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Archived Transcript for 18 December 2001:
Pages 1 to 50
1
1 Tuesday 18th December 2001
2 (10.00 am)
3 MR GARNHAM: Good morning sir. One minor housekeeping
4 matter, just to let interested parties know that the
5 recent material disclosed principally by Haringey has
6 now been processed and is available for collection.
7 Because it runs to an additional five lever arch files
8 it is behind reception on this floor and we would ask
9 interested parties to request it from the lady on
10 reception. I will ask Ms Gibson to take the first
11 witness.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much and again thanks to the
13 team for all the hard work they have done in processing
14 that material.
15 MS GIBSON: The first witness is Craig Turton sir.
16 MR CRAIG TURTON (affirmed)
17 MS GIBSON: Thank you. Would you like to begin by giving
18 the Inquiry your full name please.
19 MR TURTON: Craig Turton.
20 MS GIBSON: You have made one statement for the Inquiry that
21 is in volume 3 page 76. I think you have a copy of that
22 in front of you.
23 MR TURTON: I do.
24 MS GIBSON: Firstly, is there anything that you would wish
25 to amend or correct on that statement?
2
1 MR TURTON: No.
2 MS GIBSON: Can you confirm that the contents of that
3 statement are true?
4 MR TURTON: I can indeed.
5 MS GIBSON: Thank you. You were a Labour member for
6 Haringey Council from 1994 to 1998, is that correct?
7 MR TURTON: That is correct.
8 MS GIBSON: And Chair of the Social Services Committee from
9 1997 to 1998?
10 MR TURTON: That is correct.
11 MS GIBSON: Is it therefore the position that you were
12 responsible for the budget for the year 1998 to 1999 in
13 that position as Chair of the Social Services Committee?
14 MR TURTON: That is correct.
15 MS GIBSON: Can you also confirm that it is right that
16 historically Haringey has been a strong Labour seat,
17 I think it has been under Labour control for all but
18 three years from 1965?
19 MR TURTON: That is correct.
20 MS GIBSON: You also prepared a letter on 24th October
21 circulated to other Haringey councillors dealing with
22 the fact that you had been the subject of considerable
23 criticism for putting in the statement that you did.
24 MR TURTON: That is correct.
25 MS GIBSON: Can you provide some background for why you came
3
1 to write that particular letter?
2 MR TURTON: Certainly, I would be happy do so. It was not
3 a letter I particularly wanted to write. In my
4 professional capacity I was at the Labour Party
5 Conference this year and met a couple of my former
6 colleagues from Haringey who told me that the Leader of
7 the Council, George Meehan, was "incandescent with rage"
8 that I had given a statement to the Inquiry, and left me
9 in no doubt that my former colleagues did not find this
10 helpful at all in their position as councillors on
11 Haringey.
12 My view is that, and if I may quote from that, this
13 is an occasion when something far more important is at
14 stake than whether particular individuals hold on to
15 office or power or further their careers. I believe
16 that we should all be very honest and open about this
17 and aid the Inquiry and I believe that is what
18 Lord Laming said when the Inquiry was announced and that
19 was my motivation for coming forward.
20 MS GIBSON: You ceased to be a councillor in 1998. What was
21 the reason for that?
22 MR TURTON: I lost my seat to the Liberal Democrats in
23 Muswell Hill.
24 MS GIBSON: Thank you. Is it the position that anything in
25 your statement is in any way motivated by any bad
4
1 feeling between yourself and the rest of the Labour
2 councillors?
3 MR TURTON: Not really because I was actually nominated to
4 stand at a bye-election the following year as recently
5 as January 1999 so I do not believe that I left Haringey
6 under any political cloud. No doubt that some
7 individuals will draw the conclusion that it is
8 motivated by malice against specific individuals but
9 I would -- I will say that now that is not the case, it
10 is meant to be helpful.
11 MS GIBSON: Thank you. I want to ask you now about the
12 financial background over the period during which you
13 were a councillor. Do you agree that during the period
14 that is covered by your statement, from 1994 onwards,
15 the Council was subject to considerable financial
16 constraints?
17 MR TURTON: Certainly, I mean Haringey is an outer London
18 borough with significant inner London problems.
19 Certainly we have a high proportion of refugees and
20 asylum seekers and we have a large and very diverse
21 population in great need and certainly the Social
22 Services budget was under considerable pressure during
23 the four years I was a councillor.
24 MS GIBSON: Yes. Mr Travers in a statement that he prepared
25 for the Inquiry, volume 3, page 75.403, I do not need to
5
1 take you to the statement but he sets a context that the
2 standard spending assessment did not take account of
3 spending on asylum seekers and homelessness, so the
4 Council had to find the resources for that by budgeting
5 in effect, is that right?
6 MR TURTON: That is my recollection of the situation.
7 Certainly when we discussed it with financial officers
8 and Social Services we ended up having to, if you will,
9 scrape around for additional funding because of the
10 influx of refugees and asylum seekers.
11 MS GIBSON: It was also a problem I think in relation to
12 a deficit connected with the development of
13 Alexandra Palace; is that the position?
14 MR TURTON: I would say that the Council's financial
15 problems started from the mid-1980s with the
16 redevelopment of Alexandra Palace and it was an ongoing
17 and considerable burden to the local authority and
18 drained a significant proportion of funding for very
19 little visible effect.
20 MS GIBSON: Thank you. It is also the position that
21 Haringey is one of highest council taxes in London over
22 this period.
23 MR TURTON: My understanding it was certainly in the top
24 five.
25 MS GIBSON: Your contention is that the quality of
6
1 Children's Services was adversely affected over a number
2 of years by inadequate funding and I wonder if you can
3 pinpoint which particular years you are talking about
4 during your involvement from 1994 onwards. Is it the
5 position that it was a deteriorating picture, are there
6 any years within that period that you would point to as
7 being the time when the rot started to set in?
8 MR TURTON: My recollection was that, I mean the standard
9 spending assessment, we were one of the lowest if not
10 the lowest during a three year period from 1994 to 1998.
11 We spent very little in comparison to other boroughs on
12 that. However, in contrast we had one of the highest
13 SSAs for Education Services and that was a marked
14 imbalance during those four years, something which I was
15 motivated to address as a councillor by sitting on the
16 Social Services Committee.
17 MS GIBSON: Can I ask you to have a look at the statement of
18 Mr Travers again. It sets out the standard spending
19 assessment for Social Services, just to put things in
20 context. That is volume 3 of the witness statements
21 page 75.404.
22 MR TURTON: This is 3.2?
23 MS GIBSON: 075.404. Perhaps if I can put it up on the
24 screen because I have a copy in my bundle. If we can go
25 to the bottom of the page where the figures are, that
7
1 sets out the standard spending assessment on social
2 services for children, then the actual budget and the
3 difference which shows a picture really of the SSA,
4 there being a substantial difference decreasing over
5 time, and the worst differential in the period 1998 to
6 1999 which I think is the year that you were responsible
7 for that particular budget where there is a difference
8 of in the region of £10 million.
