right?

14 MR SINGH: Yes. Clearly -- I mean the nature of any

15 management or in the nature of any business you are

16 dependent upon a relationship based upon trust, where

17 people you trust will actually let you know what is

18 happening.

19 MR GARNHAM: I confess a little concern about this concept

20 of trust. It is an idea we have had mentioned before

21 and I wonder if you could help us with precisely what

22 part it has to play in the management of an organisation

23 like this, because while I can well understand that you

24 have an expectation that certain things will happen, is

25 it not incumbent upon any decent manager to ensure that

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1 it does, not to content himself with reliance?

2 MR SINGH: It is a combination of both. You need systems

3 and procedures which enable to you abstract the

4 information or have information given to you which

5 enables to you make an assessment as to what is actually

6 happening. But on the other hand, you are also

7 dependent upon -- and I do not think it is actually

8 unusual, that any managerial relationship is based upon

9 trust. You cannot operate in senior positions within

10 any public sector organisation without being able to say

11 well actually our relationship is based on mutual trust.

12 I think that is a profound managerial principle that you

13 cannot simply ignore. The converse of that, that if

14 there is a breakdown of trust, that in itself is

15 sufficient to lead to a departure of the ways of

16 somebody or other.

17 MR GARNHAM: Is not the proper way to trust for the best but

18 plan for the worst?

19 MR SINGH: Yes, and that is why you trust people but you

20 also -- you develop or you have systems which enable you

21 to be able to act as -- checks and balances against that

22 which you have been told.

23 MR GARNHAM: That is really what I am suggesting to you was

24 not in place in Haringey at the time. I am sure you had

25 the trust and it may well be in large measure the trust

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1 was well placed. But there was not that check for the

2 worst.

3 MR SINGH: There were many, many checks. As I tried to say

4 earlier and perhaps not well, but I tried to give you

5 the impression that whilst systems were developing and

6 evolving we were moving very much in the right direction

7 around planning, around performance, around budget

8 controls et cetera et cetera. They were not absolute

9 but what we did not actually have were systems which

10 enabled me to assess how the restructuring programme was

11 being implemented. That simply was there not and I am

12 the first one to admit that.

13 MR GARNHAM: There was not even a process by which you could

14 get the flavour of how things were happening on the

15 ground?

16 MR SINGH: Other than through discussions with the director.

17 MR GARNHAM: Can I ask you to look at another document.

18 Volume 29, please. A memo from Dave Duncan written long

19 after you had left. Page 32, 26th September 2000 to

20 Carol Wilson, AD of the Children and Families

21 Department. Over the page, paragraph 5:

22 "I believe that the period between March 1999 and

23 November/December 1999 was a particularly unstable one

24 for the department and especially the districts. The

25 restructuring meant that in Tottenham 16 managers were

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1 to become three. This restructuring also took far

2 longer than was originally stated."

3 He appears to be looking back on things when he

4 writes this letter at the restructuring process and is

5 critical of it. When he gave evidence to us -- sir for

6 your note it is Day 33, page 37 -- he told us that his

7 view was that the process was flawed from the start.

8 That was not the view he had at the time, that was

9 a view he had looking back; that the whole process was

10 flawed. Do you see any merit in that view?

11 MR SINGH: No, because I still remain of the view that the

12 restructuring and the other changes that were being

13 introduced within the department were actually

14 appropriate. They were vital if not only the external

15 agenda was to be delivered but also the changes the

16 council was to introduce between each department would

17 actually happen.

18 So I still remain convinced that the strategy that

19 was set out in redirecting the work of the department

20 was still valid. I do not shift from that. What

21 I think on hindsight that I would actually accept was

22 that there were unfortunate delays in the process and

23 those delays were unfortunate and could well have

24 created difficulties. But I do not know precisely what

25 the nature, the causes for those delays actually were.

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1 MR GARNHAM: We are seeing Mary Richardson tomorrow so we

2 can ask her about that. Subject to an explanation for

3 the delays, you regard those delays as unfortunate and

4 you can see how they might have had the sort of

5 consequences that I have been putting to you?

