Archived Transcript for 4 December 2001: Pages 1 to 50

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1 Tuesday, 4th December 2001

2 (10.00 am)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

4 Mr Sheldon.

5 MR SHELDON: Thank you sir. Could we have Mr Duncan back,

6 please.

7 MR DAVID DUNCAN (continued)

8 MR SHELDON: Good morning, Mr Duncan. As I am sure you are

9 aware, you are still under the oath that you took

10 yesterday evening.

11 You will recall we spent some time yesterday evening

12 working out the chronology of the various jobs you were

13 doing during 1999 and 2000/2001. I just want to confirm

14 that I have understood you correctly on one or two

15 points at the outset.

16 It was April 1998 that you were given the role of

17 Acting-Up Commissioning Manager with responsibility for

18 North Tottenham, is that right?

19 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

20 MR SHELDON: At that time, April 1998, you were also a team

21 manager in one of the Children and Families Teams.

22 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

23 MR SHELDON: You gave up that role, the team manager role,

24 in January 1999.

25 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

2



1 MR SHELDON: At which point you were just the Acting-Up

2 Commissioning Manager for North Tottenham.

3 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

4 MR SHELDON: You were appointed the Commissioning Manager

5 for Hornsey in September 1999 but you did not actually

6 take that role up until April 2000.

7 MR DUNCAN: Yes, and that was the joint commissioning role

8 for Tottenham and Hornsey.

9 MR SHELDON: Yes. So throughout Victoria's life in this

10 country, March 1999 to February 2000, you were solely

11 the Acting-Up Commissioning Manager with responsibility

12 for North Tottenham?

13 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

14 MR SHELDON: So when, for example, Shanthi Jacob says in her

15 witness statement -- sir, for your note it is

16 paragraph 5 of her statement -- that you were doing

17 a good job of supervising her despite the fact that you

18 were doing two jobs at the time, she might be right

19 about that, but it is not within the period with which

20 we are concerned?

21 MR DUNCAN: No.

22 MR SHELDON: And similarly when she says you were under

23 considerable strain as a result of having the two jobs,

24 Team Manager and Commissioning Manager, again she may be

25 right but that does not apply to the period January 1999

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1 to April 2000?

2 MR DUNCAN: No, that was the period of the restructuring.

3 MR SHELDON: Yes. We looked last night at a job description

4 in volume 16, page 45. I will not take you to it

5 immediately, because I think we arrived at the

6 conclusion yesterday evening that that was the job

7 description for the two-year transitional post that you

8 took up in April 2000, is that right?

9 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

10 MR SHELDON: The one that was sold to you quite convincingly

11 but the one which when you started to do it you came to

12 realise was unworkable?

13 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

14 MR SHELDON: And the reason, as I understood it, that that

15 role was just for two years was because the long-term

16 plan was to get rid of commissioning managers for both

17 North Tottenham and Hornsey and have team managers

18 reporting straight to the Assistant Director.

19 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

20 MR SHELDON: We found another job description -- sir

21 I should make clear we found it in our archives rather

22 than Haringey's -- which has not found its way into the

23 bundle. I wonder if a copy of that could be handed to

24 you. Sir I think you should have a copy and so should

25 the interested parties.

4



1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr Sheldon.

2 MR SHELDON: Mr Duncan I wonder if you could take a second

3 to glance through that and consider whether that was the

4 job description that applied to you whilst you were the

5 Acting-Up Commissioning Manager for North Tottenham

6 prior to April 2000. Were you given a job description

7 in April 1998 when you assumed this role?

8 MR DUNCAN: I do not remember. I have to say three pages of

9 this, it does not read easily. I am happy to accept the

10 title, it does look like my job description, but I am

11 not happy to say it was me. It looks as though it was.

12 MR SHELDON: I can perhaps save some time by directing you

13 to paragraphs 1 and 2 under Core Duties and

14 Responsibilities. Paragraph 1:

15 "To recruit, identify training needs, motivate and

16 develop staff ensuring effective management, supervision

17 and performance within a specified area."

18 Leaving aside what "a specified area" means, would

19 that apply, in relation to North Tottenham, to you?

20 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

21 MR SHELDON: Paragraph 2:

22 "To ensure the most effective use of allocated

23 budgets, to monitor spending against budgets and take

24 corrective action to ensure that budgets are not

25 exceeded."

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1 Again, you?

2 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

3 MR SHELDON: Thank you. When you were in that Commissioning

4 Manager role for North Tottenham you were accountable to

5 Carol Wilson the Assistant Director, is that right?

6 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

7 MR SHELDON: Does that mean she was your line manager?

8 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

9 MR SHELDON: You I take it were responsible for keeping her

10 updated as to the issues and concerns facing the teams

11 within the North Tottenham office?

12 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

13 MR SHELDON: How would you go about doing that?

14 MR DUNCAN: Through my supervision that I had from her. If

15 it was urgent it would either be by phone call or by

16 memo. In 1998/1999 I was perhaps less familiar with the

17 e-mail system. More recently it would be by e-mail but

18 I suspect in 1998/1999 it was not, it would be by phone

19 call or memo if it was urgent, and supervision if it was

20 not.

21 MR SHELDON: You were supervised about once every six weeks,

22 is that right?

23 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

24 MR SHELDON: Are you happy that she knew what you knew, as

25 far as what was going on in the team? Was she

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1 up-to-date?

2 MR DUNCAN: In most areas, I think so, yes.

3 MR SHELDON: Were you satisfied with the management and

4 supervision you were receiving from her during that

5 period?

6 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

7 MR SHELDON: You describe the manner in which the office was

8 organised in paragraph 5 of your statement onwards. We

9 can read what you say about it there and I do not intend

10 to take you to it in any detail but what I do want to

11 understand, and I hope you have a copy of your statement

12 in front of you. If not, perhaps one could be put.

13 Thank you.

14 Is the structure that you describe there the

15 pre-restructuring position? So the one that was

16 relevant -- the one that applied in 1999?

17 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

18 MR SHELDON: Just to confirm that I have understood it, all

19 cases that came into the office would be dealt with in

20 the first instance by the Duty Team; is that right?