9 MR TURTON: (Witness nods).
10 MS GIBSON: Does that does that accord with your
11 understanding of what the position was?
12 MR TURTON: It accords not with my recollection of it.
13 I am -- looking at this I am somewhat surprised there
14 was such a marked decline during that period. My
15 personal recollection was that in fact I think we
16 actually slightly increased the budget. You have to
17 forgive me however, it is some three and a half years'
18 distance.
19 MS GIBSON: Yes, so your contention is that the standard
20 spending assessment was or the spending on Social
21 Services was adversely affected by spending on
22 Education?
23 MR TURTON: A number of factors, I mean the Alexandra Palace
24 was a huge drain on it but certainly in my statement and
25 the political context of this was that elected members
8
1 decided to prioritise Education year on year at the
2 expense of Social Services and that was one of the
3 reasons I actually stood for the position of Chair was
4 to argue the case that we actually increase it, and if
5 I remember correctly we won an argument for at least
6 a measly increase of three social services for the
7 Children and Families Team which I think took effect
8 from 1999/2000, but that was the area most under stress
9 in Social Services.
10 MS GIBSON: You say in your statement that senior officers
11 gave advice to councillors that the financial allocation
12 for Children's Services and Child Protection was barely
13 adequate. Which senior officers gave that advice?
14 MR TURTON: Andrew Turnbull, Carol Wilson, the late
15 Andrew Ludlow, Dinos Kousoulou. Specifically those four
16 I remember talking about the situation with and
17 certainly when it came to the budgetary discussions with
18 all elected members certainly Dinos Kousoulou advised us
19 it was barely adequate.
20 MS GIBSON: When you say they gave that advice, which
21 members of the Council was that advice given to?
22 MR TURTON: That was all the members of the majority group.
23 MS GIBSON: So all of the members were given that?
24 MR TURTON: First of all it would be those members of Social
25 Services, it then went into the situation of effectively
9
1 horse trading over which votes should go to which budget
2 in a wider group, which was the full majority group.
3 MS GIBSON: And would those discussions have been minuted?
4 MR TURTON: Those discussions were minuted. However, it was
5 often the case that unless you had a formal motion or
6 amendment it was unlikely to be formally minuted as
7 such, so discussions were very much a free ranging, if
8 you will, free-for-all between elected members, usually
9 shouting at each other from across the chamber. Not
10 a very edifying prospect as I am sure you will imagine.
11 MS GIBSON: Similarly you mention members, senior members of
12 the staff mentioning that if there was no increase in
13 funding, tragedy could result. Firstly, were those
14 precise words used? Was the emphasis so strong?
15 MR TURTON: Possibly. I would be deceiving you if I could
16 quote and name an individual who said that. It was
17 certainly the position and I think you would have to
18 understand the emotive context of dealing with a budget.
19 It is not a clinical process. This was about members if
20 you will seeing the service they sat on, be it
21 Education, Social Services or Housing as, if you will,
22 their service and they fought their corner. It was
23 often quite an emotive process. I would think those
24 words were probably bandied about at some stage during
25 those discussions.
10
1 MS GIBSON: Again, was it the same members of the Housing
2 and Social Services Department that you mentioned in
3 your answer to the previous question who gave that
4 advice that the situation was a very desperate
5 situation?
6 MR TURTON: Yes.
7 MS GIBSON: You just mentioned that the budget setting
8 process would be quite emotive with everyone fighting
9 their own particular corner. Is it fair to say that it
10 was a situation where a number of departments had
11 pressing needs for more funding and it is against that
12 backdrop that we should look at the situation?
13 MR TURTON: Certainly.
14 MS GIBSON: In what way did those councillors who supported
15 an increase in education spending come to exercise their
16 influence over the budget unduly?
17 MR TURTON: I say unduly because I think that was
18 a historical position. When I was elected a councillor
19 I was about 24, 25 years of age, relatively young. We
20 had had members who had been on for decades before that.
21 I was very much the new boy on the block, not having
22 a very good knowledge of the political process at that
23 stage. Major decisions were taken on party lines
24 outside, as I have said in my statement, mainly in the
25 two constituency Labour parties.
11
1 The one I was a member of, Hornsey and Wood Green,
2 there was a very strong presence by the Socialist
3 Education Association. Members of that were usually
4 retired or practising teachers or lecturers and indeed
5 some senior councillors were also members of that.
6 Debate was therefore dominated by that clique
7 numerically in the Hornsey and Wood Green Labour Party
8 and it was often the case that any of us who tried to
9 shift the focus of the debate to another area, be it
10 Housing or Social Services, did not really get a look in
11 to that. It was very much a case of it was dominated by
12 Education, Education, Education but there again that was
13 the lead they were taking from Government at the time.
14 They would then, once the line had been set we would
15 go into discussions in the Council chamber amongst
16 majority members and again discussion again was
17 dominated very much by those, with some justification
18 I have to say, given that a lot of the physical
19 buildings, schools et cetera were in a very delapidated
20 condition.
21 Also the fact of we had a very vocal middle class in
22 the west of the Borough who were very good at
23 articulating and lobbying local councillors who would
24 often feel under pressure from that.
25 Those people who actually use Social Services if you
12
1 will are not so -- not very articulate in that sense and
2 not aware how to use the political process to get their
3 case across. I often felt, as did others, that if they
4 had been slightly more vocal, as the middle classes
5 were, then we would not have been in a position where --
6 we would have had some assistance externally if you will
7 to put the case stronger for the Social Services budget.
8 Am I making this clear to you?
9 MS GIBSON: Yes. Can I ask you, was there any sense in
10 which your concerns, you were not enabled to fully
11 express your concerns because of pressure from the
12 Constituency Labour Party?
13 MR TURTON: No, I would not say that. I mean I had argued
14 vociferously within that as did other members but we
15 were a vocal minority amongst a much larger group.
16 MS GIBSON: Can you point to any particular minutes of
17 meetings where we will find your expression of concern
18 about Social Services funding or indeed of any other
19 member of the minority group to which you belong who
20 were lobbying for Social Services?
21 MR TURTON: I have not got access to any of the papers from
22 that period when I was an elected member from 1994 to
23 1998, so forgive me, I cannot point you in that
24 direction.
25 MS GIBSON: Would it be the position, can you say from your
13
1 awareness of the process, and where those debates
2 occurred, whether there would be any minuted discussions
3 in which you raised your concern about Social Services?
4 MR TURTON: I would have hoped that somewhere within that
5 there would have been a statement of concern by myself
6 or others that we increase funding to Social Services.
7 Possibly I could point you perhaps to the majority group
8 minutes taken from probably the period of autumn 1997 to
9 probably about spring 1998 which was usually the time
10 when discussion was dominated by setting a budget. That
11 is an educated guess I am afraid.