6 MR SINGH: In the absence of nothing else being given to the

7 staff. I make the point again: I do not know and simply

8 do not have the information as to what precisely was

9 given to the workforce. I understood the general

10 principles of consultation but I did not know the

11 precise details that were given to staff.

12 MR GARNHAM: I have to suggest to you, Mr Singh, that the

13 restructuring process which you oversaw damaged staff

14 morale and increased the problem of staff retention,

15 staff wanting to leave because of the uncertainty that

16 existed. And that had as a consequence damage to the

17 quality of service teams like this were offering your

18 clients.

19 MR SINGH: I am not wholly convinced by that and I have

20 looked at the evidence that has been given to this

21 Inquiry. I am not wholly convinced by that because in

22 restructuring -- I think we also need to get this into

23 some sort of perspective: that the scale of the

24 restructuring was not that dramatic. I know that it

25 appears to be dramatic but actually a restructuring of

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1 an organisation which employees two and a half thousand

2 people, where you are perhaps talking about changes

3 which will probably impact on a number of people, you

4 know double figures essentially was not the sort of

5 restructuring that was that dramatic.

6 MR GARNHAM: That is true, I am sure, when you are sitting

7 in the chair that you occupy.

8 MR SINGH: Well, that is the chair I am occupying and that

9 is the view I am giving you.

10 MR GARNHAM: But the view I am asking you about and you have

11 to consider is the view of the people who are working on

12 the floor in an office like the North Tottenham District

13 Office. For them, the loss of three, four, five, six

14 managers from their office with the knock-on effects

15 that would have was dramatic.

16 MR SINGH: But I understood it that it was a reduction of

17 six to three but a replacement with another tier of

18 management.

19 MR GARNHAM: But there were people to lose their jobs. Some

20 people did lose their jobs, I think three from that

21 group of managers.

22 MR SINGH: Again I think that the management position from

23 what I understand it is that actually there were all

24 different employment opportunities for those very

25 people.

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1 MR GARNHAM: I do not think any were offered to

2 Carole Baptiste, to take one example.

3 MR SINGH: But we have discussed that before; that actually

4 there were other reasons we ended up in the situation we

5 did.

6 MR GARNHAM: That might be right but the difficulty is and

7 the difficulty that I suggest you are in is that people

8 do not know that. This process is dragging on for six

9 months or so, people do not know where their future lay

10 and that was something that was doing real damage to the

11 service that that team could offer.

12 MR SINGH: But I think you will recall that I have actually

13 accepted that protracted delays in implementation can

14 lead to demoralisation and all the other things you

15 mentioned and it is regrettable that those delays

16 happened but I do not know -- and Mary Richardson will

17 be the person who, I suspect, will be able to explain --

18 what the actual reasons were.

19 MR GARNHAM: Did you warn councillors of the consequences of

20 this? Were they aware that the process might become

21 protracted and might cause this sort of level of upset?

22 MR SINGH: The Social Services members would have received

23 regular reports to the Social Services Committee which

24 would have briefed them on regular updates.

25 MR GARNHAM: Would it have briefed them on the fact that

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1 there were delays and the fact that it was having this

2 knock-on effect on morale?

3 MR SINGH: Certainly the lead member or the chair of

4 Social Services or the lead member, because I now forget

5 when the precise system changed. I think by autumn of

6 1999 it would have been the Cabinet model that was

7 actually in place and therefore there had been

8 Social Services lead member plus deputy and others, that

9 they would have actually known about the programme for

10 implementation, and any delays which may have arisen

11 from that.

12 MR GARNHAM: Well we can look and see whether there is

13 evidence to support that assertion. Whether as a result

14 of the restructuring process or whether it is for some

15 other reason, I have to suggest to you that the systems

16 and working practices that were in place in the North

17 Tottenham District Office were not sufficient to ensure

18 that cases like Victoria's were dealt with properly, and

19 that ultimately you take the rap for that.