21 MR DUNCAN: Almost all, yes.

22 MR SHELDON: What would be the exceptions?

23 MR DUNCAN: If there was a request from another local

24 authority to transfer a case from that local authority

25 to ours. For example, if the assessment had already

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1 been done by that local authority then that would be

2 negotiated direct with the Long Term Team.

3 MR SHELDON: I see. In other words if the needs were

4 already identified?

5 MR DUNCAN: That is right.

6 MR SHELDON: But for the majority of cases it came into the

7 Duty Team and the Duty Team was made up of members of

8 the other teams, working on a rota basis?

9 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

10 MR SHELDON: Then when they got a case the Duty Team would

11 either refer the case to one of the long-term Children

12 and Families Teams if the needs were identified?

13 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

14 MR SHELDON: Or they would send it to the Investigation and

15 Assessment Team which did what it says it does, which is

16 investigate and assess so those needs can be identified?

17 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

18 MR SHELDON: And the total number of staff in those teams

19 that I have described is about 50?

20 MR DUNCAN: I am going back really. In the office at that

21 time it is probably 65 or 70 people, so probably 20 of

22 those would be support staff. So 45/50, yes.

23 MR SHELDON: You in paragraph 9 of your statement say that

24 you were accountable for the actions of all of them; is

25 that right?

8



1 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

2 MR SHELDON: Perhaps we could just explore briefly what

3 exactly you mean by that using the example of a social

4 worker in the Investigation and Assessment Team. You

5 would not line manage that worker, would you?

6 MR DUNCAN: No, sorry.

7 MR SHELDON: You would, however, manage the team manager who

8 was that worker's line manager?

9 MR DUNCAN: (Nods).

10 MR SHELDON: Do you regard yourself in that case more or

11 less accountable for the actions or failures of that

12 social worker than, for example, your boss Carol Wilson?

13 MR DUNCAN: I think it depends on -- tell me if I do not

14 answer this question. What I would see as my

15 responsibility is ensuring that the team manager is

16 enabled to manage the performance of that social worker

17 to the best of his or her ability and that would include

18 skills, resources at her disposal, knowledge about the

19 performance issues, and it is my responsibility to

20 ensure that she has that. It is Carol Wilson's

21 responsibility to ensure that I have the knowledge to do

22 that and I have the resources to do that.

23 If I have put those in place and the social worker

24 underperforms and the team manager does not tackle that

25 underperformance then I think there is an issue for the

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1 social worker and the team manager. My attitude in that

2 office has always been that we are a team and I have

3 never shirked from my responsibility in -- that the work

4 in that office was done to the best of our ability. If

5 something went wrong I am not going to pretend that I am

6 not the manager, and I ought to do something to put it

7 right.

8 MR SHELDON: Yes. You would only be aware of the

9 performance of an individual social worker on, for

10 example, an individual case, via what the team manager

11 told you though, would you not?

12 MR DUNCAN: There would be -- it would be a bit more than

13 that. I would be aware of difficulties with the social

14 worker's performance through supervision with my team

15 manager.

16 MR SHELDON: Yes.

17 MR DUNCAN: But also through internal and external audits of

18 cases. I have regular discussions with the Manager of

19 the Child Protection and Quality Reviewing Service,

20 Ann Graham, about issues relating to cases and workers,

21 and through management information would show up

22 difficulties on cases. Also I had a lead responsibility

23 for complaints from service users and other

24 professionals, and also issues arising out of child

25 protection case conferences and looked after statutory

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1 reviews. So there were other means of finding it out.

2 What I did not have was a system for randomly spot

3 checking social workers' files.

4 MR SHELDON: Should you have had one?

5 MR DUNCAN: Under the case recording policy I think team

6 managers should and I feel as though I would have been

7 part of that. The case recording policy became

8 a particular issue after the -- it was around about

9 since 1998 but it became a particular issue after the

10 joint review in March 1999 because they said they are

11 struggling with your files.

12 MR SHELDON: They said they were not making as much progress

13 as they were expected.

14 MR DUNCAN: I cannot remember the words but I would agree

15 with that. So it was a constant source of discussion

16 within our group and I was saying to managers that we

17 need to adopt the case recording policy and the manager

18 said yes, yes it is important. But they quite rightly

19 said to me, "We are not managing the workload", and

20 I said that to Carol Wilson.

21 MR SHELDON: We will come on to the case recording issue in

22 detail in due course but what I want to understand from

23 you at this point is whether or not you were satisfied

24 in your Commissioning Manager role in 1999 that you had

25 sufficient systems in place to be able to identify

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1 concerns about the performance of a particular social

2 worker or concerns about the handling of a particular

3 problem case?

4 MR DUNCAN: I am not sure whether you are asking what

5 I thought then or what I think now.

6 MR SHELDON: What you thought then, first of all. Were you

7 happy that you had your finger sufficiently on the pulse

8 of the office for which you were responsible?

9 MR DUNCAN: It is difficult. I can only answer that in two

10 ways. I think the way that I was intending to run the

11 office at that time, in 1999, could have done because we

12 worked very closely as a group and I was very much

13 involved, in intention, with the running of that office.

14 I think the problem came right from January or February

15 1999 when the restructuring started and then I cannot

16 say that I had the finger on the pulse because --

17 MR SHELDON: You lost touch, did you, at that point?

18 MR DUNCAN: -- I was juggling with an awful lot of balls.

19 MR SHELDON: What other balls were you juggling with? You

20 still only had the one job, did you not?

21 MR DUNCAN: There were a lot of issues in the restructuring

22 which I could talk about now which I could explain what

23 else was happening. Would you like me to do that?

24 MR SHELDON: I think if it is convenient with you we will

25 deal with the restructuring thoroughly in one go as part

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1 of the areas of context to which I want to come in

2 a moment. But just so we understand the position in

3 relation to the extent to which you knew what was going

4 on, you would say that you had a fairly good grasp on

5 what was going on in your office up until the beginning

6 of 1999 but thereafter it was slightly more shaky?