12 MS GIBSON: Thank you. Do you agree that the budget setting
13 process would consist of the following: the main
14 spending departments, which would include Children and
15 Social Services, putting in their claims to the
16 Committee which would be chaired by the Chief Executive,
17 I think at that time David Warwick?
18 MR TURTON: Yes.
19 MS GIBSON: He would be responsible for preparing the draft
20 budget?
21 MR TURTON: That is correct.
22 MS GIBSON: I am sorry, the Chief Executive who was then
23 Mr Singh?
24 MR TURTON: I forget the period Mr Singh left actually.
25 I think it was some time in 1997. Was it later?
14
1 MS GIBSON: I think it was in 2000 but in any event the
2 Chief Executive. That would be the process?
3 MR TURTON: The Chief Executive would be the one who would
4 actually put together the budget and put the final paper
5 towards the Council, yes.
6 MS GIBSON: You clearly were very concerned about spending
7 during this period for Social Services.
8 MR TURTON: Yes.
9 MS GIBSON: Did you not consider that it would be
10 appropriate to take those concerns to a meeting of the
11 full Council to ensure that those concerns went properly
12 on record?
13 MR TURTON: I could have done and it has also been put to me
14 by current members of the Council, "Why did you not
15 resign during that period if you felt so strongly about
16 it?" I had actually resigned from the vice chairmanship
17 of Alexandra Palace over another issue and I thought it
18 was far better to actually remain there and fight my
19 corner rather than pointlessly resigning. We could have
20 taken it to the full Council and to my shame it is
21 probably something I should have done in retrospect when
22 I think about it; however it is something I did not do
23 at the time and it is something I deeply regret because
24 obviously there would therefore be a proper record of
25 the concerns of some of the members of the Council.
15
1 MS GIBSON: Can you help with how often, with what sort of
2 regularity you would be raising these concerns and who
3 with?
4 MR TURTON: Firstly they would be within meetings with
5 officers. They would be with officers and elected
6 members on the Social Services Committee. There would
7 be the majority group. They would later be in the
8 majority group of the ruling Labour group, which
9 consisted of at the time 57 Labour councillors. Those
10 concerns were also raised in Party meetings outside, in
11 local ward meetings, in my own case in Muswell Hill
12 ward, and they were also raised at Hornsey and Wood
13 Green constituency Labour Party meetings. So quite
14 a wide and varied forum.
15 MS GIBSON: So would it be the position that the Leader of
16 the Council would be fully aware of your concerns?
17 MR TURTON: That is correct and if I remember correctly
18 shared some of those concerns.
19 MS GIBSON: Which particular concerns did he share?
20 MR TURTON: That Social Services was adequately funded and
21 I do remember the then Leader of the Council raising
22 concerns about the issue of Social Services needing to
23 be funded above its SSA.
24 MS GIBSON: What response did you receive to your expression
25 of concern?
16
1 MR TURTON: From whom?
2 MS GIBSON: Well, perhaps from firstly from the Leader of
3 the Council as to why more spending could not be
4 directed towards Social Services and then any other
5 members that you raised your these concerns with.
6 MR TURTON: I do not believe it was the case that he
7 expressed that it could not be raised. One was always
8 pointed back in the direction of debating that with
9 colleagues and the strength of one's argument leading to
10 an increase. However, I often stated that unless we had
11 vociferous support from leadership that would be
12 something that was unlikely to proceed.
13 MS GIBSON: To clarify, the Leader of the Council was not
14 George Meehan in 1998?
15 MR TURTON: No, the Leader of the Council at that time was
16 Toby Harris, now Lord Harris.
17 MS GIBSON: Right. In what sense was this directed by
18 issues of electability?
19 MR TURTON: As with any local government organisation,
20 I would think wholly, probably very unreasonably. It
21 was certainly the case as I stated before that if you
22 have a vociferous middle class banging on your door
23 stating that you must increase spending to education,
24 and constituency votes, that is bound to be something
25 that you take on board in making your decision.
17
1 MS GIBSON: Was that the standard response that you would
2 receive when you expressed your concerns about the
3 riskiness of the situation to Social Services because of
4 underspending in that area?
5 MR TURTON: Not exactly, no, that would not be the standard
6 response one would receive. It was certainly something
7 that one was reminded of but I do not think there was
8 a stock response.
9 MS GIBSON: What was the general message that you were
10 getting as to why this could not happen?
11 MR TURTON: The general one was all service departments are
12 under considerable pressure and there was a great need
13 to improve standard of service in Education, Housing,
14 Social Services across the political spectrum.
15 MS GIBSON: Was an element of that the fact that Education
16 if you like was protected by Central Government and the
17 level of spending on Education?
18 MR TURTON: I would say certainly and with the current
19 Government's emphasis at that time certainly it was the
20 case that Education, Education, Education was the
21 message which elected members were receiving loud and
22 clear.
23 MS GIBSON: Can I ask you to have a look at volume 15
24 page 133. You can see there that is the Haringey
25 Housing and Social Services Joint Review position
18
1 statement and going over the page you will see that that
2 document is dated November 1998.
3 MR TURTON: Yes.
4 MS GIBSON: Firstly, have you seen this document before?
5 MR TURTON: No, never.
6 MS GIBSON: Could I ask you to go to page 151 of the bundle.
7 You will see at the second paragraph down that there is
8 reference there to Education and it speaks there of
9 a variable and strained relationship between Social
10 Services, who are the authors of this document, and the
11 Education Department. Can you assist with why that
12 might be the case?
13 MR TURTON: Can you clarify your question for me please?
14 MS GIBSON: The fact that there is discussion there of
15 a variable -- relationships with the Education
16 Department, and this is a document coming from the
17 Housing and Social Services Department, are variable and
18 have been strained in the past, not least by competition
19 for diminishing levels of finance. Does that accord
20 with the other evidence that you have just given about
21 the spending on Education?
22 MR TURTON: That is the case and it is an accurate statement
23 that relationships between elected members and officers
24 representing those two departments were historically
25 strained. However, I would say it is most unwise to
19
1 actually put that in writing in a document, if one's
2 motivation is to improve relationships between Council
3 departments. It actually beggars belief that anybody
4 put that in.
5 MS GIBSON: Is it the position that contrary to what you now
6 state you did not at the time tell the Budget Setting
7 Committee or the Executive Committee of the Council that
8 it would not meet its statutory obligations to children
9 unless it provided more resources?
10 MR TURTON: I am sure that I must have done at some point
11 but I have no absolute specific recollection of doing
12 so.
13 MS GIBSON: Again, can you point to any written
14 documentation to support your contention?
15 MR TURTON: Again, I have not had any contact with any
16 Council documentation for about three years so I could
17 not point you in that direction, I am sorry.
18 MS GIBSON: Do you recall from memory ever writing a letter
19 or memo to that effect?