20 MR SINGH: And my response to that is that it is my

21 understanding that as a result of a clear re-examination

22 of all systems and working practices during the course

23 of 1998, that I was led to believe that their systems

24 were actually in place. It is also my belief that that

25 to a large extent was confirmed by the independent

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1 external review to the Joint Review. That is my

2 understanding.

3 MR GARNHAM: Let me turn if I may to terms and conditions of

4 employment of Social Services staff. These were I think

5 you have accepted unsettling times for staff during this

6 restructuring period; yes?

7 MR SINGH: Yes.

8 MR GARNHAM: Given that staff are unsettled in that way,

9 does it not seem to you a surprising time for new terms

10 and conditions to be suggested to employees that ended

11 up worsening their position?

12 MR SINGH: These were not actually terms and conditions

13 changes exclusively to Social Services.

14 MR GARNHAM: No.

15 MR SINGH: You will actually appreciate that -- I mean the

16 Council was forced in an extremely difficult financial

17 position where it was seeking, in response to the

18 comprehensive spending review which clearly had been

19 announced and the results of which had been announced

20 the previous Christmas, forced into looking at its

21 budgets very carefully, and that over three years it had

22 to find a reduction of 27 million.

23 Now that 27 million, because firstly the council tax

24 was one of the highest in London and secondly there was

25 still a clear indication from Government that it did not

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1 wish to see council tax rise above a certain threshold,

2 it actually left very little room for manoeuvre but to

3 either cut services or to find other ways of saving

4 money. There was no other option but to actually do

5 that. And that included looking at terms and

6 conditions.

7 Now, I think that we need to be absolutely clear

8 that three years prior to this occasion, as a result of

9 negotiations with the trade unions, the council was able

10 to secure a reduction in terms and conditions. We were

11 able to do so.

12 MR GARNHAM: Yes.

13 MR SINGH: The philosophy of that was to --

14 MR GARNHAM: When you say reduction in terms and conditions,

15 presumably you mean terms and conditions that proved

16 cheaper for the council, do you?

17 MR SINGH: Absolutely, a downward reduction. That was done

18 with agreement with the trade union movement because

19 there was a realisation on the part of the trade union

20 movement that actually if eventually it came to the

21 option of either reducing total number of jobs or terms

22 and conditions that they felt that that was a better --

23 not necessarily happy with -- but that was the better

24 route. That led to a sizeable reduction. On the basis

25 of that joint agreement the council made explicitly

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1 clear to the trade unions that it would not re-engage in

2 a discussion about terms and conditions for a three-year

3 period.

4 Three years later we find ourselves in

5 a conditioning financial difficulty and the aim of the

6 exercise was to engage in a discussion with the trade

7 unions, and if there were to be agreement then to

8 introduce those changes but only on the basis of

9 agreement. There was never an intention by the -- on

10 the part of the Authority to attempt to impose

11 a reduction in terms and conditions because I think you

12 know as well as I do the tearing up 10,000 people's

13 contracts is actually a difficult thing to do and that

14 we were not willing to engage in that particular

15 exercise.

16 So it was always an understanding that it would be

17 done on the basis of agreement, and actually the trade

18 union was split; the manual trade unions were saying yes

19 on the basis of -- you know, if the options are

20 reductions in the number of jobs or actually a reduction

21 in terms and conditions, we are happy to explore that.

22 Unison said no.

23 MR GARNHAM: It is a classic trade union nightmare choice.

24 MR SINGH: Yes, but these are real life choices. This is

25 the reality in which we operate.

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1 MR GARNHAM: I am not disagreeing with that but I am trying

2 to understand what it is that you and senior management

3 and councillors should have seen as a likely consequence

4 of this.

5 MR SINGH: There was no, with respect, large scale

6 demoralisation across the whole of Haringey Council.