7 MR DUNCAN: What I would say is that in 1998 it was

8 difficult because I was learning a new job whilst still

9 doing an old job. I was doing two jobs. I thought in

10 January 1999 -- I had a new manager, who was going to be

11 a team manager who replaced my old job and I thought now

12 we could really get going, then within a matter of weeks

13 the restructuring started. So I do not think we ever,

14 during this period, had a chance to look at the merits

15 and the weaknesses of the system. So I am not sure that

16 we ever -- I could ever say that I was satisfied because

17 it was never given an opportunity to run properly.

18 MR SHELDON: Before we come on to the specifics of that, let

19 us look just briefly at a general overview of the

20 situation throughout the period in which you were in

21 charge. On the basis of the timetable that we have

22 confirmed this morning, you were Commissioning Manager

23 with responsibility for North Tottenham from April 1998

24 to June 2001, although in the last year of that period

25 you had Hornsey as well.

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1 MR DUNCAN: (Nods).

2 MR SHELDON: Carol Wilson presumably appointed you to that

3 Acting-Up Commissioning Manager post.

4 MR DUNCAN: In April 1998?

5 MR SHELDON: Yes.

6 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

7 MR SHELDON: Did she tell what you your job was going to be

8 when she did so? Did she give you a brief or a set of

9 objectives?

10 MR DUNCAN: I do not remember her giving me a set of

11 objectives, no. I had no issue with Carol during 1998,

12 other than I was saying to her and she acknowledged that

13 other difficulties of not having a team manager that --

14 and I was covering that managerial post. I ought to say

15 Mary Richardson was the person who appointed me because

16 she was chair of the panel.

17 MR SHELDON: If I were to suggest to you that you left the

18 North Tottenham office in a considerably worse state at

19 the end of that three-year period than when you started

20 that job in April 1998, would you agree with me?

21 MR DUNCAN: I would want to expand on it, but yes,

22 absolutely.

23 MR SHELDON: Let us just trace the story through the

24 documents we have and you can explain whether or not the

25 picture they present is accurate. Starting point,

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1 volume 13A page 98 which is the SSI case recording audit

2 that you mentioned.

3 If we start at 93, in fact, that is the front page

4 of the report. 13A. This is a report, Mr Duncan which

5 came out -- dated on the front page August 1997 but

6 I think it came out in early 1998. Is that your

7 recollection?

8 MR DUNCAN: I have not seen this report for a very long

9 time.

10 MR SHELDON: But it would, would it not, have been one of

11 the first things you would have seen when you took up

12 your Commissioning Manager job?

13 MR DUNCAN: I have to say it was not.

14 MR SHELDON: You did not look at it?

15 MR DUNCAN: I did not say that, but I have not seen this

16 report for a very long period of time.

17 MR SHELDON: When did you first see it?

18 MR DUNCAN: It is hard for me to remember.

19 MR SHELDON: You have just taken over the Commissioning

20 Manager role in April 1998. Did you bother to look at

21 the SSI inspection that had been done a couple of months

22 previously or brought out a couple of months previously?

23 MR DUNCAN: I am just really trying to familiarise myself

24 with it to be honest.

25 MR SHELDON: Before you do that can you help with when you

15



1 saw it?

2 MR DUNCAN: I would have seen it at the time.

3 MR SHELDON: Yes. Perhaps the easiest way to familiarise

4 yourself with it is to go to the summary and

5 recommendations page.

6 MR DUNCAN: Is that at the end or the start?

7 MR SHELDON: No, it is page 98 of the bundle, about three or

8 four pages into the report. There are a couple of

9 concerns recorded in that summary and recommendations,

10 for example at paragraph 1.5 we see reference to

11 "variable practice" about three lines down in relation

12 to case recording.

13 Over the page at paragraph 1.13 we see a reference

14 to "some excellent case recording practices in which

15 staff had used and developed the system to extremely

16 good effect" but others where "custom and practice

17 dictated what took place".

18 However, we also see in that summary and

19 recommendations section some very positive things. For

20 example, paragraph 1.14: "We found a number of examples

21 of good practice". Paragraph 1.15: "Generally

22 relationships were positive within the department but

23 there was insufficient regular and routine sharing

24 between teams".

25 So the general picture that the report seems to give

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1 is that there were areas where things could be improved

2 but overall, within the ambit of this report, the office

3 was functioning fairly well. Does that accord with your

4 recollection of the situation when you arrived in April

5 1998? As the Commissioning Manager, at least?

6 MR DUNCAN: Yes, I would say so. I mean, I was glad to get

7 that job because I thought it was a good office. I had

8 worked there for six years and I thought it was a stable

9 staff group of competent and hard working people.

10 MR SHELDON: And that would seem to be the impression given

11 by the joint review, which came next and is in

12 volume 15A at page 28. Do you remember this review

13 coming out?

14 MR DUNCAN: Very much so.

15 MR SHELDON: We see from page 30 that the report came out in

16 November 1999, and that is just under the heading

17 "Haringey" at the top. Again, without taking you to it

18 in exhaustive detail because it is a long report, the

19 picture is generally a positive one, is it not?

20 MR DUNCAN: It is a very positive one. It complimented

21 Haringey's social work staff and contrary to what some

22 people have said about the joint review, it was fairly

23 comprehensive in its examination of Children and

24 Families in Tottenham. It looked at about 100 files, it

25 talked to the social workers and managers, four out of

17



1 12 teams, so roughly 33 per cent of our work and our

2 workers, and it said very complimentary things which I

3 think was right.

4 MR SHELDON: You thought it was a balanced and thorough

5 review, did you?

6 MR DUNCAN: I did.

7 MR SHELDON: Again one or two areas of improvement, for

8 example if you turn to page 63 in that bundle you will

9 see the part I was referring to earlier about more

10 progress being expected in relation to case recording.

11 The very bottom of that page:

12 "The review team would have expected more progress

13 given the inspection of 18 months ago."

14 The one we have just looked at. But again the

15 impression we seem to get is areas where improvement

16 could be achieved but overall positive. Yes?

17 MR DUNCAN: Yes. I would point out that I think their

18 comments on the case records were social services wide,

19 it was not specific to children's services.

20 MR SHELDON: Certainly. Next we have an internal audit that

21 was carried out in April 2000. That is in volume 15 at

22 page 106. We mentioned this yesterday evening when we

23 were discussing the situation in Hornsey and you will

24 recall saying in relation to Hornsey this was a fairly

25 damning audit and report.