20 MR TURTON: I recall actually writing to the Leader of the
21 Council and actually I think it was chairs of other
22 services including Education stating that historically
23 we were the lowest on the SSA in London and we needed to
24 ensure that we had sufficient funding within the service
25 not just for one year but it had to be ongoing and we
20
1 had to look at about a five year plan if you will to
2 actually increase it. It was unrealistic to expect
3 a huge cash injection in one year if not two. My
4 motivation was to ensure that we see a steady and rising
5 increase in the service over a number of years and for
6 that level to be maintained in the future and improved
7 upon.
8 MS GIBSON: You have described in your statement the
9 problems of recruitment and retention over the period
10 1995 to 1998 when you ceased to be a councillor, which
11 is at slight variance from some of the other evidence we
12 have heard during the course of the Inquiry where other
13 staff paint a picture of consistent work, consistent and
14 stable workforce until after the restructuring exercise
15 in 1999.
16 MR TURTON: Not in comparison with some of the other London
17 boroughs, no. Certainly with regard to, if I remember
18 correctly, we often used Islington and Hackney as
19 comparisons. Hackney was not a very good comparison in
20 terms that I think they actually had worse recruitment
21 and retention problems than we did. However,
22 Islington's if I remember correctly was significantly
23 better. The position did deteriorate.
24 Some positions there is always a big vacancy,
25 occupational therapy I remember being a key one, partly
21
1 from the fact that there is no actual guaranteed career
2 structure within that profession and it was very hard to
3 recruit anybody in the first place, never mind retain
4 them, but I certainly remember in the east of the
5 Borough and some of the offices, particularly the North
6 Tottenham one, there were problems and I think it is not
7 fair to say that there was a sudden recruitment and
8 retention problem at the back end of 1999. I think that
9 process had started a couple of years earlier really.
10 MS GIBSON: Again was this a matter that you raised with
11 your colleagues and the full Council?
12 MR TURTON: Not with the full Council. We did discuss it in
13 the Social Services Committee and officers did report on
14 that situation.
15 MS GIBSON: Aside from discussion was there any plan of
16 action as to how this situation could be alleviated?
17 MR TURTON: Giving the example of the occupational
18 therapist, it is very unlikely unless something happened
19 centrally from Central Government. We looked at the
20 position of how does one recruit; would it be the fact
21 that would you try and recruit from the local area. If
22 so, could there be certain incentives towards travel.
23 At one stage the Council did discuss actually giving
24 an allowance for people who actually were employed by
25 the Council who lived locally but I do not think that
22
1 came to anything, but there was no specific determined
2 push about how we would actually improve recruitment and
3 retention, no.
4 MS GIBSON: You talk of cosmetic restructuring taking place.
5 Are you referring to the restructuring in 1999? I think
6 that is after you left but plans for that were afoot
7 obviously before it took place or you are you speaking
8 about the merger between the Housing Department and
9 Social Services Department --
10 MR TURTON: The merger between Housing and Social Services
11 happened before I became a councillor so that is not
12 really relevant, but I think there was, when we are
13 talking about restructuring I am not just referring to
14 Council-wide, that can happen within directorates, there
15 can be restructuring and it seemed to be a sort of
16 annual state of affairs that rather than actually look
17 at a problem in-depth and allow staff to get on and do
18 a job we would have a cosmetic restructuring state of
19 affairs which would usually happen from about fourth to
20 first tier officers.
21 MS GIBSON: Turning to ways in which the situation may be
22 alleviated for the future, do you think there is any
23 fundamental problem in the way that the standard
24 spending assessment works and the fact that there is not
25 a set figure for Social Services and local councils can
23
1 depart from that?
2 MR TURTON: I think there are two things I would like to see
3 happen as a result of this Inquiry. The first is that
4 I think that I mean the SSA needs to be revisited by
5 Government. I do not think it is appropriate at all
6 that local councils and particular councillors, many of
7 whom have a great lack of knowledge of the complexities
8 of social services issues, are allowed so much freedom
9 to decide where money is spent and on what.
10 The second one relates to that. I strongly believe
11 that elected members who sit on Social Services should
12 have some form of mandatory training and that is in part
13 organised by the Social Services Inspectorate as I think
14 there is a lamentable lack of knowledge by councillors
15 as to actually what services Social Services provides in
16 this country.
17 MS GIBSON: You gave an example in your statement of one
18 committee member who did not know what a looked after
19 child was after three years of serving on the committee.
20 MR TURTON: It is an extreme example but it did happen.
21 MS GIBSON: Did you have a background yourself in working in
22 Social Services or did you inform yourself?
23 MR TURTON: No, I did not have a background. I actually was
24 employed at that time as a civil servant and I had some
25 dealings with Social Services but I tried to educate
24
1 myself as an ongoing process as to actually what
2 services were provided and read up on the issue, but
3 again there was no formal training offered on that,
4 actually unlike Housing where I seem to remember that an
5 induction as a councillor one was given some quite
6 detailed notes about exactly how the Housing Services
7 budget operates, for example.
8 MS GIBSON: Is it your contention that it would have been
9 possible to spend more money on Social Services, it was
10 just lack of political will that prevented that from
11 happening?
12 MR TURTON: No, I think -- I do not say I do not think it
13 was just lack of political will, I think there were
14 enormous pressures on Haringey Council and probably
15 still are, a lot of services competing for the same pots
16 of money. However, I think that if the Council -- if
17 I had actually stuck to my guns and ensured money was
18 not diverted from Social Services, then we could at
19 least have protected some of the funding within that
20 budget.
21 MS GIBSON: Thank you. You say, and you may have already
22 answered this, at the end of your statement that you are
23 not beyond criticism personally. Is that what you refer
24 to, the fact that you did not stick to your guns in
25 respect of safeguarding that budget?
25
1 MR TURTON: I am as much to blame as anybody, I believe.
2 I think we are all collectively responsible for
3 underfunding that service, perhaps me more than anybody,
4 being the actual Chair of the committee, and one is
5 always wise with hindsight but I believe that I should
6 have certainly been more vocal about the issue and
7 certainly argued more forcefully in a public arena,
8 maybe taking the case out of the councillor arena and
9 utilising the media for that purpose. One can always be
10 wise with the benefit of hindsight.
11 MS GIBSON: Thank you very much.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I am very grateful for your
13 evidence to the Inquiry and the way you have given your
14 evidence this morning. Could I just ask you a number of
15 questions for clarification please. The first question
16 is at the beginning of your evidence you referred to the
17 alleged rage expressed by Mr Meehan. I do not know
18 whether that was expressed or not but the question
19 I want to ask you is this. What do you think either he
20 or other members took exception to in your statement?
21 MR TURTON: It is rather hard to say as I have not had the
22 opportunity to converse with him but I could speculate
23 that it was they perhaps viewed it as unhelpful to
24 criticise the political process which led to
25 decision-making as opposed to the operational
26
1 relationship between members and officers.