7 There was no, if I may say so, large scale worker flight

8 from Haringey Council. Yes, the evidence emerges in

9 January as far as I am concerned that a number of social

10 workers were actually leaving and I think there are,

11 yes -- the terms and conditions debate may well have

12 contributed to that and yes I accept the point about the

13 exit interviews but there were also other factors, other

14 factors like 700 new jobs across London arising out of

15 Quality Protects. People able to secure high levels of

16 job, less stressful and therefore people moved into that

17 arena.

18 MR GARNHAM: But these were factors that you should have

19 been able to foresee. The reason why there was this

20 particular department hit so hard by the flight of

21 workers was because it was also this department that had

22 just gone through an uncomfortable restructuring

23 exercise.

24 MR SINGH: I have made my position I think reasonably clear

25 that in the grand scale of things the level of

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1 restructuring that was being imposed and implemented was

2 not actually massive. If you want to know about real

3 restructuring then you talk about the restructuring

4 I had to do where 2,000 workers had to go, 2,000 job

5 losses in one go. Now that is massive and major and

6 dramatic and has a real impact. But actually I have to

7 say that much of the philosophy of the redirecting of

8 work was actually more about changing the culture of the

9 organisation. Yes there were some job losses but it was

10 not that dramatic.

11 MR GARNHAM: It is the combined effect, is it not, on the

12 workforce that is already demoralised and demotivated by

13 the way in which this restructuring is being conducted,

14 then finding, just getting to the end of that, that

15 management are putting on the table proposals that will

16 have the effect of requiring them, as Dave Duncan put

17 it, to work longer hours for less money. Now it is

18 hardly surprising in those circumstances, is it, that

19 staff start to leave, especially when there are

20 opportunities elsewhere?

21 MR SINGH: Perhaps you are not suggesting, but most

22 certainly the whole issue about terms and conditions was

23 not just a Haringey issue, it was a matter which was

24 being discussed across many local authorities.

25 MR GARNHAM: But it is the coincidence of the suggestion of

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1 lower terms and conditions on the one hand against the

2 restructuring process that has upset and unsettled

3 people in Haringey and that is where it had bits that

4 produced the unfortunate consequences we know about.

5 MR SINGH: That is if you accept the proposition that the

6 principal reason for social worker flight was either out

7 of this debate about terms and conditions or about

8 restructuring. But I would actually suggest to you

9 there may well be other factors equally significant

10 about other career opportunities and the difficulties

11 that most London boroughs had and you are fully aware of

12 the fact that the London Association of Government had

13 flagged -- or did actually flag up that this was a broad

14 based problem across the whole of London.

15 MR GARNHAM: You are right, there were problems across

16 London with competition for social workers but you lost,

17 I think, 23 social workers in the space of six or seven

18 weeks.

19 MR SINGH: Yes.

20 MR GARNHAM: You are not suggesting, are you, that that was

21 a pattern that was replicated across London?

22 MR SINGH: I do not know what precisely was the pattern.

23 27, yes, is excessive.

24 MR GARNHAM: And it renders extremely difficult the

25 continued performance of your statutory functions, and

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1 when we look for the reasons that are especial to

2 Haringey to explain why that is happening, we see, do we

3 not, this coincidence of restructuring and then

4 immediately on top of that, to a workforce that are fed

5 up with the way their management have dealt with them,

6 offers of worst terms and conditions.

7 MR SINGH: And you totally ignore the fact there are 700 new

8 jobs across London. That has to be put into this frame,

9 within the scenario.

10 MR GARNHAM: But that is a common factor that is true of all

11 London boroughs.

12 MR SINGH: And London boroughs all had a -- well

13 a significant number, had a major crisis around social

14 work.

15 MR GARNHAM: I am suggesting to you that nobody suffered in

16 that regard like Haringey has.

17 MR SINGH: But do we actually know?

18 MR GARNHAM: We have heard nothing to suggest the contrary.

19 MR SINGH: Has there been some sort of assessment across

20 London as to what the attitude was, because most

21 certainly London local government saw that as a major

22 and significant issue across the piece.

