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Archived Transcript for 18 December 2001:
Pages 51 to 100
51
1 MR GARNHAM: No. One of the functions of this Inquiry is to
2 find out what happened and to see where, if at all,
3 blame should be laid; but another and I would suggest
4 more important function is to identify what needs to be
5 done to put such things right. The Inquiry is in real
6 difficulty in addressing that second question if it
7 cannot discover from the likes of you, to put it frankly
8 Mr Singh, how it can be that these talented, resourceful
9 managers, in the positions that they were in at the
10 time, were unaware of what was going on beneath them if
11 the evidence which at the moment goes uncontradicted is
12 correct.
13 MR SINGH: But their evidence is that they were aware of
14 what was actually happening and that that is different
15 from the view which has been expressed by front line
16 staff.
17 MR GARNHAM: Carol Wilson said she was quite unaware that
18 the case recording guidelines were not being used, quite
19 unaware that managers were not reading files, quite
20 unaware of the inadequacy of the supervision. It is
21 possible as I have said that the people who told us
22 about those things have all come here to lie. If that
23 is not true, if they have told the truth, then something
24 has gone wrong in the passage of information from shop
25 floor level to the Wilson level, has it not?
52
1 MR SINGH: Yes.
2 MR GARNHAM: What do we do about avoiding that in the
3 future? How do we make the change?
4 MR SINGH: I think clearly there are a number of ways that
5 that could be addressed. One way is simply about
6 reinforcing that whole management process and, you know,
7 ensuring checking, externally validating, indeed even
8 setting up external procedures centrally based to look
9 at processes and systems. Perhaps the one thing we were
10 not terribly good as was the centralling -- I mean from
11 the centre examine whether process and systems are
12 working effectively on the ground. That could be it.
13 I think that the issue about training is a key issue
14 but then having looked at the training plans for the
15 department they were pretty substantial. I put in place
16 a major management development programme aimed at all
17 senior staff because we were concerned about management
18 capability and capacity within the organisation. That
19 was actually put in place. So I am not absolutely sure
20 beyond that what I as Chief Executive could have
21 actually done.
22 MR GARNHAM: You understand at the moment I am not simply
23 trying to apportion blame on you, I am trying to
24 understand where things went wrong.
25 MR SINGH: Sure.
53
1 MR GARNHAM: One possibility is that it might be thought
2 that there is a lack of willingness to take
3 responsibility. Can I compare the evidence we have
4 heard from Haringey with that which we heard from the
5 NHS witnesses? There were suggestions, again a matter
6 for the Inquiry whether or not to accept them, of errors
7 and omissions in the way the North Middlesex Hospital
8 for example dealt with Victoria's case, but in the NMH
9 case we had attend here Dr Rossiter, the consultant in
10 charge of paediatrics, a woman of very considerable
11 experience and reputation, who was willing to accept
12 that she personally was to blame for these failings.
13 Now, that willingness to acknowledge error is at least
14 at the root, is it not, of progress?
15 MR SINGH: Surely and I have personally thought long and
16 hard about what could I have done differently which
17 could have actually led to a situation where the tragedy
18 of Victoria could not have actually happened. I have
19 thought long and hard about that. I have thought about
20 the sorts of procedures that we could have put in place
21 beyond that. But I end up thinking I am not sure that
22 there was a great deal else more that we could have
23 actually done. Now I know that does not help you but --
24 MR GARNHAM: It is a Council of despair if it is right, as
25 we have heard progressively through this Inquiry, that
54
1 Arthurworrey blames Baptiste, Kozinos and Mairs, Kozinos
2 and Mairs blame Duncan, Duncan blames Wilson, Wilson
3 says, "Did not know about it, did not get to my level".
4 There is a continuous moving of responsibility and
5 nobody has said, "Sorry, I messed up." Nobody in
6 Haringey has said, "Sorry, I messed up".
7 MR SINGH: It is absolutely clear that Haringey has messed
8 up and it is absolutely clear that there were
9 fundamental failures. Now, but I am not clear in my own
10 mind as to where the line of responsibility lies. That
11 is my own dilemma.
12 MR GARNHAM: It is your dilemma but it is also ours because
13 without understanding where it is in the structure that
14 things go wrong it is much harder to put it right and
15 that is why we call you to help us understand that.
16 MR SINGH: I am genuinely trying to be helpful. I mean, my
17 whole purpose of coming here is in the spirit of trying
18 to be helpful but I am not actually sure what else we
19 could have done. There is the issues of resources. It
20 may well have been possible for the Authority to have
21 considered that further and no doubt you will come to
22 that.
23 MR GARNHAM: I will.
24 MR SINGH: But beyond that I cannot honestly think of what
25 else I could have actually done to ensure that the
55
1 tragedy which happened did not happen.
2 MR GARNHAM: In a sense that is the most worrying thing of
3 all, is it not, Mr Singh? I mean, bad enough that
4 organisations make mistakes that have these sort of
5 dreadful consequences. Even worse if the
6 Chief Executive of one of them comes along and says,
7 "I know it happened but I cannot think what we could
8 have done to prevent it"?
9 MR SINGH: I am clearly saying that if the scenario which
10 you are proposing, if that proposition is right, clearly
11 there were fundamental managerial failures and there is
12 no question of that. It cannot be the case that through
13 a line management chain people do not know what is
14 actually happening. I fully accept that.
15 MR GARNHAM: Even if they do not, that is blameworthy.
16 MR SINGH: Even if they do not they should have established.
17 Now, I think that I accept. Making those systems and
18 processes more effective and where failures have taken
19 place to remedy those failures, that I accept. But
20 above and beyond that I struggle desperately as to what
21 else we could have done.
22 MR GARNHAM: Do you also accept that there ought to be
23 somewhere in the organisation an acknowledgment of
24 personal or corporate responsibility?
25 MR SINGH: Without doubt. I mean, I am in a slight
56
1 difficulty because I no longer am part of
2 Haringey Council but most certainly if I was currently
3 Chief Executive my own view would be that there has to
4 be acceptance of corporate responsibility. That is
5 a personal view.
6 MR GARNHAM: In fairness to Haringey, when they made their
7 opening statement at this Inquiry, there was a measure
8 of acceptance of corporate responsibility but my
9 question had two limbs, corporate and individual. Now,
10 whereas in other organisations like NMH we have found
11 a willingness to accept an individual responsibility, in
12 Haringey we have not.
13 MR SINGH: If I felt that I personally and individually was
14 responsible for what actually happened to Victoria then
15 I would actually own up to that. I have thought about
16 that and I do not think I am.
17 MR GARNHAM: Are you not simply because it happened in your
18 charge?
19 MR SINGH: I mean yes and no. Yes in the sense that clearly
20 as Chief Executive I am responsible for the totality of
21 the organisation's activities, but in a sense at an
22 individual level, the level at which a child tragically
23 dies, it is difficult to say actually I could have in
24 any way intervened to ensure that that did not happen.