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1 MR DUNCAN: One team in Hornsey.

2 MR SHELDON: Yes. However, in relation to North Tottenham

3 the position is if not ideal, then certainly not all

4 that bad.

5 MR DUNCAN: I would say that, yes.

6 MR SHELDON: If we have a look, for example, at page 107,

7 the last paragraph relating to North Tottenham, we see

8 the comment that there were "pockets of good analysis

9 and clear objectives but occasionally there was a lack

10 of focus and minor drift." Other comments would

11 include things like, for example, more home visits would

12 be a good idea, supervision, there was clear evidence of

13 hands on and regular supervision.

14 They were slightly concerned by the repetitive and

15 basic nature of management actions on file, as we see

16 from the first page. But, again, the picture is of

17 solvable problems against the background of if not

18 entirely positive, they are not a disastrous office.

19 MR DUNCAN: Definitely.

20 MR SHELDON: The next report I would like to take you to is

21 one that has only recently been brought to our attention

22 and so is in an update to the bundle. The reference is

23 volume 45B page 178. It is a report by Ben Brown.

24 Sorry, it is 118. That is probably the source of the

25 confusion, I am sorry.

19



1 Before we go to this, it is perhaps fair that I give

2 you the opportunity to remark upon the report in general

3 because you have not had long or much notice of the fact

4 that it was going to be referred to because it has only

5 just formed part of our bundle. Were you aware of this

6 report being compiled at the time?

7 MR DUNCAN: What happened was that Ben Brown arrived at the

8 Tottenham office unannounced. I had just left the

9 Tottenham office. That was the point at which, in early

10 June I think, that I had got over to Hornsey solely.

11 So ...

12 MR SHELDON: So you were aware he was there but you were

13 there not on a day-to-day basis knowing what he was

14 doing?

15 MR DUNCAN: No.

16 MR SHELDON: Did he talk to you in the course of compiling

17 his report?

18 MR DUNCAN: He tried to avoid talking to me. I persistently

19 asked him to meet with me to discuss the report because

20 I could not see that he could write a report about any

21 team in Tottenham without talking to the relevant

22 people.

23 MR SHELDON: He did talk to you in the end, did he?

24 MR DUNCAN: Finally, but after he had written the draft

25 report.

20



1 MR SHELDON: Let us see what he says in summary about what

2 he found. If I could take you to page 14 of that

3 report.

4 MR DUNCAN: Could I just check with you because you said

5 that you would allow me to make general comments about

6 this report. I would like to have that opportunity.

7 MR SHELDON: Go ahead.

8 MR DUNCAN: I have only had 12 hours to read the report and

9 this was done in June. Sometimes when you read reports

10 that you do not agree with, after a few days you

11 moderate your views and I have not been given that

12 opportunity to moderate my views.

13 MR SHELDON: I accept that.

14 MR DUNCAN: And Haringey did not give me the respect to show

15 me this report in advance and so they will get

16 a 12 hours on version of what I think of this report,

17 and I do not accept that you can make an assessment on

18 a very serious cry for help from a manager by just

19 talking to a few social workers.

20 Ben Brown sat in the Tottenham office and ignored

21 the practice managers in that team and did not talk to

22 them. He did not want to talk to me but I would not let

23 him get away with not talking to me. And he has written

24 a report, without any evidence backing it up in any way,

25 that is critical of Rose Kozinos and me. At best, he

21



1 has misunderstood what I said to him. At worst he has

2 deliberately misrepresented what I have said to him and

3 I think that the conclusion of this report was written

4 before he had even started the investigation and I feel

5 very strongly about it.

6 MR SHELDON: I anticipated you might which is why I gave you

7 the opportunity to make the comments you just have.

8 I still would like you to look at a particular section

9 of it and make some specific comment about that, if you

10 would.

11 MR DUNCAN: Sure.

12 MR SHELDON: That is on page 14, under the heading "7.1,

13 Summary", page 14 of the report. I am afraid my copy is

14 not numbered with the bundle numbers. "Summary":

15 "In summary there are very serious problems

16 concerning the practices of management and staff at

17 North Tottenham. Significant amounts of these concerns

18 are about the managers. The team members do not appear

19 to want management that will provide the support ..."

20 MR DUNCAN: "Do appear".

21 MR SHELDON: "... do appear to want management that will

22 provide the support, guidance and advice they urgently

23 need."

24 The last paragraph under that heading:

25 "It is clear that if the action outlined in the

22



1 recommendations above is not taken quickly, the children

2 looked after by the North Tottenham teams will remain

3 seriously at risk."

4 Firstly, that is of an entirely different order and

5 tone to the reviews and reports that we have been

6 looking at up to now.

7 MR DUNCAN: (Nods).

8 MR SHELDON: In respect of those conclusions there, firstly

9 serious problems with the management and secondly

10 children being seriously at risk as a result of being

11 looked after by the North Tottenham office, do you

12 accept those conclusions?

13 MR DUNCAN: I do not accept the way that he has reached

14 those conclusions. I have not seen Rose's memo for

15 a very long period of time. I think she was

16 highlighting very great problems in that team and as

17 a consequence the risk to children. It sounds as though

18 Ben Brown is agreeing with that but they are coming to

19 that conclusion through different routes.

20 MR SHELDON: Aside from the reservations that you have about

21 the manner in which the report was compiled, even if

22 a report had been compiled in a manner you regarded as

23 fair, taking full account of your views and the views of

24 the other staff there, would we expect such a report to

25 show a deterioration in the service offered by the North

23



1 Tottenham office from April 2000 to April 2001?

2 MR DUNCAN: Can I answer that in a slightly elongated way?

3 MR SHELDON: If it helps, yes.

4 MR DUNCAN: By June 2001, senior management in Haringey and

5 the Tottenham office, they are on different planets.

6 The senior managers in Haringey are disturbed to get

7 Rose's memo and they did not like it and their response

8 to that memo should have been a serious and considered

9 look at what that Tottenham office needed. It should

10 have recognised that Rose Kozinos was a long-standing,

11 loyal and talented manager who had worked in Haringey

12 for many years. She needed looking after. That team

13 needed looking after.