23 MR GARNHAM: It would not be surprising, would it, if we

24 were to discover and conclude that Haringey was worse

25 off than others because of the fact that these two

137



1 events were happening at the same sort of time?

2 MR SINGH: I think the one thing that I would actually

3 accept, and this is hindsight and with hindsight there

4 are all sorts of amazing things that suddenly you would

5 do differently. I suspect that -- no, I know that we

6 did not actually handle our communications with the

7 workforce around terms and conditions well. We could

8 have done much more about that.

9 I am not absolutely even convinced that perhaps we

10 conducted the discussion/negotiations with the trade

11 unions that well. But as a principle, it was right and

12 proper to look at terms and conditions as part of

13 a broader look at how we achieved 27 million. I mean,

14 it was reasonable, it was a reasonable -- I still hold

15 on to the view that it was a reasonable and sensible

16 thing to do.

17 MR GARNHAM: How much was going to be saved by the changing

18 terms and conditions?

19 MR SINGH: The total package I think -- we were not in any

20 way looking for the total package but I suspect, and

21 presumably the Director of Finances and someone else

22 would confirm it was anything up to about 4 million but

23 that we were looking for something like about 1 million

24 plus would actually be a success story.

25 MR GARNHAM: A figure we have been given is somewhere

138



1 between £80,000 and £120,000.

2 MR SINGH: Across the whole of the Authority?

3 MR GARNHAM: For Social Services.

4 MR SINGH: No, I am actually talking about the Authority as

5 a whole.

6 MR GARNHAM: Would you disagree with that figure for

7 Social Services?

8 MR SINGH: I have no idea what the figure for

9 Social Services is. I am talking -- I would be

10 surprised but I am talking about the figures for the

11 whole of the Authority.

12 MR GARNHAM: If it were somewhere in the region of £100,000

13 then it is chicken feed, is it not?

14 MR SINGH: Not in the context of the million, million and

15 a half I am talking about in terms of the Council and

16 you cannot actually introduce reductions of terms and

17 conditions in one department and not in the other. This

18 was a global corporate approach which actually said: can

19 we actually bridge -- I think that it is very well in,

20 dare I say it, in the comfort of this environment to be

21 talking about the reality of local government when you

22 are in a financial crisis where you have to look at

23 whether you cut services on the one hand or whether you

24 actually proceed to do things like ... nobody wants to

25 reduce terms and conditions.

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1 The principal attack on terms and conditions would

2 have actually been about maternity leave. The biggest

3 single saving would have actually been maternity leave.

4 Nobody wishes to do that but the reality is that

5 Haringey's maternity leave provisions were one of the

6 best in London and therefore we felt that we could put

7 that on the table as a significant potential saving.

8 Now these are difficult times and I think you need to

9 understand they were extremely difficult times for the

10 Authority.

11 MR GARNHAM: They are difficult times but the mark of a good

12 manager is managing during difficult times.

13 MR SINGH: Absolutely.

14 MR GARNHAM: Well, what troubles me about this negotiation

15 on terms and conditions is that am I not right in

16 thinking that in the end the Council backed off and did

17 not impose these changes?

18 MR SINGH: That is a statement of fact.

19 MR GARNHAM: That being so, all of this was in fact entirely

20 pointless.

21 MR SINGH: No it was not because the purpose actually was to

22 engage in a meaningful set of negotiations with the

23 trade union movement to see whether they would actually

24 accept that this could contribute to bridging the

25 27 million quid gap no matter how large or small but at

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1 least we were thinking a million plus and that that

2 would help and save jobs. That was a reality.

3 MR GARNHAM: What it actually did was to provoke three one

4 day strikes, I think.

5 MR SINGH: Yes.

6 MR GARNHAM: In itself unfortunate because it means for

7 those three days there is not proper cover of your

8 normal work.

9 MR SINGH: Yes.

10 MR GARNHAM: But even worse, in the context at least of

11 Social Services, was that it was seen by those who

12 responded to the exit interviews as one of the things

13 that finally pushed them over the edge and pushed them

14 out of Haringey.