25 Therefore, I then have to ask myself therefore can
57
1 I personally hold myself culpable for that?
2 MR GARNHAM: Plainly you cannot, because you I do not
3 suppose knew of Victoria's experience before her death?
4 MR SINGH: No, I did not know.
5 MR GARNHAM: But you can in the sense that you are
6 responsible for the systems which failed her.
7 MR SINGH: Yes and it is my view that the framework of those
8 systems were there.
9 MR GARNHAM: But the operation was not if the premise I put
10 to you is right.
11 MR SINGH: Absolutely right but if that premise is right
12 then those systems were not being adhered to. Now,
13 there is therefore a fundamental systems failure.
14 MR GARNHAM: Mr Singh, there are five particular areas
15 I want to ask you about. Can I flag them up now so you
16 know where we are going?
17 MR SINGH: Can I write these down?
18 MR GARNHAM: Yes, do. I am going to suggest to the Chairman
19 that it might be convenient to take a break after I have
20 indicated what they are. They are first communication,
21 secondly restructuring, thirdly changes to terms and
22 conditions, fourthly finance and fifthly reviews, joint
23 review, SSI reviews.
24 MR SINGH: Yes.
25 MR GARNHAM: I wonder whether that might be a convenient
58
1 moment. Then we can start comfortable to get stuck into
2 those five.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We will have a break Mr Singh.
4 During this break you are not allowed to discuss your
5 evidence with anyone. I hope you will adhere to that
6 and we will break until 25 minutes to 12.
7 (11.25 am)
8 (A short break)
9 (11.35 am)
10 MR GARNHAM: Mr Singh, the first of the topics I want to ask
11 you about is the one most central to the answers you
12 were giving to us before: communication. Let me ask you
13 first of all about the first line of communication.
14 Were you involved in the appointment of Mary Richardson?
15 MR SINGH: Yes.
16 MR GARNHAM: The appointment presumably is an appointment by
17 the Council, is it?
18 MR SINGH: The appointment is made by members of the
19 Council.
20 MR GARNHAM: On your recommendation?
21 MR SINGH: I think there is an independent adviser brought
22 in who is a social services expert who actually helps to
23 advise the members but clearly members would also seek
24 my own view.
25 MR GARNHAM: And they did in this case?
59
1 MR SINGH: Yes.
2 MR GARNHAM: And your view was that she was a suitable
3 person for the job?
4 MR SINGH: Competent and suitable for this job.
5 MR GARNHAM: How long was she expected to remain in post
6 when she was appointed?
7 MR SINGH: Interesting question. There is clearly no set --
8 MR GARNHAM: It was not a fixed term contract?
9 MR SINGH: No, sorry, it was not a fixed term contract.
10 Clearly you would expect a director to be there at least
11 two or three years, perhaps even longer. I was there
12 for 11 years and other directors had been there for
13 significant periods of time.
14 MR GARNHAM: In fact she remained for I think a fraction
15 under two years, did she not?
16 MR SINGH: That is right.
17 MR GARNHAM: Disappointing I imagine for the Council that
18 she left. You left a fraction before her?
19 MR SINGH: About the same time.
20 MR GARNHAM: You knew of her resignation presumably before
21 you went?
22 MR SINGH: Yes.
23 MR GARNHAM: Disappointed Council to lose her?
24 MR SINGH: Disappointed, yes.
25 MR GARNHAM: Particularly as the department was part way
60
1 through a major restructuring exercise which she had
2 helped initiate?
3 MR SINGH: For two reasons disappointed. One that she came
4 to Haringey with a very good positive reputation and
5 I had spoken with the then Chief Executive of Waltham
6 Forest to establish Mary's general sort of expertise.
7 MR GARNHAM: From where she came, was it?
8 MR SINGH: That was where she came from and it was a very
9 positive response from that Chief Executive but
10 secondly, yes, I mean the reality was that by March 2000
11 the restructuring process was in train and it is always
12 disappointing to see somebody leave once something is
13 actually in mid-train.
14 MR GARNHAM: Particularly disappointing I would imagine
15 given that there were a number of other senior
16 management figures who left there or thereabouts, there
17 or shortly thereafter. You first of all.
18 MR SINGH: Yes.
19 MR GARNHAM: Then?
20 MR SINGH: Others left clearly afterwards so at the point at
21 which I left I was not aware that others were leaving.
22 MR GARNHAM: So you did not know about the resignations from
23 Dinos Kousoulou --
24 MR SINGH: No.
25 MR GARNHAM: -- carol Wilson or Dave Duncan?
61
1 MR SINGH: No, because they came much later.
2 MR GARNHAM: They were not in the offing when you went?
3 MR SINGH: No.
4 MR GARNHAM: When Mary Richardson was appointed what brief
5 was she given?
6 MR SINGH: Well the brief that she was given was to manage
7 the Housing and Social Services Department.
8 MR GARNHAM: What was regarded as her three top jobs?
9 MR SINGH: That she would need to consider the extent to
10 which the organisation was geared up to deliver the
11 services that we wanted to deliver.
12 MR GARNHAM: So delivery of service is first?
13 MR SINGH: Delivery of service first of all, with all the
14 stuff around performance. Secondly it was around that
15 sort of time when the Government had issued its
16 consultation paper.
17 MR GARNHAM: Quality Protects?
18 MR SINGH: No, on modernisation of local government and
19 there was a design on the part of the Authority to
20 pursue that process with some rigour, and therefore that
21 was one; and secondly a realisation at that stage, and
22 I am thinking Mary started in March 1998, it was clear
23 that a joint review was to happen, that we were
24 scheduled to be reviewed by the SSI and the
25 Audit Commission and that Quality Protects and changes
62
1 in Social Services were also on the horizon. That was
2 the agenda. To look at the organisation to see whether
3 it was fit for purpose, to look at the extent to which
4 we were responding to modernisation; and thirdly to look
5 at the legislative framework that was there on the
6 horizon emerging.
7 MR GARNHAM: This is a reference to Quality Protects?
8 MR SINGH: Quality Protects, yes.
9 MR GARNHAM: Given that those were her jobs and given that
10 from what we understand from her statement those are the
11 tasks that she set about working for, what was the
12 mechanism by which you learned from her how she was
13 doing on each?
14 MR SINGH: Essentially through a number of internal
15 processes. First of all through a service business
16 planning process so that she produced jointly with her
17 Management Team the business plan for the department,
18 that business plan would have to be agreed with myself
19 before it went to members of the Authority and then
20 clearly looked at by the Social Services Committee who
21 would clearly have a --
22 MR GARNHAM: Business plan first of all.
23 MR SINGH: Business plan first of all. Secondly, the
24 performance management framework which we had just put
25 in place, which essentially defined the key performance
63
1 indicators which the Authority was interested in but
2 included all the Children's Service indicators as
3 identified by the Dobson letter. That was actually
4 I mean built in subsequently into that framework.
5 The third way in which I established what was
6 happening within Social Services was to look at the data
7 that was generated through the Children's Strategy Board
8 and indeed the monthly data that was sent to me produced
9 by the Children's Services Division, plus finally the
10 one to one sessions that I had with Mary.