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. In the second paragraph of your
3 statement, you say that you want to inform the Inquiry
4 about the political decisions which led to the
5 inadequate funding of Housing and Social Services which
6 in turn contributed to the failure of the service to
7 care and protect Victoria Climbie.
8 I want to be sure that what you are saying to the
9 Inquiry is that you believe there is a direct
10 relationship between the funding and what happened to
11 Victoria.
12 MR TURTON: I think I have actually clarified that elsewhere
13 in my statement. If I can draw your attention to the
14 conclusion on the second page, I will quote from that if
15 I may. I state there:
16 "It would not be appropriate to conclude that
17 inadequate funding of Children's Services alone directly
18 led to the death of the late Victoria Climbie. Other
19 agencies were equally at fault in neglecting to detect
20 the abuse this child suffered and to provide adequate
21 protection."
22 Certainly it would be the case that if we had
23 actually funded the service better, had been able to
24 recruit and retain staff, certainly within the Children
25 and Families Service in North Tottenham, social workers
27
1 would not have had the extreme case load they had and
2 perhaps would have been able to spend more time and
3 examine individual cases in depth. It is a lot of
4 different factors related to it so I do not believe it
5 would be fair to say that because we did not fund Social
6 Services in my opinion adequately, the child died.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: No, but what you are saying, that is why I am
8 grateful to you for clarifying these matters, you are
9 saying that there is a relationship between the funding
10 of services and their effectiveness in protecting
11 children like Victoria?
12 MR TURTON: That is certainly my opinion, yes.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: I say that because I would like to take you
14 to another part of your statement, paragraph 6 on the
15 front page. It is the paragraph that begins "It should
16 be noted ..." and I will read the last section:
17 "... the apportionment of the annual Council budget
18 between the various Council departments and services
19 seldom considered the statutory requirements and duties
20 of Social Services, particularly with regard to
21 Children's Services and Child Protection."
22 That is a very strong statement Mr Turton and I just
23 want to make sure that that is your view.
24 MR TURTON: That is certainly my view and if I may clarify,
25 I think part of that is due to the lack of knowledge
28
1 that elected members have about the duties which Social
2 Services has to discharge statutorily.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Let me ask you a question on
4 that. Do you believe that it is a responsibility of the
5 senior officers of a local authority to make sure that
6 elected members fully understand not only their role but
7 also their statutory responsibilities, the statutory
8 responsibilities placed upon the authority?
9 MR TURTON: I would agree with that wholeheartedly but
10 I also would say that it is up to elected members to
11 have an adequate interest in the subject and learn about
12 it.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but implicit in what you have said is
14 that there was not sufficient effort made by the senior
15 officers of Haringey to actually inform elected members
16 of their statutory duties that the law had placed upon
17 them as a corporate body.
18 MR TURTON: My recollection being that we were certainly
19 reminded of our responsibilities by the senior officer
20 at the time, Dinos Kousoulou. Certainly within the
21 budgetary process that did not happen and I have no
22 recollection of a social services senior officer
23 actually reminding the councillors of their statutory
24 obligations, no.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: I just wanted to ask for your help on another
29
1 matter which is in relation to Education, Education,
2 Education that you have quoted. Is it your view or not,
3 please tell me from your experience, that it is
4 a responsibility of elected members to protect the most
5 vulnerable members of the community as well as providing
6 general services?
7 MR TURTON: Absolutely.
8 THE CHAIRMAN: And it is your view that Haringey did not do
9 this?
10 MR TURTON: In this particular case, reference to
11 Victoria Climbie, no.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Had you had a proportion of the 10 million
13 pound difference between SSA and spending, is it your
14 view that the prospects are that Victoria would have
15 been protected?
16 MR TURTON: I think you can plan ahead to ensure that the
17 possibility does not occur. However, from Brighton we
18 have had an example of a case where the individuals who
19 abused the child were able to convince a multitude of
20 professional officers that they were looking after the
21 child, so I think you cannot legislate against frankly
22 evil people doing evil deeds to children.
23 THE CHAIRMAN: I accept that absolutely. Just one other
24 question I wanted to ask you if I may. The
25 restructuring of not just Social Services and Housing
30
1 but perhaps other aspects of the Council's work in your
2 view, if I understand you right, this is why I am asking
3 this question, was not to enhance service provision but
4 to avoid making tough decisions. I put it in a really
5 sort of direct way to you.
6 MR TURTON: I think it was too often the case that
7 reorganisations are done rather than definitive action,
8 yes, rather than actually addressing fundamental
9 challenges facing Social Services such as issues of
10 funding but also recruitment and retention of staff. It
11 was too often the case that we would have what
12 I regarded as a cosmetic exercise in moving the
13 goalposts and shifting the players on the pitch around.
14 THE CHAIRMAN: I am hesitating because there is still one
15 area that I am a little uncertain about and that is that
16 you said that the decisions would be made for electoral
17 advantage and I understand exactly what you mean and
18 I understand the way in which these things sometimes are
19 handled, but given the electoral position in Haringey,
20 the Labour Party was not seriously at risk in losing
21 control of Haringey. Why was it not possible to debate
22 these matters in a way which achieved the kind of
23 balance that you are saying should have been achieved
24 across the statutory responsibilities of the authority?
25 MR TURTON: I would say that Haringey lacks a culture of
31
1 openness and it is an environment in which frank debate
2 cannot take place and I think this Inquiry may have seen
3 some of that from the way Haringey has actually dealt
4 with cooperating with this Inquiry.
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed. Ms Gibson.
6 MS GIBSON: I have no further questions.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: I am grateful to you for your evidence this
8 morning.
9 MR GARNHAM: Our next witness is Mr Gurbux Singh please.
10 MR GURBUX SINGH (sworn)
11 MR GARNHAM: Please have a seat Mr Singh. Can you give the
12 Inquiry your full name.
13 MR SINGH: My name is Gurbux Singh.
14 MR GARNHAM: Your current professional address.
15 MR SINGH: The Commission for Racial Equality,
16 Elliott House, 10 to 12 Allington Street, Victoria.
17 MR GARNHAM: Mr Singh has made one statement for the
18 Inquiry. You will find it in volume 3 of the witness
19 bundle at page 42. I wonder if a copy of that could be
20 put in front of Mr Singh. Mr Singh, can you flick
21 through it and confirm to us that you have signed it.
22 MR SINGH: Yes, I can.
23 MR GARNHAM: Are there any amendments you wish to make to
24 it?
25 MR SINGH: Nothing fundamental other than under paragraph 1
32
1 which really relates to the point at which I left
2 Haringey. Technically I left Haringey at the beginning
3 of May but the reality is that there is a combination of
4 annual leave which was due to me and also the fact that
5 the then Home Secretary asked me to conduct a review,
6 effectively I was out of Haringey by --
7 MR GARNHAM: February?
8 MR SINGH: No, I suspect by the end of March or early April
9 but everything else is fine.