15 MR SINGH: Not the strike, I do not think.

16 MR GARNHAM: What it was that generated the strike?

17 MR SINGH: Yes.

18 MR GARNHAM: The terms and conditions and the fact that it

19 was necessary for the unions to challenge it?

20 MR SINGH: If you are saying that the evidence is that most

21 people left Haringey as a combination of restructuring

22 and the terms and conditions issue, that is not a matter

23 which frankly management within Haringey accepted; that

24 that is too crude an analysis. There were other factors

25 equally important. But all of them may have contributed

141



1 to people actually leaving.

2 MR GARNHAM: I am sure that is right but this was another

3 factor that contributed.

4 MR SINGH: I accept that point and the point that I have

5 made already which I think is where perhaps the

6 Authority failed was that I do not think we effectively

7 communicated with the workforce, and that if perhaps we

8 had communicated with the workforce perhaps more

9 effectively then there would not have been the sort of

10 outcry which took place.

11 MR GARNHAM: Even that limited concession that you make is

12 pretty fundamental, is it not, because if you are --

13 MR SINGH: That is why I am making it.

14 MR GARNHAM: Let us understand its significance. If you are

15 going to make this sort of suggested change then that

16 level of consultation is an absolute essential if you

17 are to avoid the sort of trouble that in fact

18 materialised here.

19 MR SINGH: Sure.

20 MR GARNHAM: Can I ask you to look, please, at a report that

21 went to the Council after you left, volume 28, please.

22 Before I come to that it is right, is it not, that

23 if you do get a lot of staff from the department not

24 only is that a bad thing in itself and you do not have

25 those staff doing that job anymore, but it also yet

142



1 further demoralises those who remain? That is obvious.

2 MR SINGH: There is a direct relationship.

3 MR GARNHAM: 28/376. So we know what it is, it is a report

4 from the Acting Director of Housing and Social Services.

5 MR SINGH: We are still trying to find it.

6 MR GARNHAM: Sorry. 375 you will need.

7 MR SINGH: We have found it. Thank you.

8 MR GARNHAM: Do you have it?

9 MR SINGH: Yes, thank you.

10 MR GARNHAM: 28/375, a report from the Acting Director of

11 Housing and Social Services to the Policy and Strategy

12 Committee, dated, I think it is May 2000. If you go to

13 378, please, we see the reasons for staff shortages

14 there, and much as you have told us the author sets out

15 national factors which were common across the piece and

16 then at 6.3, "Local Factors":

17 "Children's Services have experienced some

18 difficulties in recruiting frontline staff since the

19 summer of 1999. This has become a haemorrhage from

20 November to December directly linked to the industrial

21 action after which increased numbers of staff tendered

22 their resignation and others noted their intention to

23 seek employment in other authorities."

24 Then we have the results of the exit interviews:

25 "Strongly felt dissatisfaction with pre-Christmas

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1 proposed reductions in terms and conditions at a time

2 when other authorities offer increased inducements.

3 Dissatisfaction with continued year on year

4 restructuring, budget reductions and general environment

5 of financial uncertainty, non-competitive salaries and

6 lack of a reward scheme ..."

7 And so it goes on. Is this not precisely the sort

8 of overarching issue that you as Chief Executive should

9 have a grip on and ensure it is not happening?

10 MR SINGH: But you only have a grip on it when it is drawn

11 to your attention that you know that these things are

12 actually having an impact. I was not aware that there

13 was a problem of the departure of social workers until

14 January.

15 MR GARNHAM: Should we not then conclude that there is

16 something wrong with the management of Haringey beneath

17 you if these points had not been recognised, reported to

18 you or dealt with?

19 MR SINGH: The reality actually is that if you were to

20 pursue that logic, that you do not do anything which is

21 leading to potential demoralisation, that you do not

22 actually engage in any change whatsoever because if you

23 do so inevitably change is resisted by all sorts of

24 people, that that will then lead to demoralisation.