14 What we got was this, which was a slanderous attack

15 on managers to cover up the fact that senior management

16 in Haringey did not want to hear that children were

17 still at risk at Tottenham. The problems that Rose was

18 identifying were that for all sorts of reasons, which

19 I am sure we will go into and it is a complicated set of

20 factors that all came together, the lack of experience

21 and the number of vacancies that there were,

22 particularly in the Tottenham Investigation and

23 Assessment Team, meant that team managers could not

24 guarantee the quality of the work that was coming out.

25 That is what Rose was saying and she wanted senior

24



1 managers to share that burden and to support her in

2 finding a way out of it and she did not get that. She

3 got this, which is a distortion of the facts.

4 MR SHELDON: Yes. But nothing that you have just said in

5 that answer appears to be inconsistent with the basic

6 proposition, causation aside, that the service provided

7 by the North Tottenham office in June 2001 was of

8 a lesser quality than the service provided in early

9 2000.

10 MR DUNCAN: Oh yes, sorry. I would agree with that, I would

11 just want to be able to say why I thought --

12 MR SHELDON: You will certainly be given that opportunity,

13 but the point that I was putting to you was that even if

14 Ben Brown had done a fair, balanced, accurate and

15 thorough report, he would still have come to the

16 conclusion, or come to a conclusion along the lines of,

17 "There has been a deterioration in the service over the

18 last year or so", and so the reasonably positive picture

19 presented by the reports that we have looked at up until

20 now would have changed by June 2001.

21 MR DUNCAN: I cannot say what Ben Brown would have found.

22 I think I would agree with what you have just said.

23 MR SHELDON: If you had written the report?

24 MR DUNCAN: If I had written the report, yes. I just would

25 not have written that report.

25



1 MR SHELDON: Let us talk about the restructuring now because

2 it has been hinted at in a number of your answers and it

3 is clearly a matter of some importance which we should

4 establish at the outset. Firstly, did you feel that

5 restructuring was necessary in early 1999?

6 MR DUNCAN: No. But that is not a criticism. I accept that

7 sometimes departments have to change and sometimes they

8 have budgetary pressures in which to do it but there was

9 no reason in my mind to restructure, but that is not my

10 decision and I respected the decision that things had to

11 change.

12 MR SHELDON: Were you aware of what problem it was supposed

13 to be solving?

14 MR DUNCAN: The two issues did become blurred and I can

15 understand why. It was around a modernising local

16 government agenda that the government had. But very

17 quickly it was clear that it was a financial cut and

18 with the greatest respect to Carol Wilson and -- well

19 Carol Wilson, she acknowledged that openly that this was

20 a cut and Haringey had very serious financial problems.

21 MR SHELDON: Was it, at least in part, an attempt to get rid

22 of some managers in whom Haringey had lost confidence?

23 MR DUNCAN: Well, if -- certainly when it was mooted, no.

24 MR SHELDON: Did you ever think that is what it might be at

25 least partly about?

26



1 MR DUNCAN: Not particularly and maybe I am naive about

2 these things. Looking back then clearly I can see that

3 that is probably what it was about, but I do not think

4 departments would -- I certainly do not think this one

5 in this case -- it was an enormous restructuring of

6 Children's Services. That would not have happened just

7 so you can get rid of managers. It may have been

8 a by-product.

9 MR SHELDON: So you are clear in your mind still, even

10 looking back, that the overriding cause and the

11 overriding issue that restructuring was addressing was

12 financial?

13 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

14 MR SHELDON: Were you involved in any sense in the decision

15 to restructure?

16 MR DUNCAN: No.

17 MR SHELDON: Were you consulted at all before that decision

18 was taken?

19 MR DUNCAN: Carol mentioned it in passing, probably about

20 December 1998 or January, that this is what is being

21 talked about and what do you think but it has not been

22 agreed yet, and I have to be honest, I did not have

23 strong views. The enormity of it did not really hit

24 home.

25 MR SHELDON: But it was raised in that way, was it, rather

27



1 than a formal consultation process with you asked to

2 reduce your thoughts to writing?

3 MR DUNCAN: No.

4 MR SHELDON: Nothing like that. You were one of the people

5 within the restructuring process that were going to have

6 to fight for your job, is that right?

7 MR DUNCAN: Well I was fighting for my old job, my team

8 manager's job, yes.

9 MR SHELDON: But that burden was lifted from you in January

10 1999, was it, when you ceased being a team manager and

11 solely --

12 MR DUNCAN: No. Throughout until September of 1999 I was

13 effectively a team manager in my substantive role.

14 MR SHELDON: I see. So were you interviewed in September

15 1999?

16 MR DUNCAN: What happened was -- if I just explain. It is

17 always very complicated but my substantive post was

18 a team manager.

19 MR SHELDON: Yes.

20 MR DUNCAN: The substantive post holder is a commissioning

21 manager, was seconded over to set up a new asylum team

22 in Haringey. So the commissioning manager's post that

23 I was in could only ever be temporary because the new

24 commissioning manager for asylum could only ever be

25 temporary because that is the nature of that job.

28



1 When the restructuring happened all substantive team

2 manager post holders had to apply. 13 of us had to

3 apply for six substantive team managers' posts and that

4 was what I was allowed to apply for.

5 But there was also the opportunity to be the

6 temporary commissioning manager for both offices, that

7 was to run for two years and I was allowed to apply for

8 that because the existing -- it confuses me sometimes --

9 but the existing commissioning manager post holders, one

10 of them was going to go to -- was seconded out of the

11 borough and one was going to take early retirement.

12 MR SHELDON: So you effectively side-stepped the team

13 manager round of interviews by going for this other

14 post?

15 MR DUNCAN: Yes. What happened was the interviews for the

16 commissioning manager post took place I think in the

17 middle or the third week of September and the team

18 manager interviews were the fourth week of September and

19 then into October of 1999. If I had not been the -- if

20 I had not been successful at interview in the

21 second/third week of September I would have had to go

22 for the team manager interviews. Because I was

23 successful I did not have to go for these team manager

24 interviews.