11 There were a number of other arrangements. Clearly
12 there was the Monday financial monitoring process, so on
13 a monthly basis there would be a generally line by line
14 discussion about budgets with the Director plus her
15 Financial Accountant plus the Director of Corporate
16 Services. So we would actually look at the overall
17 shape of the budget for each department to see where
18 difficulties were in fact emerging.
19 MR GARNHAM: So it sounds as if there were two inputs and
20 three outputs. Inputs was you were monitoring business
21 plan?
22 MR SINGH: Yes.
23 MR GARNHAM: What was going in; and financial management,
24 what was being spent?
25 MR SINGH: Yes.
64
1 MR GARNHAM: And 3, measures of output, the key PIs,
2 performance indicators, data from the division and your
3 one to one supervisions?
4 MR SINGH: Yes.
5 MR GARNHAM: So that ought to have given you a framework for
6 knowing the work she was doing and the effect it was
7 having?
8 MR SINGH: Yes.
9 MR GARNHAM: And it was through that mechanism that you
10 would expect, would you, to learn information about
11 performance on the ground in Social Services?
12 MR SINGH: Yes.
13 MR GARNHAM: Gina Adamou, who you will know tells us in her
14 statement, paragraph 28, that she learned of
15 difficulties with staffing in Social Services in the
16 autumn of 1999 when Carol Wilson happened to mention to
17 her that she was worried there might be a problem. Now,
18 first of all, were you aware of that?
19 MR SINGH: No.
20 MR GARNHAM: Secondly, how is it that information is passing
21 from Wilson to Adamou rather than up the chain through
22 the mechanism you have described?
23 MR SINGH: I have no idea. The first occasion I became
24 aware of the issue of recruitment retention was actually
25 either just immediately prior to Christmas or
65
1 indeed January 2000 and that is the first occasion when
2 it was drawn to my attention.
3 MR GARNHAM: If what Ms Adamou says is right, it
4 demonstrates a problem in the communication of
5 information structure, does it not? I am not suggesting
6 it is wrong that she should have conversations with
7 Carol Wilson but I am suggesting it is wrong that
8 information does not also pass up to you.
9 MR SINGH: Certainly it was very right that there were those
10 conversations between the councillor and Carol Wilson
11 but I am surprised that in fact if it was a significant
12 problem in the autumn of 1999 I am surprised that that
13 was not then fed up to me.
14 MR GARNHAM: Yes. The systems, the two inputs and three
15 outputs you have described to us ought to be picking up
16 information like that if it is significant for the
17 running of a chunk of the department.
18 MR SINGH: The reality is that we were not at that stage
19 identifying corporately vacancies across all the
20 organisation. We were not actually doing that.
21 MR GARNHAM: You mean you did not have that process in place
22 or it was not happening on that occasion?
23 MR SINGH: No, I mean that process was being developed
24 through a new IT system which would enable it to happen.
25 Up until then, at the point at which the Council began
66
1 to set its budget and then inevitably got into looking
2 at redundancies, then clearly we had to set up a manual
3 system to enable that to happen prior to the new
4 technology being brought in.
5 MR GARNHAM: We will come on to explore the consequences of
6 staffing shortages but they are a root of one of the
7 suggested problems in this department, and what concerns
8 me, and what I would like your help with, is why the
9 detectors that led Carol Wilson it is said to know about
10 this and to tell Adamou did not also feed into the chain
11 of information leading up to you.
12 MR SINGH: I have no idea at all why either Carol -- because
13 I mean Carol Wilson was somebody that -- clearly my
14 whole style of management was not simply to work through
15 a line chain. I do not think that is the right way to
16 do things. I would on occasions meet with Carol Wilson,
17 particularly around the development of the One Stop
18 Shops which were quite fundamental to the way in which
19 the Council delivered front line services, and there
20 were opportunities then that if Carol felt that there
21 was an emerging problem that she could have expressed
22 that view to me. That just did not happen.
23 MR GARNHAM: During the course of your one to ones with
24 Richardson, did the question of unallocated cases in the
25 Duty Teams get reported to you?
67
1 MR SINGH: The information around unallocated cases was
2 something which was routinely collected through the
3 performance management framework so that is where we
4 would have picked that up and it was my understanding
5 that that again was not an issue at that time.
6 MR GARNHAM: You say that the KPIs ought to have detected
7 that?
8 MR SINGH: Absolutely.
9 MR GARNHAM: So that the unallocated cases, KPIs, were not
10 limited to any one category, it was across the board?
11 MR SINGH: Across the whole board, yes. There is an
12 argument to be made as to whether -- I mean that
13 information should have been broken down further but the
14 reality is that corporately on a quarterly basis the
15 whole of the Council received information on Council
16 performance which included services to children.
17 MR GARNHAM: Staffing?
18 MR SINGH: Not staffing levels I have to admit.
19 MR GARNHAM: Not KPI staffing levels?
20 MR SINGH: No.
21 MR GARNHAM: What was the mechanism by which you would learn
22 of serious deficiencies in staffing levels?
23 MR SINGH: Essentially through the line management chain.
24 MR GARNHAM: So it would be a matter of somebody taking the
25 trouble to report it to their manager and they reporting
68
1 it up to you?
2 MR SINGH: Yes, and as had been the case in 1992 I think
3 when there was a major social work problem, a social
4 work shortage, and as eventually became the case
5 in January 2000 when I was informed about the more
6 recent problems.
7 MR GARNHAM: Does there not need to be in the sort of system
8 you are describing a means by which that is checked?
9 MR SINGH: Yes. That is quite an obvious and key point that
10 what we need to have is a system which corporately
11 managed, which identifies the levels of vacancies across
12 the whole of the organisation. That was being
13 introduced. A new software package was actually being
14 acquired to do precisely that.
15 MR GARNHAM: But it was not in place at the time.
16 MR SINGH: It was not in place at the time.
17 MR GARNHAM: And should have been.
18 MR SINGH: And should have been.
19 MR GARNHAM: 1998, the year before the one with which we are
20 primarily concerned, how did you regard the quality of
21 information monitoring in your Council?
22 MR SINGH: At that stage --
23 MR GARNHAM: Performance monitoring I should say.
24 MR SINGH: At that stage not terribly impressive and it was
25 for that reason that the Authority took a decision to
69
1 try and put in place quite a robust system where the
2 Authority would receive information on essentially the
3 40 to 50 headline key indicators but also decided that
4 it wanted to receive corporate information around I mean
5 things like turnaround times for people within reception
6 areas, sickness, absenteeism.