25 MR GARNHAM: On the contrary you manage it in a way that

144



1 ensures that you bring staff with you along the lines of

2 the way you were talking about.

3 MR SINGH: But I believe with the one major exception around

4 the question of effective communication and around the

5 terms and conditions, I am led to believe that the way

6 in which the restructuring was taking place within

7 Housing and Social Services was being effectively

8 managed. Now that is a message that comes to me loudly

9 and clearly. As a result of this Inquiry clearly we are

10 seeing evidence which is saying hang on, that statement

11 is not sustainable because there is a different position

12 over here. But that is the first time I am seeing it.

13 MR GARNHAM: So your stance then is there is nothing wrong

14 with this approach to the problems you were facing

15 provided they are properly managed. "I was not aware

16 that things were not going as -- if you, Mr Garnham are

17 right, I was not aware that these things were going

18 wrong"?

19 MR SINGH: That is right.

20 MR GARNHAM: "And that demonstrates some weakness in

21 communication between lower management and me"?

22 MR SINGH: And me, yes.

23 MR GARNHAM: Well, thank you. The results of all this were

24 serious, were they not, Mr Singh? Not only was there

25 a serious shortage of staff in Children's Services by

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1 the end of 1999, beginning of 2000, but there was also

2 substantial sums of money wasted, because is it not

3 right that first of all Haringey had to start employing

4 agency staff?

5 MR SINGH: Yes.

6 MR GARNHAM: Could you have volume 42, please. Page 410.

7 Another report from the Acting Director of Housing and

8 Social Services after you had left, 1st August 2000.

9 Just go over the page to page 414, at "Cost of agency

10 staff":

11 "The average cost of an agency social worker is

12 66 per cent more than for a permanent employee.

13 Consequently the service can only afford to appoint 21

14 agency social workers where, if obtainable ..."

15 Sorry, the grammar loses me. You know the gist.

16 "... against 34 vacancies as the savings accruing

17 from 22 vacancies cover the cost of only 14 agency

18 social workers."

19 MR SINGH: Presumably that is saying the cost of agency

20 staff is considerably more than employing a social

21 worker.

22 MR GARNHAM: By two-thirds more by the sound of it, which

23 will not come as a surprise to you. It is known

24 generally agency staff are more expensive. So the

25 consequence of developments at the end of 1999/2000 was

146



1 that you lost social workers, you had to cover the work

2 by employing agency staff, you therefore spent more

3 money or employed fewer social workers with the result

4 either that your deficit increased or alternatively that

5 you did not have enough social workers to cover the

6 work. That is a disastrous outcome from the strategy

7 you were adopting.