25 MR SHELDON: It follows from that that you were by no means

29



1 immune to the uncertainty and concern about your future

2 that would have been felt by team managers and, at least

3 until the revised plan was announced, senior

4 practitioners as well?

5 MR DUNCAN: When we first started the senior practitioners

6 were in the -- when we first knew of the re --

7 MR SHELDON: I meant the rerevised plan because there was

8 some time when the senior practitioners thought they

9 were going to have to apply for their jobs as well?

10 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

11 MR SHELDON: All I was asking was you felt the same concerns

12 that team managers and for a period senior practitioners

13 were feeling about the uncertainty for your future?

14 MR DUNCAN: Very much so.

15 MR SHELDON: What impact, if any, do you think that that

16 had, looking back, on your effectiveness as the manager

17 of that office?

18 MR DUNCAN: Well when we first knew about the restructuring,

19 let us say it was about February of 1999, the interviews

20 were to take place I think in the June and then it just

21 got delayed and delayed. So in fact what was to be

22 a three or four month period took about seven or eight

23 months, and effectively I felt disempowered to be

24 a manager of the managers when I knew that they were --

25 I was going to be competing with them as colleagues for

30



1 those six team manager posts.

2 MR SHELDON: Practical effect of that day-to-day, this

3 disempowerment: any, or just how you felt?

4 MR DUNCAN: Well, the obvious impact came in July of 1999

5 when Carole Baptiste's team wrote expressing concern.

6 I am more than happy to elaborate on that now.

7 MR SHELDON: I do not want to do that now but what I do want

8 to do is to check that I understand you correctly to say

9 that you would have dealt with that differently if you

10 had felt more empowered in your management role?

11 MR DUNCAN: Absolutely. I -- certainly so close to those

12 interviews and at that time we thought the interviews

13 were going to be July/August and there was no way that

14 I could carry out any kind of investigation into the

15 statements made by Carole Baptiste at the time, so close

16 to the interviews.

17 MR SHELDON: We have heard some suggestion that people had

18 to revise for these interviews, is that right?

19 MR DUNCAN: I would have thought so.

20 MR SHELDON: Did you have to revise?

21 MR DUNCAN: Dead right.

22 MR SHELDON: Lots?

23 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

24 MR SHELDON: At work?

25 MR DUNCAN: I certainly did not because I never had

31



1 a minute's moment to do that at work. I noticed Lisa's

2 transcripts and no-one ever actually -- perhaps I should

3 have thought this through. No-one ever approached me

4 and said, "Look, I need to do some preparation work for

5 these interviews, can I do it in work time?"

6 MR SHELDON: Would you have regarded that as a proper use of

7 work time if they made that pitch to you?

8 MR DUNCAN: It is an interesting one because in some ways it

9 is very much a work issue. What I think I would have

10 said, but it did not come up is, "Look, you have to make

11 sure you carry out your basic functions as a team

12 manager, whether that is covering duties, supervising

13 staff or managing social workers managing case work.

14 And by all means set yourself two hours every few days,

15 close your office and prepare for that interview."

16 The preparations, you see, were around a formal

17 presentation. So there was specific preparation,

18 preparatory work to be done. But it was also around the

19 issues that would come up in team manager interviews.

20 And there were so many changes in social work at this

21 time with Quality Protects and the new modernising

22 agenda. There was actually an awful lot for new

23 managers to grasp and also the experienced team managers

24 who knew their job very well would actually be having to

25 make sure they knew what the changes were.

32



1 MR SHELDON: So a lot of time had to be spent on it?

2 MR DUNCAN: A lot of time. Well I had to do it twice.

3 I was revising for a team manager and a commissioning

4 manager at that time.

5 MR SHELDON: Within the context of an already full workload?

6 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

7 MR SHELDON: Could you have volume 2 of the green files

8 please, page 158.501. That is your letter that we

9 looked at yesterday to Anne Chan dated 17th July 2001 in

10 response to our request for details about why the

11 interviews in the restructuring were delayed from June

12 1999 to September 1999. Before we come to the detail of

13 that, the impression that one might get from reading

14 this letter, and also from some of the answers that you

15 have given in evidence so far, is that you take a fairly

16 dim view of the way in which this was handled by senior

17 management. Is that fair?

18 MR DUNCAN: Yes. Yes, it is fair. What I ought to say --

19 I would like to get across at some point what I was

20 thinking around -- or my views and my relationship with

21 Carol Wilson, because in some ways that is relevant as

22 well.

23 MR SHELDON: If it is a convenient moment, tell us what you

24 thought of Carol Wilson.

25 MR DUNCAN: Well Carol is somebody who I have an awful lot

33



1 of respect for and she was line managing me. Carol --

2 if I thought I was working hard, Carol was really quite

3 remarkable in the hours that she put in for Haringey and

4 by the very nature of someone like that, you have

5 respect and you want to work hard yourself. She had an

6 awful lot of knowledge that I learned from her and

7 a sense of justice for children. And I say this because

8 that, I think, provides leadership.

9 So I suppose what I am saying is that I put up with

10 an awful lot because of that during that time and that

11 lasted really until about July 2001 -- no, July 2000,

12 when I think things really just became too difficult.

13 So when I say I was unhappy with the restructuring

14 process and around senior management's part of that,

15 yes, I was unhappy. Carol can sit here and say whether

16 she would have done things differently, but I just could

17 not understand why it took so long to resolve this and

18 why then certain things happened that enabled the

19 restructuring to unravel before it had even started.

20 MR SHELDON: It is not just the length of time is it that it

21 took to do, it was the uncertainty during that period of

22 exactly what was going on that was of principal concern

23 to staff, was it not?

24 MR DUNCAN: Well I can tell you a catalogue. I can take you

25 through that process and say what was going on.

34



1 MR SHELDON: Well let us just look, because it may save time

2 to do so, at a memo in volume 28A at page 169. If you

3 can keep your volume 2 in front of you.

4 This is a memo to you Mary Richardson from the

5 senior practitioners and the team managers in North

6 Tottenham. We can see over the page they are all listed

7 at the bottom of the memo. The purpose of this memo

8 they say in the first line is to express their dismay

9 and distress at the proposals that are being made to

10 restructure this department.