10 MR GARNHAM: With that qualification are you content that
11 statement is true?
12 MR SINGH: Absolutely.
13 MR GARNHAM: You are now Chairman of the Commission for
14 Racial Equality?
15 MR SINGH: Yes.
16 MR GARNHAM: Between May 1989 and as you now tell
17 us March 2000 you were the Chief Executive of Haringey
18 Council?
19 MR SINGH: Yes.
20 MR GARNHAM: A period of just under 11 years?
21 MR SINGH: Yes.
22 MR GARNHAM: You began your career I think in the
23 predecessor to your current employer. You begin working
24 as a Housing specialist with the Community Relations
25 Commission in 1972?
33
1 MR SINGH: Yes.
2 MR GARNHAM: You began working in local government in early
3 1980?
4 MR SINGH: Yes.
5 MR GARNHAM: Working first with the GLC, then with Hackney,
6 Brent and then Haringey?
7 MR SINGH: That is correct.
8 MR GARNHAM: You were Director of Housing at Haringey from
9 1987 to 1989?
10 MR SINGH: Yes.
11 MR GARNHAM: When you became Chief Executive?
12 MR SINGH: That is right.
13 MR GARNHAM: Could you be given volume 29 please, page 102.
14 We have a copy of your c.v, I think you call it your
15 biographical summary. Do you have that?
16 MR SINGH: Yes I have.
17 MR GARNHAM: You give us three examples of the way in which
18 your management style has in the past been effective.
19 Firstly the GLC, you tell us you took over a poorly
20 performing team delivering failing services and
21 transformed it over a two year period into one of the
22 GLC's best housing teams.
23 MR SINGH: Yes.
24 MR GARNHAM: Second, you tell us that you were involved in
25 the management of the aftermath of the riots on
34
1 Broadwater Farm Estate and that estate was turned as
2 a result of your efforts and doubtlessly the efforts of
3 others into a model of good practice.
4 MR SINGH: Yes.
5 MR GARNHAM: Then thirdly in Haringey you tell us you
6 developed one of the most successful community safety
7 partnerships in Britain involving three of the agencies
8 with which we are now concerned, the police the Council
9 and the Health Authority.
10 MR SINGH: Yes.
11 MR GARNHAM: Can we deduce from that that you take the view
12 that good management can turn around poor team
13 performance?
14 MR SINGH: Absolutely.
15 MR GARNHAM: Is the corollary of that that management must
16 take responsibility when the performance of a team falls
17 below what is acceptable?
18 MR SINGH: Yes.
19 MR GARNHAM: By the time Victoria's case came to Haringey
20 you had been Chief Executive for a little over nine
21 years. Long enough to have made a difference?
22 MR SINGH: Yes.
23 MR GARNHAM: Long enough for you to ensure that the role
24 that was carried out by the levels of management beneath
25 you were to your liking, your satisfaction?
35
1 MR SINGH: Yes.
2 MR GARNHAM: You go on in your statement, paragraphs 2 to 4,
3 to describe your main duties as Chief Executive. You
4 had overall responsibility for efficient management and
5 for the efficient execution of the Council's functions,
6 a classic statement of the role of a Chief Executive.
7 MR SINGH: Sure.
8 MR GARNHAM: You tell us that that involved in particular
9 initiating and monitoring, those are the two words you
10 use, initiating and monitoring the implementation of the
11 Council's work programme. I take that to mean, but tell
12 me if I am wrong, both the initiation of policy and the
13 seeing that through into practice?
14 MR SINGH: Yes.
15 MR GARNHAM: And you tell us that one of your functions was
16 to ensure that the Council kept responsive to change?
17 MR SINGH: Yes.
18 MR GARNHAM: And in a local government arena that is the
19 substance of a Chief Executive's job because you live in
20 a world of constant change?
21 MR SINGH: Absolutely.
22 MR GARNHAM: I imagine you would tell us that managing
23 change is the consequence of being responsive to change?
24 MR SINGH: Yes.
25 MR GARNHAM: That you have to learn and to teach your staff
36
1 how they should see change, not necessarily as a threat
2 but as an opportunity, and how to deal with it?
3 MR SINGH: Yes.
4 MR GARNHAM: Can we take it from that then Mr Singh that at
5 the core of your role as Chief Executive was ensuring
6 that management was efficient and effective and taking
7 responsibility when it was not?
8 MR SINGH: It was actually more than that. The reality
9 actually is that as Chief Executive it is not just
10 simply about putting in place appropriate management
11 arrangements and making sure that management works
12 effectively, it is also building in place corporate and
13 service based processes and procedures which enables
14 that to actually happen.
15 MR GARNHAM: Yes.
16 MR SINGH: And the two go hand in hand. You cannot actually
17 divorce the two.
18 MR GARNHAM: So you set up or helped set up the aims and
19 ambitions?
20 MR SINGH: Yes.
21 MR GARNHAM: And then you identify and adopt and see are
22 implemented the mechanics by which that is put into
23 practice?
24 MR SINGH: Yes.
25 MR GARNHAM: As you will know we have already heard a good
37
1 deal of evidence about the way that Victoria Climbie's
2 case was handled by Haringey. Have you read any of it
3 or have you heard of any of it?
4 MR SINGH: I clearly have not had the opportunity to read
5 all of it but I have read a fair amount. I have clearly
6 read.
7 MR GARNHAM: You know the gist?
8 MR SINGH: The gist of it, yes.
9 MR GARNHAM: That the conclusions that might be drawn from
10 that evidence are going to be a matter for Lord Laming
11 in due course but it is at least possible thus far to
12 suggest as possible considerations a number of failings
13 of management in Haringey and just so that you know what
14 I am talking about, can I remind you of those
15 possibilities and we will talk about what they mean.
16 MR SINGH: Yes.
17 MR GARNHAM: It has been said, and we will have to test
18 whether or not this is right, but it has been said that
19 the allocated social worker in Victoria's case was
20 overworked and received no proper instruction or
21 supervision on the case, Victoria's case, that she was
22 asked to take on. Point one.
23 Point 2, it is said that she was part of a team that
24 was demoralised, demotivated.
25 Third, it has been suggested that she was managed by
38
1 a team manager with a poor or very poor attendance
2 record who when she was there conducted supervisions
3 that were substantially below standard.
4 Fourth it has been suggested that some members of
5 the team received no or little induction in their roles
6 when they first arrived in Haringey.
7 Fifth that team members were unaware of important
8 documentation and policies, things like the ACPC
9 handbook and the case recording guidelines that Haringey
10 management had produced. It has been said that team
11 managers routinely failed to follow guidance that was
12 produced either because they took the view that the
13 guidance was out of date or for no good reason that we
14 have been able to discover at all.