7 MR GARNHAM: I will take you to it and we can look at it.
8 Volume 28A please, page 149. This is a report from you
9 to the Policy and Strategy Committee of September 1998.
10 Do you recall it?
11 MR SINGH: Yes.
12 MR GARNHAM: I suspect it is one amongst dozens or hundreds
13 but you have some recollection of it?
14 MR SINGH: Yes, I do.
15 MR GARNHAM: It was from you, you are the Chief Executive at
16 the time?
17 MR SINGH: Yes.
18 MR GARNHAM: And had a hand in the preparation of this?
19 MR SINGH: Yes.
20 MR GARNHAM: Over the page to page 150, paragraph 3.1.
21 Research and consultation carried out as far as the
22 Haringey 2000 project gave a powerful impetus for change
23 in the operation of the Council. Whilst there had been
24 improvements in performance in many parts of the
25 organisation in recent years there were areas of
70
1 inadequate performance across the organisation. The
2 Council remained in the bottom quartile of London
3 boroughs for its performance against the majority of the
4 Audit Commission's performance indicators. No
5 justification for complacency on performance, need to
6 strengthen both the culture and practice of performance
7 management. Yes?
8 MR SINGH: Absolutely.
9 MR GARNHAM: That was the problem you identified at that
10 time?
11 MR SINGH: Yes.
12 MR GARNHAM: The result was a suggestion by you to this
13 committee of a new approach with new key performance
14 indicators, KPIs. Go to 155 please in that document and
15 in appendix 1 we see the corporate indicators for
16 quarterly monitoring. These are to be the new KPIs.
17 MR SINGH: Yes.
18 MR GARNHAM: Go over two pages please to Social Services
19 which is section F.
20 MR SINGH: Yes.
21 MR GARNHAM: There are just six KPIs for the whole of Social
22 Services and just two for Children's Services, numbers 1
23 and 2.
24 MR SINGH: That was the start but actually the reality was
25 that when the system was effectively put in place all
71
1 the indicators which went to the Children's Strategy
2 Board, which were far more extensive, actually were also
3 part of this framework.
4 MR GARNHAM: Help me with that because it may be
5 a coincidence that struck you before, but on the very
6 day you were writing this Frank Dobson was writing his
7 letter to councillors.
8 MR SINGH: Was it the same day?
9 MR GARNHAM: Same day. Can you have that as well,
10 volume 13A. If you keep that one open you will be shown
11 the Dobson letter in volume 13A. Page 1. As is
12 becoming increasingly familiar to us at this Inquiry,
13 page 1 is not at the beginning of the volume, it is
14 instead 10 pages through. You want 13A/001.
15 21st September 1998, the same day as your paper as it
16 happens.
17 What we see in the Dobson letter and in particular
18 in the annexes to that is first of all a list of
19 expectations of Council members as corporate parents.
20 MR SINGH: Yes.
21 MR GARNHAM: And secondly and for my purposes more
22 importantly the questions for councillors to ask.
23 I have not counted them up but there are three pages'
24 worth of largely single line questions. That paints
25 a rather different picture to the one we see in your
72
1 management paper which would have two KPIs for children.
2 How do we reconcile those?
3 MR SINGH: Partly because the report which was scheduled for
4 the 21st September would have been written ten days or
5 so before the Dobson letter, but secondly this was the
6 start of a process, like most things it is quite
7 interactive, you put a framework in place, you build on
8 that, you develop on that and most certainly once the
9 Dobson letter had been fully digested and once you had
10 got into the rigours of getting performance built into
11 the organisation the Dobson questions were then
12 subsequently answered routinely to all members.
13 MR GARNHAM: Do you mean that your Council would regularly
14 and routinely provide councillors with answers to all of
15 these questions?
16 MR SINGH: That is my -- that is my understanding and that
17 is what I thought actually went to most, certainly to
18 the two quarterly monitoring reports for the period of
19 Victoria's relationship with Haringey.
20 MR GARNHAM: And those were distributed to whom?
21 MR SINGH: They would have gone to the Policy and Strategy
22 Committee.
23 MR GARNHAM: Because as I understand the Dobson letter,
24 correct me if I am wrong, the intent behind it is that
25 councillors should -- all councillors, particularly
73
1 those who have an interest in Children's Services,
2 should be answering these questions of officials
3 regularly.
4 MR SINGH: Sure, I mean clearly the Dobson letter itself
5 went to all councillors.
6 MR GARNHAM: Of course.
7 MR SINGH: But the full extent of the distribution of the
8 report on performance, whether that just went to policy
9 and to strategy or whether it went to a wider set of
10 members, clearly it also went to the full Council and
11 the full Council would have picked up on performance
12 then.
13 MR GARNHAM: Am I to understand your answer that this report
14 that was then issued regularly dealt with answers to all
15 of these questions?
16 MR SINGH: That is my understanding.
17 MR GARNHAM: I am sure it is me, there are a lot of
18 documents and I have not read every one, but I have not
19 found that yet but, but doubtless we can be directed to
20 where it is.
21 MR SINGH: I hope you can because most certainly that was my
22 understanding, that all the information which went to
23 the Children's Strategy Board also was part of the annex
24 which went to the performance management framework.
25 MR GARNHAM: That information you tell us it was your intent
74
1 would have covered the answers to all of these Dobson
2 questions in annex B.
3 MR SINGH: That is my understanding and that most certainly
4 was the intention.
5 MR GARNHAM: So you had in place, did you, by the time of
6 Victoria's case coming to your Council's attention, you
7 had in place monitoring systems and recording systems
8 sufficiently subtle to detect answers to all of these
9 questions?
10 MR SINGH: I mean that is my understanding. I have not and
11 perhaps I should have done but I have not gone through
12 in detail the reports which would have gone to Committee
13 in probably November, December and February,
14 February 2000, and I suspect November 1999 which would
15 have dealt with the two or three months periods.
16 MR GARNHAM: And these were quarterly reports, were they?
17 MR SINGH: Quarterly.
18 MR GARNHAM: And they treated as new KPIs for the purposes
19 of Children's Social Services the questions that the
20 Dobson letter poses?
21 MR SINGH: That is my understanding. That is my
22 understanding.
23 MR GARNHAM: So we would have seen these in February 2000
24 and then in November 1999 and August 1999?
25 MR SINGH: The 7th February and I think it was -- I do not
75
1 remember precisely the date for the quarter that would
2 have ended up -- that would have covered
3 July/August/September. I think it was November. It
4 could have been very early December.
5 MR GARNHAM: Thank you for that. As I understand the
6 purpose of --
7 MR SINGH: I mean the thing I find surprising is that you
8 have not actually -- the reason I ask this question is
9 that I have been away from Haringey Council as you know
10 for 21 months or so and therefore I am not aware of the
11 information that you have and I am clearly aware of the
12 difficulties about information but I assume that you
13 would have had quite a voluminous document for each
14 quarter.