8 MR SINGH: Clearly it is disastrous, principally because of

9 the number of social workers who had left and the sort

10 of crisis which clearly developed during the course of

11 2000 through to 2001. I mean that is actually

12 recognised by Haringey that there was a massive problem

13 which began at around Christmas from what I understand

14 and which fed through right the way throughout the

15 course of the year. That is not in dispute as far as

16 I am concerned.

17 MR GARNHAM: But it is the foreseeable consequence, is it

18 not --

19 MR SINGH: But I do not think --

20 MR GARNHAM: -- of what you were doing?

21 MR SINGH: I say this to you again: it is all very well in

22 this room to be sitting here now and to say, "Well

23 actually, we are putting proposals around restructuring,

24 which are consistent with what Government actually

25 wants, consistent with..." I mean nobody would actually

147



1 disagree fundamentally with the principles underpinning

2 that restructuring. Nobody fundamentally, as far as

3 I am personally concerned, would disagree with: the

4 right thing to do is to save some money out of terms and

5 conditions with the benefit that fewer people who become

6 unemployed and go on to the scrap heap in a borough

7 where there is the highest level of unemployment in

8 London anyway. All that argument is familiar to you.

9 There is nothing individually wrong with either of

10 those two things and frankly they were both things which

11 were perfectly reasonable to do and I do not think, even

12 now, you could have predicted in July, when the

13 restructuring proposals were agreed in March, or when in

14 July members of the Council considered whether terms and

15 conditions were relevant, that that would then lead to

16 the sort of crisis which then emerged -- if you say

17 that --

18 MR GARNHAM: I wonder about that. Let me ask you. Without

19 the benefit of hindsight, looking at what you and your

20 colleagues knew, here you had an increasingly

21 competitive market for social workers. What Haringey

22 proposed to do is to restructure their Social Work

23 Department and lose a number of managers. Shortly

24 thereafter or during the course of that you propose to

25 cut their wages and require them to work harder. I do

148



1 not think you have, do you Mr Singh, to be the most

2 brilliant manager in the world or gifted with hindsight

3 to work out that that is likely to push some staff into

4 leaving?

5 MR SINGH: If the number of people who were actually

6 meant -- who were displaced was nil, which is what

7 I understood, that alternative employment would be found

8 for those people on protected salaries, then I do not

9 think you can make the assumption that the restructuring

10 would lead -- would equal two people getting demoralised

11 and leaving.

12 MR GARNHAM: I am suggesting to you restructuring plus

13 changes in terms and conditions would predictably have

14 that effect and what is more, if it does you are going

15 to have to use agency staff at greater cost.

16 MR SINGH: So three years previously, when we took out

17 a substantial amount out of terms and conditions when

18 there were also at the time I suspect restructures

19 within the organisation, why did that not lead to

20 demoralisation?

21 MR GARNHAM: Because you did it in a way to keep the unions

22 on side, I suspect.

23 MR SINGH: Yes, and that is why I am saying we failed to

24 effectively communicate with the workforce and we

25 probably did not conduct our negotiations with the trade

149



1 unions in an adequate fashion. That is what I am

2 readily accepting.

3 MR GARNHAM: And what I say is: given that that is true, it

4 is entirely predictable that that will have the effect

5 of losing staff and you having to spend even more money

6 on agencies.

7 MR SINGH: That is clearly a matter for the Inquiry to

8 conclude.

9 MR GARNHAM: Okay. In paragraph 17 of your statement, and

10 perhaps you could glance back at that, you know how the

11 Joint Review commended your Council for joined up

12 thinking -- joined up thinking and joined up action

13 I think it is that you note. Do you see that? The

14 first bullet point at paragraph 17:

15 "Reinforcing the Council's 'outward looking'

16 responsibilities - partnerships, joined up thinking and

17 action."

18 I need to suggest to you in at least two important

19 respects your thinking and your action was not joined

20 up. Firstly, the changing decision about splitting the

21 Directorate and secondly a series of actions that

22 provoked staff to leave, leading to staff shortages, and

23 the need to spend even more money than you would have

24 done anyway on recruiting others.

25 MR SINGH: I think I have --

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1 MR GARNHAM: You have dealt with the first?

2 MR SINGH: I have dealt with the first and I think I have

3 been trying to deal with the second.

4 MR GARNHAM: One of the other consequences of the second, on

5 top of agencies, the need to employ agency staff is that

6 you had -- your Council had thereafter to spend

7 substantial sums trying to retain and recruit staff, did

8 it not?

9 MR SINGH: Yes.

10 MR GARNHAM: So not only are you spending money on temporary

11 workers to cover the gaps, you are also then having to

12 spends hundreds of thousands of pounds on attracting and

13 retaining staff?

14 MR SINGH: Yes.

15 MR GARNHAM: As a consequence of a proposal that you did not

16 in fact take all the way through to completion?

17 MR SINGH: But that joined up thinking, if that is what you

18 are linking into, is much more about the extent to which

19 the Authority was working with external agencies, as

20 opposed to what you are talking about, about apparent

21 joined up thinking within the organisation. This is

22 actually, because this is around the Joint Review, and

23 my understanding that that joined up thinking was the

24 extent to which the Authority was engaged in

25 collaborative arrangements with the Health Authority et