11 The part I want you to look at in particular is over

12 the page at the top of page 170. They are asking for

13 written clarification of the details of the proposals

14 and the process that it involves, time scales, job

15 descriptions, what is going to happen to the people that

16 are not successful in interview, what options they will

17 have, what implications it will have for the grade and

18 salary for each successful and unsuccessful candidate

19 and the implications for managers and senior

20 practitioners acting up.

21 That is July 1999, so some considerable time after

22 the restructuring was announced. In your view are these

23 all things that should have been worked out before we

24 started on this process?

25 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

35



1 MR SHELDON: So do you regard it as acceptable that come

2 July 1999 the people that were affected by this

3 restructuring are still unaware of those basic things?

4 MR DUNCAN: Yes. I agree with that. What prompted this

5 I am sure is -- which was one of what we thought was the

6 final straw but there were many final straws to come --

7 was we were assured that the senior practitioners, who

8 are a very strong bunch of people in terms of their

9 competence, were not going to be affected and

10 I certainly felt in the early part of the restructuring,

11 because I could see that it was going to be difficult

12 for us -- what we thought would only be two or three

13 months then became seven months -- was that the

14 stability provided by the senior practitioners was going

15 to be crucial for that office. Suddenly at the end of

16 June or mid-June we hear that senior practitioners are

17 going to have to apply for their jobs as well and that

18 was one of the things that started to get this

19 restructuring unravelling.

20 MR SHELDON: We see an echo of that situation in your letter

21 to Anne Chan back in volume 2, the second page of it,

22 where you are attempting to answer the fairly simple and

23 direct question at the top of the page. Then you list

24 in four bullet points various meetings and sets of

25 minutes that you would need to see in order to be able

36



1 to answer that.

2 I do not want to take you to all of those in detail,

3 if you can confirm that the situation is that at

4 a senior management level there was a significant amount

5 of uncertainty as to exactly what was going on as far as

6 restructuring and what plans were throughout 1999, or at

7 least up until September.

8 MR DUNCAN: Yes, I think so to begin with but it became

9 clear, yes.

10 MR SHELDON: In exploring why this process was handled in

11 the way it was, and why there was this lack of clarity,

12 is that something we should ask Carol Wilson and

13 Mary Richardson or can you help us with it?

14 MR DUNCAN: No, I cannot. I think I ought to say that

15 during this restructuring I was in a slightly difficult

16 position, even in Carol's eyes, because she was not sure

17 whether I was -- because she was aware, and she is

18 a very fair person, that in some ways I was a team

19 manager and so I was out of the loop a little bit in

20 terms of information -- sort of out of the loop in terms

21 of being part of a proper process, I think.

22 MR SHELDON: Certainly. Can I get your view on this,

23 though, as a person directly affected by the

24 restructuring and party to the sort of concerns that we

25 have talked about. It is this: to what extent in your

37



1 view were the problems you have identified about

2 demotivation, lack of empowerment in a management role,

3 and so on, due to the fact that there was going to be

4 a restructuring along the lines that we know happened

5 and how much was it due to the way in which that

6 restructuring was handled?

7 MR DUNCAN: Sorry, could you just -- I am --

8 MR SHELDON: What was the problem? Was it the fact that the

9 department was going to be restructured and half the

10 managers were going to lose their jobs or was the

11 problem that it was handled so badly?

12 MR DUNCAN: Both. I mean I think -- I know it sounds very

13 naive now, when I go over the restructuring, that I ever

14 thought that it would work, but it was clear to begin

15 with, and Haringey was so used to restructuring, this

16 was just another restructuring, but it was never going

17 to work, I can see that now, and it was flawed right

18 from the start. The way that it was handled and what

19 happened in the interim period during that restructuring

20 process completely sabotaged it.

21 MR SHELDON: But the flaws in it were not apparent to you

22 from the outset?

23 MR DUNCAN: It should have been.

24 MR SHELDON: But you said: "At the time I respected the

25 decision, it seemed fair enough to me. I did not have

38



1 particularly strong views but it became apparent to me

2 over time that it was the wrong thing to do."

3 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

4 MR SHELDON: Now, again, is it that it became apparent to

5 you over time because it was handled badly or it became

6 apparent to you over time that it was a bad plan to

7 start with?

8 MR DUNCAN: Both.

9 MR SHELDON: Thank you. In that memo to Mary Richardson

10 that we glanced at just now, the view is expressed not

11 only that staff are dismayed and distressed but also

12 that there is a feeling that this has a knock-on effect

13 on the service to children and that children may be put

14 in danger.

15 MR DUNCAN: Could you show me particularly where?

16 MR SHELDON: Yes. It says at the beginning:

17 "We are writing to express our dismay and distress

18 at the proposals that have been made to restructure this

19 department. We believe the process of these proposals

20 are potentially dangerous and detrimental to the people

21 to whom we offer a service."

22 Does that reflect your view at the time in mid-1999?

23 MR DUNCAN: I am a very moderate person in that sense and

24 I do not use words like "danger" very easily so I do not

25 think I would have used that. Looking back on it now

39



1 they were absolutely right to use it. At the time I am

2 not sure that I would have done, but I think with

3 hindsight they were right.

4 MR SHELDON: Would you have been content to express yourself

5 in the more moderate terms along the lines of "having an

6 impact on service provision"?

7 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

8 MR SHELDON: Do you know what if anything was done in

9 response to this memo? I see you were copied in on it.

10 MR DUNCAN: I know Carol Wilson set up a series of meetings

11 with the senior practitioners to talk through their

12 changing role and some of their concerns.

13 MR SHELDON: Were you involved in that?

14 MR DUNCAN: No, I was not.

15 MR SHELDON: That was only the senior practitioners, not the

16 team managers?

17 MR DUNCAN: Yes, I believe so.

18 MR SHELDON: You were aware as to the extent to which their

19 concerns were addressed during the course of those

20 meetings?

21 MR DUNCAN: The feedback was mixed. I think the senior

22 practitioners were glad in respect of the fact that they

23 were able to talk to Carol about their concerns but

24 their concerns were not resolved, if you like.