15 MR GARNHAM: Mr Singh I confess straightaway that I have
16 stopped pretending that I know where every document is
17 in the 60 volumes of material or whatever it is we have
18 now, so it may be I have missed it and we can look for
19 it over lunch and I will ask you again if I need to.
20 MR SINGH: Sure.
21 MR GARNHAM: The purpose behind Dobson was undoubtedly to
22 ensure that departments like Mary Richardson's focus
23 their attention on questions that were regarded by the
24 Secretary of State as being key.
25 MR SINGH: Yes.
76
1 MR GARNHAM: But it was a somewhat more subtle purpose as
2 well, was it not? It was to provide ordinary
3 councillors, if I can call them that, with the
4 ammunition to nag their social services departments to
5 make sure that they understood what was going on.
6 MR SINGH: Yes.
7 MR GARNHAM: Was that preserved, that ability to nag
8 preserved by your method of dealing with it by the
9 routine disclosure of this information?
10 MR SINGH: I think it would have been preserved with those
11 members who were of that committee, and just to remind
12 you it was the leadership of the Authority that were
13 members of that particular committee including obviously
14 the lead member for Social Services. Whether in fact
15 that then enabled the rest of the Council, i.e. members
16 who were not members of the Policy Strategy Committee,
17 is actually an important point.
18 MR GARNHAM: And you do not know the answer?
19 MR SINGH: I do not actually know the answer to that,
20 but~...
21 MR GARNHAM: Were you conscious of the nagging process
22 taking place of councillors pestering officials to find
23 out this information or did it appear to be that they
24 were satisfied with what they were getting?
25 MR SINGH: It is difficult for me to actually comment on
77
1 that. I am not aware of particular nagging around this
2 particular issue. There were lots of naggings about
3 other matters but clearly I am not absolutely sure
4 whether there was specific nagging or the ability to
5 nag. Most certainly that ability existed for those who
6 were on this particular committee.
7 MR GARNHAM: Did it happen? Was the result of the Dobson
8 letter that -- that people were pestered for
9 information?
10 MR SINGH: I think the Authority was extremely conscious and
11 concerned about unallocated cases. That was always
12 a major problem because it had had a history again
13 I think about 1992 when there was a major crisis around
14 the number of unallocated cases, and that is when we had
15 to put in place a recruitment retention package for
16 social workers then, so it was always conscious about
17 that.
18 Most certainly it was conscious about the third
19 placement because I think that strikes you in
20 particular, particularly given the target which the
21 Dobson letter had actually set. Those two particular
22 matters, but beyond that I am not absolutely sure.
23 MR GARNHAM: How did you personally go about ascertaining
24 how referrals were being dealt with in the sort of teams
25 that have been the focus of our retention, the DIAT?
78
1 MR SINGH: It is clearly difficult for me at an individual
2 level to establish how referrals were actually operating
3 on the ground, but again the way in which I would inform
4 myself is through the information that was being
5 generated. Clearly there was some detailed information,
6 absolutely detailed information about the nature and the
7 type of referrals that were coming in so there would be
8 global data if you like about the total numbers of
9 referrals about the reviews and assessments that were
10 being carried out, and clearly if data around -- not
11 only children on the Child Protection Register but also
12 the children looked after, all of that information was
13 routinely collated and presented to me as part of the
14 performance management framework. Now, beyond that
15 I did not know how the processes were working on the
16 ground.
17 MR GARNHAM: As it happens Victoria was not on the Child
18 Protection Register and she was not a child looked
19 after. But she was a child who was being dealt with on
20 referral from a hospital to your Duty Investigation and
21 Assessment Team. Was it not incumbent upon you in
22 relation to that as with other similar teams for you to
23 know how referrals were being dealt with?
24 MR SINGH: No, I mean I think I have to make the point that
25 whilst children and -- I mean Children's Services as
79
1 a division, and excuse the language, is a business unit.
2 It was hugely important, but the reality is that there
3 were probably 40, 45, 50 business units across the whole
4 of the organisation and I would argue that it is
5 unreasonable to expect a chief executive to actually
6 understand the details at that level. It is physically
7 beyond possibility.
8 MR GARNHAM: Even if that is true and one can understand the
9 point you make, should you not be in a position to have
10 mechanisms that guarantee that you will know once things
11 started going wrong?
12 MR SINGH: The mechanisms were those which I have set out.
13 They were principally through a performance management
14 framework that generated information. Yes, the
15 information may not have been as fulsome as it should
16 have been but the reality is that there was a developing
17 programme focused on performance management within the
18 organisation which enabled myself and indeed politicians
19 within the Authority to look at overall performance,
20 including key performance around Children's Services.
21 I think to expect to go beyond that within that sort of
22 corporate framework is absolutely unrealistic.
23 MR GARNHAM: Thank you. Let us turn to restructuring and
24 its consequences. You describe the process of
25 restructuring in paragraphs 5 to 10 of your statement.
80
1 Do have that open? Paragraph 6 you tell us that from
2 late 1998 work was begun to prepare the Council for
3 modernisation and the restructuring was to be the
4 vehicle for modernisation, was it not?
5 MR SINGH: Essentially it is two things. One, the
6 Authority, having taken the decision that it wished to
7 respond to modernisation in a serious, positive way,
8 asked me to consider the implications of that at
9 a corporate level. So the backcloth to the Housing and
10 Social Services restructuring and the change there,
11 really the backdrop to that is the Council-wide
12 restructuring which then took place. That restructuring
13 essentially was focused around building in capacity at
14 the centre of the organisation around performance
15 management, the application of best value and
16 introducing best value uniformly across the
17 organisation, to putting in place a scrutiny process
18 because the politicians had taken a view that they
19 wanted to separate out the executive from the
20 non-executive function, so putting in place a series of
21 committees around restructuring.
22 MR GARNHAM: This is the so called Cabinet style government?
23 MR SINGH: The Cabinet style government, yes. As well as
24 that, the Council took a number of corporate decisions
25 which it wished to apply across the whole organisation
81
1 on the need to focus around performance, focus around
2 building information systems in place, because that was
3 seen as a weakness within the organisation to look at
4 again as I say best value, to look at devolution. The
5 Council is very much of the view that devolving people
6 management and indeed resource management to the nearest
7 points of front line service was actually important.
8 MR GARNHAM: To the nearest point of?
9 MR SINGH: Front line service delivery, devolving
10 essentially to third and fourth tier managers
11 principally. The reason for saying all of that is that
12 the Housing and Social Services reorganisation, the
13 changes which took place there, were in that particular
14 context.
15 MR GARNHAM: I understand.
16 MR SINGH: It was not as if it was just Housing and Social
17 Services changing, it was the whole organisation moving
18 forward.
19 MR GARNHAM: Yes. This was not the first restructuring that
20 had happened in your time. Perhaps it was the most
21 universal or comprehensive, was it?