15 It is said that case files went unread by managers
16 and supervisors at the time of supervisions, at the time
17 cases were closed. It will be a matter for Lord Laming
18 whether that is right but that is the suggestion. If it
19 is right, to what extent should we hold you responsible?
20 MR SINGH: I think the first question clearly is the one you
21 have posed. That is a matter for this Inquiry to form
22 a view about, and if clearly that conclusion is that
23 there was -- all those things were the case, then
24 clearly there were considerable management failures but
25 I have to also say that the evidence also exists that
39
1 there were proper reviews of procedures and policy, that
2 there were training strategies and training plans put in
3 place, that in fact the child protection policy and
4 procedure had actually been reviewed in 1998, that many
5 of the policies which relate to children and many of the
6 systems and processes had actually been put in place
7 during the course of 1998 in preparation for the Joint
8 Review. That many -- and the evidence is actually there
9 both internally and indeed externally that we had put in
10 place within Social Services an auditing function
11 precisely to look at the systems and processes which
12 were in place or not in place as the case may be.
13 So that I mean clearly there is a different view
14 which actually says many of those things were actually
15 there. I mean, it is also interesting that the Part 8
16 review, the thing I have actually read, whilst it
17 painted an appalling picture of failure, mainly focuses
18 on individual decisions, failure and the inability of
19 agencies, multiagencies to work together as opposed to
20 systems which failed. I believe those systems are
21 actually there and I believe the evidence is there to
22 support my statement but I have to say that I mean
23 clearly if the Inquiry differently -- then coming back
24 to your central question.
25 MR GARNHAM: Let me stop you there.
40
1 MR SINGH: My own responsibility was the question you asked
2 me.
3 MR GARNHAM: Yes, it is.
4 MR SINGH: Clearly as Chief Executive I am ultimately
5 overall responsible for the way in which the Council
6 performs and operates, but having said that, clearly
7 there are directors who have statutory responsibility
8 and that I would actually say that it is directors and
9 layers of management below that who ultimately are
10 responsible for the day-to-day delivery of the services
11 within their sphere of responsibility.
12 MR GARNHAM: Can I break that answer down a little because
13 you are quite right that there is evidence that the
14 structures and the policies and the procedures were in
15 place, but I wonder, and I wonder if you could help me
16 with this, as to the extent to which that assertion,
17 that evidence is inconsistent with the evidence I have
18 suggested has been brought before this Inquiry, because
19 it may well be that Haringey had devised some excellent
20 procedures and policies and documents and protocols but
21 if the sort of evidence I have been talking about is
22 right, it was not achieving the ends it set out to
23 achieve.
24 MR SINGH: Yes, I mean that clearly may be but I would also
25 have to point you in the direction of the Joint Review
41
1 which also painted a different picture.
2 MR GARNHAM: The Joint Review might or might not be right.
3 MR SINGH: As Chief Executive I depend on external reviews
4 to tell me what the hell is actually happening and it is
5 perfectly reasonable for me to expect a Joint Review
6 conducted by two reputable bodies, SSI and
7 Audit Commission, to actually be reliable and that gave
8 myself and indeed members of the Authority considerable
9 comfort in a very difficult environment that we were
10 operating in.
11 MR GARNHAM: Two points arise from that. First of all you
12 do not, do you, rely solely on that report --
13 MR SINGH: No.
14 MR GARNHAM: -- as the source of your information, and
15 secondly, things change?
16 MR SINGH: Surely, things change, and it is absolutely right
17 there are a number of things I rely on or relied on as
18 Chief Executive. Essentially a number of internal
19 processes, quite elaborate processes internally,
20 principally around departmental planning and service and
21 business plans including divisional plans for the
22 Children's Service, information which would be generated
23 to the performance management framework which we put in
24 place which would again deal with the outcomes of
25 processes. Clearly evidence that was coming out of the
42
1 Children's Strategy Board and indeed information that
2 came to me on a monthly basis about certain fundamental
3 issues around children, so that as Chief Executive I am
4 dependent upon information coming in to me internally
5 but secondly I am dependent upon information which comes
6 to me externally and thirdly I am dependent upon
7 information coming through to me from the director in
8 the one to one relationship with the directors.
9 Now, it is in a sense a combination of all three of
10 those you can begin to form a judgment as to how the
11 department is performing.
12 MR GARNHAM: Absolutely. What I am trying to understand,
13 you have been frank enough to acknowledge that if the
14 Inquiry finds these failings are a true reflection of
15 the position then ultimately you take responsibility,
16 but I am interested in gaining your help if I may so
17 that we understand how things went wrong, because if
18 that is right and the picture is one painted by a number
19 of managers of junior and middle ranking level in
20 Children's Services, and it is painting a more or less
21 consistent picture, if that is right, how did it happen?
22 MR SINGH: I have actually reflected on that, having looked
23 at the evidence which has come in front of the Inquiry,
24 that we have essentially two -- at least two pictures
25 emerging. A picture where the evidence from management
43
1 appears to be actually systems are in place, everything
2 is working fairly well, we were not actually told about
3 the problems, we were not aware that these issues were
4 bubbling away, and yet we have another picture which is
5 a picture painted by social workers, by team leaders and
6 indeed by area managers as I understand it.
7 Ultimately the reconciliation on what is right and
8 wrong will be Lord Laming's Inquiry. I have to say that
9 the sort of problems which have been identified during
10 the course of this Inquiry I was not aware of and they
11 were not raised with me, they were not identified with
12 me. Most certainly when we come to budgets that is
13 a different scenario but the reality is that I was not
14 aware of the sorts of problems which appeared to be in
15 existence as presented by the front line staff.
16 MR GARNHAM: It would be perfectly reasonable for a man in
17 your position not to be aware of those provided there
18 was in place beneath him a mechanism for dealing with
19 it.
20 MR SINGH: Yes.
21 MR GARNHAM: There are two different positions we need to
22 look at. If what the staff on the ground are saying is
23 correct, that they were funnelling upward their
24 concerns, then the error would seem to lie in those who
25 received those reports and the way they dealt with them.
44
1 MR SINGH: Yes.
2 MR GARNHAM: If on the other hand they are wrong and that
3 information was not coming to middle management, then
4 the error would appear to lie in the systems that picked
5 up that sort of response. Is that not right?
6 MR SINGH: I believe that the processes and systems were
7 there and I have tried to make the point already. You
8 know, I mean there were supervision sessions held, the
9 Council had clearly agreed under my leadership to put in
10 place performance appraisals uniformly across the
11 organisation, and that was developed within Social
12 Services as well as elsewhere, that there were systems
13 and processes with individual supervision, team
14 meetings, team managers being supervised, those
15 processes were there which should have enabled the
16 opportunity to be there to raise the sorts of concerns
17 which have subsequently been raised.
18 MR GARNHAM: Let us test that answer by the example you give
19 of the PDR. On the face of it, reading the documents,
20 an impressive structure for monitoring and supervising
21 staff. Yet we have evidence from Angella Mairs, a third
22 tier manager in this department, that they simply
23 disregarded it.
24 MR SINGH: Yes (a) I was not aware that that was happening.
25 I know what you expect me to --
45
1 MR GARNHAM: I do not suggest you were.
2 MR SINGH: Absolutely right.
3 MR GARNHAM: Where has it gone wrong because it is
4 self-evident, is it not, that there is no point in
5 having it if it is not used?
6 MR SINGH: It has clearly gone wrong through the management
7 chain. Clearly if the third tier are not being
8 supervised by the second tier and that goes down the
9 line, then clearly there is a problem but it is not my
10 understanding that that was the case.
11 MR GARNHAM: Where was the problem then?
12 MR SINGH: I do not actually know where the problem was.
13 I am led to believe that there were clear procedures and
14 processes in place around PDR where line managers right
15 the way down from the Director through to the Assistant
16 Directors third and fourth tier and then through to the
17 whole system, that PDR was actually working. That is
18 a view that I was informed about. That was the position
19 that as I understood it.
20 Now, I did not actually independently seek
21 verification as to whether that was the case. Some
22 organisations it may well be possible for that to have
23 been done. You simply take a slice of the organisation
24 and you carry out an audit as to whether performance
25 appraisal is actually working consistently across the
46
1 organisation. We did that once. We did not do it again
2 but that was just to establish whether performance
3 appraisal was actually operating. Now perhaps those
4 sorts of things we could have done but we did not.
5 MR GARNHAM: Perhaps the most fundamental of the errors that
6 there has been evidence to support is that supervisors,
7 senior practitioners I think they were called at the
8 time, did not read case files and nor did what I am now
9 corrected to call fourth tier management read them.
10 That was plainly contrary to not only the letter but
11 also the spirit of the PDR and to common sense and good
12 practice. Now, if that is a situation that existed at
13 the shop floor, if people are too busy, or the
14 alternative I suppose is not conscientious enough but
15 let us look at too busy to read files, then the system
16 is going to break down however clever everything else
17 is, is it not?
18 MR SINGH: Yes.
19 MR GARNHAM: If you have a busy office, if you have staff
20 who are working under substantial case loads and start
21 to let that sort of thing slip with the potential
22 disasters that can follow, how are we to understand why
23 that happened and what is to be done to stop it? Do we
24 have to look at the root causes for the busyness?
25 MR SINGH: Yes, of course we need to look at -- if it is
47
1 established as a fact that that was the case and that
2 PDR was effectively -- or supervision and team leaders
3 or third and fourth tier managers not actually adhering
4 to what they should have been doing, and if that is
5 established as fact, then clearly we need to look at the
6 root causes, precisely the points you are making about
7 the sorts of pressures those people are under.
8 MR GARNHAM: We have to look at the root causes as to why
9 they were making mistakes.
10 MR SINGH: Sure.
11 MR GARNHAM: We also have to understand, do we not, why it
12 is that management senior to them were not picking up
13 that error?
14 MR SINGH: Yes.
15 MR GARNHAM: So help us with the latter of those two. How
16 is it if that is the position that management senior to
17 those who are not doing what they should have done are
18 not picking it up? What has gone wrong?
19 MR SINGH: That is what I find slightly baffling and I have
20 to admit that if -- it goes back to my earlier comment
21 that if the scenario that you are painting is the case
22 then that should have been picked up through the line
23 management chain, and most certainly if that scenario is
24 correct, and most certainly it was not picked up because
25 I would have expected (a) the director to inform me
48
1 accordingly and (b) do something about it, to establish
2 what the root causes were so we could actually tackle
3 them.
4 MR GARNHAM: The reason I imagine that you have been
5 successful in your GLC Housing Team and been successful
6 on Broadwater Farm was not because you were particularly
7 adept at devising attractive policy documents, it was
8 because you actually got things done. How is it the man
9 who is able to do that who has been running this Council
10 for nine years at the time has beneath him, if all
11 I have suggested is right, this sort of non-management?
12 MR SINGH: To be fair that is yet to be established.
13 MR GARNHAM: What, the factual premise?
14 MR SINGH: You know the Inquiry may well conclude that
15 position but I still remain unconvinced that that
16 actually is the case. I have read the evidence of
17 Carol Wilson. I remain convinced that she had
18 a managerial grip. The thing that strikes me about the
19 management within the department was very much the point
20 that the Joint Review concluded that there was
21 managerial grip. There was leadership from the senior
22 management of the department, there was a management
23 group that knew what they were doing, complete
24 understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the
25 organisation.
49
1 MR GARNHAM: How can --
2 MR SINGH: That is what that independent review concluded
3 you had. That cannot simply be ignored and washed away
4 as if it did not happen.
5 MR GARNHAM: But I am entitled to ask you, if we are
6 pursuing the accuracy of this, how it can be that if
7 managers of the Carol Wilson level had a grip, all this
8 could go on beneath them without their knowledge, if
9 that be the indication?
10 MR SINGH: I do not know is the answer. I cannot reconcile
11 in my own mind a situation where on the one hand
12 managers have a grip, they are saying yes there are some
13 difficult issues that we are dealing with but actually
14 we are in control, confirmed by an external validation
15 through the review, to a position which actually paints
16 a different scenario altogether which actually says
17 there is not a grip.
18 MR GARNHAM: There are two possibilities. One the witnesses
19 who have come and told us about the administrative chaos
20 at the shop floor are not telling the truth.
21 MR SINGH: Yes.
22 MR GARNHAM: It is difficult to accept that, first of all
23 because it has been entirely consistent and secondly
24 because we have sitting in front of us Victoria's
25 parents who have lost their daughter.
50
1 MR SINGH: True.
2 MR GARNHAM: Or alternatively the conclusion that managers
3 had a grip is misplaced.
4 MR SINGH: Yes, but you have also got the witnesses of those
5 managers and if they are telling you that they did and
6 they had effective systems which were working, that they
7 were supervising their staff, then it is also suggesting
8 that they are not telling the truth either.
9 MR GARNHAM: No, it is suggesting that they did not know,
10 that they are not good enough at their job.
11 MR SINGH: Well, I think I have to say that if you look at
12 the calibre of people that existed within Housing and
13 Social Services they were of considerable talent.
14 Mary Richardson, who clearly will give evidence at some
15 stage, very experienced Director, eight years as
16 Director within Waltham Forest, came down here with
17 a considerable reputation, left Haringey to take on an
18 even more challenging job.
19 Assistant Directors within the department who were
20 well experienced within Haringey, people of considerable
21 talent. Carol Wilson, a considerably talented
22 individual; Dinos Kousoulou, talented; people who have
23 managed the organisation for a considerable period of
24 time. So they are experienced people. They are not
25 amateurs at this job.
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