22 MR SINGH: No, I mean far from it. I think the most
23 difficult restructuring was the one which took place
24 in March 1999 -- sorry March 1990 and clearly you will
25 want to talk about finance later but actually the
82
1 reality was the Authority had to reduce its budget by 40
2 million in one go in 1989.
3 MR GARNHAM: It had to set a lawful budget?
4 MR SINGH: Well yes.
5 MR GARNHAM: That was the way the tabloids --
6 MR SINGH: It tried to set up an unlawful budget. It did
7 not actually set up an unlawful budget because it would
8 never be allowed to do.
9 MR GARNHAM: I said it had to set a lawful one.
10 MR SINGH: It had to set a lawful budget because it was
11 capped and we had to take 40 million quid out of the
12 revenue budget. That meant in March 1990 I proposed to
13 the Authority a restructuring of the organisation from
14 a 17 business unit structure to essentially a 10
15 departmental structure. It was not as I wanted because
16 clearly you have to think about what you can get
17 through, agreements of the political process. But that
18 was the first major restructuring.
19 There was a subsequent restructuring which took
20 place in 1993 which essentially created the -- virtually
21 the current local government structure within Haringey.
22 MR GARNHAM: One of the consequences of the 1993
23 restructuring I think was the joining together of
24 Housing and Social Services.
25 MR SINGH: Yes.
83
1 MR GARNHAM: There were other reorganisations and
2 restructurings particularly in the Social Work
3 Department.
4 MR SINGH: Yes, but I mean not that which I thought were
5 significant.
6 MR GARNHAM: The reason I ask you that is because some of
7 the staff talk about restructuring fatigue.
8 MR SINGH: Yes.
9 MR GARNHAM: Let me show you the document first, volume
10 28A/181. This is letter to Carol Wilson from the Social
11 Services Convenor Peter Lewington and he writes at
12 page 181, about four paragraphs down:
13 "Many staff are just very tired of these exercises,
14 restructuring fatigue, which have been a regular feature
15 of life in this department in recent years. For
16 Children and Families Team the most recent was last year
17 when they reorganised their front line Duty system.
18 Staff in North Tottenham at least also being asked to
19 participate in various pilots. People do become stale
20 and exhausted by constant, often ill thought out
21 reorganisation. I have often thought about this
22 department that the management approach has tended to be
23 that when there is a problem, rather than address it
24 directly the response is to have another restructuring."
25 That was a concern expressed by a trade union
84
1 official. Do you recognise that potential problem?
2 MR SINGH: Yes, I think that restructuring can be used for
3 solving ills which in fact should be dealt with through
4 other processes and through other forms of action.
5 MR GARNHAM: Because it gives the appearance of activity
6 which may or may not bring with it changes in
7 performance.
8 MR SINGH: That is right but having said that, I think that
9 the restructuring that I was involved in as Chief
10 Executive was quite fundamental. You know, to
11 essentially create an organisation of four directorates
12 and getting Housing and Social Services genuinely to be
13 integrated was actually a major objective.
14 MR GARNHAM: This is 1993.
15 MR SINGH: 1993, but after that it is not my recollection
16 that there were substantial restructurings within the
17 department after that.
18 MR GARNHAM: Why was modernisation necessary?
19 MR SINGH: In 1998?
20 MR GARNHAM: Yes.
21 MR SINGH: The Authority took the view that it shared with
22 Government the view that a political decision making
23 itself had to change.
24 MR GARNHAM: That is the Cabinet point.
25 MR SINGH: Secondly that we had no option but to respond to
85
1 best value. Government were introducing that whether or
2 not you liked it and therefore we had to put in place
3 arrangements which would enable that to happen. The
4 third issue was about performance and that was actually
5 a combination of both a Government perspective about
6 improving performance but secondly a view that members
7 of the Authority and I and indeed senior officers had
8 about the need to considerably enhance and improve the
9 performance of the Authority.
10 MR GARNHAM: Why does need to improve performance lead to
11 modernisation? Why not simply do properly the job you
12 had before the change?
13 MR SINGH: That is easy for you to say. The reality is that
14 performance management I would actually argue is
15 generally new to much of the public sector and ever
16 increasingly, and if you talk to people within national
17 Government -- within, sorry, yes, national Government
18 across Whitehall, that is a relatively new concept.
19 Performance management certainly within local government
20 is relatively new but that is not to say that -- and
21 Haringey probably approached the issue somewhat late.
22 I mean you are right we should have been doing these
23 things but I mean we were approaching it late but
24 nevertheless it had to actually be done. I mean there
25 were other matters within modernisation which were about
86
1 greater involvement of users of our services and again
2 you could actually argue that should have happened
3 routinely already, but it was not.
4 MR GARNHAM: So modernisation is a convenient and not an
5 apposite description of a process of adopting these sort
6 of improvements?
7 MR SINGH: Absolutely. It is combination of on the one hand
8 responding to a Government agenda which is saying you
9 need to change, and on the other hand saying here is a
10 real opportunity within the organisation to
11 significantly improve the performance and culture of the
12 organisation.
13 MR GARNHAM: When he gave evidence Mr Kousoulou identified
14 three purposes which he said lay behind the
15 restructuring, the three drivers, to use the jargon.
16 First of all, a more devolved and more modern management
17 structure; secondly, a means of addressing poor
18 performance by some managers, and third saving cash. It
19 is 37 page 32. We do not need the document, it is just
20 a reference as to the day on which that evidence was
21 given.
22 MR SINGH: The three were what, sorry?
23 MR GARNHAM: More devolved and more modern management
24 structures, I think you have already told us that you
25 recognised that.
87
1 MR SINGH: Devolved performance and savings.
2 MR GARNHAM: Performance and the way he put it was poor
3 performance by managers, by particular managers, and
4 then saving cash.
5 MR SINGH: Yes.
6 MR GARNHAM: Accurate?
7 MR SINGH: Accurate insofar as it goes. I would also have
8 to suggest that the changes which were required within
9 Housing and Social Services, I mean to use drivers,
10 clearly there were other drivers like Quality Protects,
11 the use of (inaudible) teams, changes which the
12 Department of Health was wanting to be introduced,
13 closer collaboration, working with Health, those are
14 also matters which required adjustments within the
15 organisation.
16 MR GARNHAM: Would it be fair to say that the three that
17 Mr Kousoulou identified are at the top of the pile of
18 reasons for change?
19 MR SINGH: I would actually say that the first key driver
20 was actually that external agenda.
21 MR GARNHAM: You mean the one imposed on you by central
22 Government?
23 MR SINGH: Yes, you know, "Look, you need to respond to
24 actual and emerging new legislation." You had clearly
25 the external agenda of the review which whilst in part
88
1 had been positive but in part had been critical and
2 therefore it was important that the organisation
3 responded progressively to those areas of weakness. So
4 I think those were important external drivers for
5 change. Yes, of course, the issue of devolution, the
6 need to improve performance and the need to save some
7 money was also significant.
8 MR GARNHAM: You put the driver of performance in a rather
9 more cerebral manner compared with other witnesses in
10 that you talk about the intention being to improve
11 performance generally whereas the impression that I have
12 been left with by some witnesses was that it was a cloak
13 if you like for getting rid of managers who were no good
14 and it was easier than disciplinary proceedings.
15 MR SINGH: No, I have seen the evidence on that and frankly
16 as far as I am concerned this was much more about
17 improving systematically the performance of the
18 organisation, performance of Haringey Council in general
19 terms and more specifically the individual directorates.
20 Because there was a serious concern within the Authority
21 about the level of performance of Haringey vis-a-vis
22 when compared with other local authorities. I think
23 already you have seen my statement about the lowest
24 quartile. There was a genuine desire to improve the
25 quality of services that we were providing to users of
89
1 our services.
2 MR GARNHAM: The example that I think underlay those
3 suggestions I put to you earlier was that of
4 Carole Baptiste who had been a manager about whom there
5 had been substantial reservations for some time. One of
6 the consequences of the restructuring in that particular
7 department was that she was regarded as unappointable
8 for the new job and so perhaps conveniently she was
9 eased out of her job.
10 MR SINGH: Sure, I am not suggesting that I am sufficiently
11 naive that I am not aware that those things could
12 actually happen. Obviously I mean there are occasions
13 when people will use the framework of restructuring and
14 change to deal with problems which should have been
15 dealt with through other processes.
16 MR GARNHAM: You anticipate my next question because it
17 ought not to be thus, ought it?
18 MR SINGH: No.
19 MR GARNHAM: It ought to be that the problem faced by any
20 competent manager, if she be it, should be addressed
21 head on?
22 MR SINGH: Absolutely right. It should be dealt with head
23 on and it is generally not acceptable that people do not
24 deal with those issues head on but it is also
25 understandable that people will use opportunities like
90
1 this. We are all human beings for goodness sake and if
2 an opportunity does actually arise you will exploit that
3 opportunity for the interests of the organisation. It
4 may not be terribly pure and neat but in reality it
5 happens.
6 MR GARNHAM: The third of the drivers that Mr Kousoulou
7 talked about, saving money, he appeared to place
8 considerable stress on and there was a real need to save
9 money.
10 MR SINGH: Absolutely.
11 MR GARNHAM: And a particularly acute need in this
12 department, was there not, in Children's Services?
13 MR SINGH: Yes, clearly the Authority was under considerable
14 financial pressure and indeed I have to make the point
15 that the Authority during my whole 11 years I was there
16 was under considerable financial pressure, some of that
17 created, if I may say so absolutely honestly, by the
18 Authority itself, but there were some real fundamental
19 financial difficulties which actually meant that all
20 departments of the organisation were financially
21 stretched in terms of resources.
22 MR GARNHAM: We are going to come on to resources in
23 a little but the point I want to put to you in this
24 regard is this. What led to the decision for example to
25 reduce the number of managers, and there is some dispute
91
1 about the precise size of the difference, it might have
2 been 12 to six, 10 to seven, it does not much matter,
3 but was the reason for adopting that particular new
4 structure, that particular modern approach, rather more
5 to do with saving three or five or six people's salaries
6 than any clever devolving agenda?
7 MR SINGH: I think it was a combination of both, that yes it
8 did avail the opportunity to make savings but it is also
9 true to say that, and again as I understand it, that the
10 sorts of changes that were being introduced or proposed
11 to be introduced around practice managers or whatever
12 they were called was something which existed across
13 other social services departments across London and that
14 in a sense this is in part a looking at what was
15 happening elsewhere, so it was not simply a cynical
16 response to saving money.
17 MR GARNHAM: It might be thought that it was terribly
18 convenient that the modernisation and the devolving of
19 responsibility just happened in a department where cash
20 had to be saved to result in three, four, five, six
21 managers disappearing.
22 MR SINGH: No, I mean we need to be honest that whilst I am
23 actually saying that one of the fundamental key drivers,
24 to use that language, was the external agenda as set by
25 Government, it is absolutely clear that another key
92
1 driver was to save money. I am not going to hide behind
2 that, it was a fact.
3 MR GARNHAM: It was happy if the two pointed in the same
4 direction?
5 MR SINGH: It was happy when the two things happened
6 together and indeed often restructuring was a method
7 through which you would actually save money because --
8 I mean through a whole lot of rationalisation
9 particularly within bureaucracy which could flow from
10 that.
11 MR GARNHAM: You tell us in your statement that considerable
12 effort was spent by the Housing and Social Services
13 Department in preparing for modernisation.
14 MR SINGH: Yes.
15 MR GARNHAM: And that you were confident that as part of
16 this review, to use your words, Social Services
17 procedures had been subjected to vigorous appraisal.
18 MR SINGH: Yes.
19 MR GARNHAM: Again I am quoting you. The review that you
20 refer to in those sentences, that is what went before,
21 that was the internal review, was it, that went before
22 the proposed restructuring?
23 MR SINGH: Yes, I am essentially talking about the period in
24 1998 where the whole sort of business plan of the
25 department was principally focused around preparing for
93
1 the Joint Review and that actually entailed a rigorous
2 concerted management action on looking at updating
3 policy, updating procedures, looking at working
4 practices, including the auditing of some of those
5 policies and practices, to ensure, and this again may be
6 a cynical view, but to ensure that when the review
7 actually happened our systems were actually okay. I am
8 sorry, that is what I think I am referring to.
9 MR GARNHAM: I am trying to understand what it is you are
10 referring to, so that the work that was done in this
11 department ahead of the Joint Review had effectively two
12 purposes, one to prepare you for the review and secondly
13 to lay the foundation for change that might follow?
14 MR SINGH: That is right.
15 MR GARNHAM: What is the appraisal you are talking about
16 when you say it is subject to vigorous appraisal in
17 paragraph 6, on the second page of paragraph 6, top of
18 that page:
19 "... I was confident that as part of this review
20 [you have told us what that is] our procedures in Social
21 Services had been and were being subjected to a vigorous
22 appraisal."
23 MR SINGH: I mean that is vigorous appraisal by managers.
24 MR GARNHAM: In the course of the review?
25 MR SINGH: In the course of the review, yes.
94
1 MR GARNHAM: And the basis for your confidence that there
2 had been such a vigorous appraisal?
3 MR SINGH: Essentially the confidence was based upon a new
4 director that I had confidence in, I mean somebody who
5 really came across as somebody who was competent, able
6 and was able to deliver some real change. A confidence
7 in the Senior Management Team within the department.
8 I mean I believe there were some very able, talented
9 people working in that department, leading that
10 department. So the confidence actually came from them
11 and that did not exist dare I say for another department
12 which took up much of my attention in 1999.
13 MR GARNHAM: I shall not delay things by asking you about
14 that.
15 MR SINGH: I think there is a relevance.
16 MR GARNHAM: Yes, because of the comparison?
17 MR SINGH: No, because actually a significant amount of my
18 time within the latter half of 1998 was actually going
19 to be focused on Education because there were some, you
20 know, unlike this review here, the OFSTED Review had
21 actually slated the LEA, completely condemned it and was
22 effectively saying that the whole of the LEA function
23 should be externalised and that both the Joint Review
24 and the OFSTED inspection were running very much
25 parallel.
95
1 MR GARNHAM: Yes.
2 MR SINGH: On the basis of having received generally
3 a positive review on Social Services inevitably in terms
4 of priority, my priority as Chief Executive was to say
5 what the hell do we do about Education, so to that
6 extent it becomes important.
7 MR GARNHAM: That is very helpful. It suggests a number of
8 things that may be relevant for us as we go through this
9 examination because it does suggest that the focus of
10 your attention was because it had to be on Education
11 rather than on Social Services in this period. I am not
12 suggesting you did not put any attention into this but
13 your primary focus.
14 MR SINGH: I think my prime focus during virtually all of
15 1999, probably most certainly from about the summer
16 or June/July but in fact even earlier because I mean the
17 crisis within Education meant that the newly appointed
18 Director of Education went on sick leave for two months.
19 That actually meant that I had to get much more involved
20 in Education than one would normally do so, including
21 bringing in somebody on a temporary basis to run the
22 department, and that was running at the same time as the
23 OFSTED inspection which clearly fundamentally slated the
24 Authority.
25 MR GARNHAM: The second way in which that is helpful to our
96
1 understanding is it helps us understand perhaps the
2 financial imperative in directing money towards
3 Education.
4 MR SINGH: Yes, because I mean Education was seen to be not
5 only a high political priority but actually was seen to
6 be in some real difficulty.
7 MR GARNHAM: Yes. When I ask you this question I do not
8 expect you to have detailed recall of the details of
9 this appraisal but I want to know what coming out of the
10 appraisal you have just talked about struck you as the
11 strengths and weaknesses of this department. Were there
12 headline points?
13 MR SINGH: I think the general sort of appraisal from the
14 internal assessment by the Management Team of Housing
15 and Social Services was actually not dissimilar to the
16 weaknesses identified within the Joint Review. In
17 a sense whilst we were making some progress around
18 performance there was still a long way to go.
19 MR GARNHAM: What does that mean? I do not understand that,
20 this expression that is used in the Joint Review and
21 elsewhere.
22 MR SINGH: In the sense that whilst you had an overall
23 framework which says, "This is the key information you
24 want to abstract", but the question then was were the
25 systems in place robust enough to be able to generate
97
1 the information to enable you to then feed into that
2 sort of corporate --
3 MR GARNHAM: So it is a comment on the communication system
4 rather than on the quality of the performance in the way
5 they dealt with people's files?
6 MR SINGH: I think it is much more about the quality of
7 information and the systems which are required to
8 generate that information.
9 MR GARNHAM: Yes and not about the way in which cases like
10 Victoria's were handled.
11 MR SINGH: Yes.
12 MR GARNHAM: So when we hear talk about the defects in
13 performance it is really defects in performance
14 indicators that you are talking about rather than in our
15 case ground floor social work. That is what I am
16 talking about. Clearly a Director of Social Services
17 would have a different -- may mean something else.
18 MR SINGH: Absolutely right.
19 MR GARNHAM: The Housing and Social Services Department
20 review was adopted by members and you tell us
21 implementation was delegated to the Director
22 Mary Richardson.
23 MR SINGH: Yes.
24 MR GARNHAM: You tell us that one of the objectives of the
25 new plan was to split Housing and Social Services into
98
1 two Directorates from April 2001.
2 MR SINGH: Yes.
3 MR GARNHAM: So this is you planning in June or so 1999 for
4 what would take place in April 2001?
5 MR SINGH: Yes.
6 MR GARNHAM: We know from evidence we have heard earlier in
7 this Inquiry that at the same time as it happens Ealing
8 Borough Council were bringing the two directorates
9 together, forming one instead of two.
10 MR SINGH: Right.
11 MR GARNHAM: I am therefore interested in your Council's
12 reasoning in the decision to split.
13 MR SINGH: I think the reasoning was reasonably
14 straightforward. The way in which Housing finance was
15 constructed by Government actually meant that if the
16 housing stock remained within a local authority then the
17 investment capacity within that stock was limited and
18 the Government's overall strategy was that local
19 authorities should wherever possible consider seriously
20 strong transfer to other organisations.
21 MR GARNHAM: Housing associations and the like?
22 MR SINGH: Housing associations, registered social landlord,
23 because that was the only way in which you could get
24 serious investment in the housing stock. Haringey,
25 whilst it was very much a local authority that prided
99
1 itself on its municipal approach to service delivery,
2 had actually accepted that stock transfer was actually
3 a reality and that it would actually happen and that
4 ultimately it would be beneficial to the Authority if it
5 were to happen and most certainly it would be beneficial
6 to the tenants and residents of the borough.
7 MR GARNHAM: And that led to a decision to split?
8 MR SINGH: That was actually saying, "This is actually going
9 to happen so what we need to do therefore is to begin to
10 plan for that eventuality".
11 MR GARNHAM: The two departments had come together as one in
12 1993 you told us.
13 MR SINGH: Yes.
14 MR GARNHAM: The aim behind that change I think was to make
15 more efficient dealing with what are often closely
16 related issues of housing and social support.
17 MR SINGH: Yes.
18 MR GARNHAM: How then is it justified six years later to
19 make a decision to split them apart again?
20 MR SINGH: It was purely justified on the basis that the
21 only way we were going to get real investment into the
22 housing stock was through this particular process,
23 through the externalisation of the stock to other
24 service providers, that was the only way and it was felt
25 that what we should actually do, and the Authority had
100
1 already taken a decision to begin the stock transfer
2 process. I think 25 per cent was earmarked to be
3 transferred to registered social landlords I think in
4 the first year of 2000/2001. So that those decisions
5 had been made and the received wisdom was that the best
6 thing to actually do was to decouple the two departments
7 to enable this to eventually happen and to some extent
8 actually a thinking that one option was not simply to
9 transfer to an existing housing association but to in
10 fact enable the Housing DSO as it were to bid for that.
11 MR GARNHAM: Service organisation?
12 MR SINGH: Direct service organisation, to enable the stock
13 to be transferred with an organisation that had a public
14 service ethos. That was essentially the thinking behind
15 it.
16 MR GARNHAM: This thinking was going on in the first half of
17 1999?
18 MR SINGH: Yes, around then.
19 MR GARNHAM: Because by June 1999 you were recommending this
20 to the two relevant committees.
21 MR SINGH: Yes.
22 MR GARNHAM: At the same time, the first two or three months
23 of 1999 you were having the inspection by the Joint
24 Review Team who were to produce their report in November
25 of that same year.
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