25 MR SHELDON: Yes. Volume 29, please, page 33. This is your

40



1 memo of September 2000. Looking over on the second

2 page, you start your paragraph 5 by saying that you

3 believe that the period March 1999 and November/December

4 1999 was a particularly unstable one. Then the

5 particular part I appreciate your assistance on at this

6 point is the last sentence of paragraph 5:

7 "This was encapsulated by clear signals that

8 Mary Richardson herself was negotiating to leave the

9 department."

10 Was that common knowledge?

11 MR DUNCAN: Fairly common knowledge.

12 MR SHELDON: At what point?

13 MR DUNCAN: In about August or September two things happened

14 that were very relevant for me. One was this, which

15 within our senior management group there was a rumour --

16 which I do not normally listen to -- but it was very

17 clear that she was negotiating to leave to take a higher

18 post in Hackney. We are neighbouring boroughs; people

19 work in Haringey and Hackney and interchange, so there

20 were very good grounds to think that this was a basis

21 for the rumour.

22 I seem to remember an e-mail from Mary a week or so

23 later absolutely flatly denying this and telling people

24 to stop talking about it and that was the final

25 confirmation for me that it was happening.

41



1 MR SHELDON: Did the people in your teams get wind of this

2 as well?

3 MR DUNCAN: I think they probably did. I say that because

4 I felt very strongly about it.

5 MR SHELDON: Why did you feel strongly about it? Captain

6 deserting a sinking ship, do you think?

7 MR DUNCAN: Absolutely. I think loyalty is such an

8 important -- what is the word? What is loyalty? It is

9 a --

10 MR SHELDON: Quality?

11 MR DUNCAN: Quality -- thank you -- to have in a busy office

12 and for somebody to be the architect of such a major

13 restructuring, throw all the cards up in the air and

14 then run away before they all fall down. I was fuming.

15 MR SHELDON: So the point you are making in this memo is

16 that morale was low anyway and this made it worse?

17 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

18 MR SHELDON: Next on the subject of context within the

19 office at the time. I would like to get your assistance

20 on the industrial action which took place towards the

21 end of 1999. For this you will need volume 28,

22 page 379.

23 This is a document I am presently unable to identify

24 because my file has fallen apart but it seems to be --

25 yes, it is a report called -- it starts on page 375

42



1 called "Social Work Recruitment and Retention Crisis in

2 Children's Services" written by the Acting Director.

3 The part that I want you to look at at the moment is

4 on page 379, paragraph 6.3.1. This is a section in

5 which the factors relevant to North Tottenham are being

6 considered by way of explanation of the staffing crisis.

7 You will see in paragraph 6.3.1:

8 "Children's Services have experienced some

9 difficulties in recruiting frontline staff since the

10 summer of 1999. This has become a haemorrhage from

11 November/December directly linked in the industrial

12 action, after which increased numbers of staff tendered

13 their resignations."

14 Firstly, do you recall this industrial action?

15 MR DUNCAN: I recall the industrial action.

16 MR SHELDON: What did it consist of and how many days did it

17 last?

18 MR DUNCAN: Two separate days I remember. I think it was

19 just two separate days.

20 MR SHELDON: Two one day strikes?

21 MR DUNCAN: In December 1999.

22 MR SHELDON: Who did it involve?

23 MR DUNCAN: Unison members.

24 MR SHELDON: So in relating that to your team in North

25 Tottenham -- all of them, half of them?

43



1 MR DUNCAN: Most of them.

2 MR SHELDON: What was it about?

3 MR DUNCAN: Terms and conditions.

4 MR SHELDON: Not restructuring?

5 MR DUNCAN: No, the local authority had -- were suggesting

6 that they work longer hours at reduced pay and that sort

7 of thing.

8 MR SHELDON: How much sympathy did you have for it?

9 MR DUNCAN: For the strike or for the ...?

10 MR SHELDON: For the strike and then afterwards the

11 sentiments behind it?

12 MR DUNCAN: I think it was an absolutely -- it was a very

13 strange decision by the Council at that time to try to

14 change the terms and conditions of staff because it was

15 not going to gain very much and the impact in terms of

16 morale was huge. And even if the Council had secured

17 the cuts in terms and conditions they wanted, it would

18 not have made that much difference financially to them,

19 so it was really a lose, lose situation for the Council,

20 so I think it was a mistake by the Council to do it at

21 that time. So in that sense I had sympathy for Unison

22 saying that they wanted to take action. It is not

23 normal for me or my staff to take industrial action or

24 to go on strike and that was the only time it ever

25 happened.

44



1 MR SHELDON: Did you have anything further to say in answer

2 to that?

3 MR DUNCAN: No.

4 MR SHELDON: You are a member of Unison?

5 MR DUNCAN: Well I was.

6 MR SHELDON: You went out with the rest of them?

7 MR DUNCAN: No.

8 MR SHELDON: You went in?

9 MR DUNCAN: No. It was almost -- well perhaps Unison shop

10 stewards would not agree with me but it is almost

11 a custom practice that people at my level would work.

12 I certainly was not given a hard time by my colleagues.

13 MR SHELDON: So was the position this: staff in your office

14 had just come through a traumatic restructuring process,

15 just emerged out of the other end of that in late 1999,

16 and then they are hit with a plan to make them work

17 longer hours for less money?

18 MR DUNCAN: Yes. They had not quite come through the

19 restructuring, I do not think. I do not think any of us

20 had, really.

21 MR SHELDON: Do you agree with the sentiment expressed by

22 the author of that report to the effect that the

23 haemorrhage of staff that occurred in late 1999 was

24 linked to that terms and conditions issue?

25 MR DUNCAN: No, I would not particularly and I have to say

45



1 this report was written by Carol but it is based on

2 reports that I had written, you see, and I had not

3 included that. I think the haemorrhage of staff she is

4 right to say it was November/December and

5 January/February, but because the group that I am

6 talking about were a long-standing permanent members of

7 staff, they were talking to me from the summer that they

8 were intending to leave and they meant it.

9 So for me managing the service the instability arose

10 from the summer where I could see that the service was

11 going to struggle, and obviously when you think that you

12 are going to leave in the summer it is probably about

13 November/December that you actually do leave because of

14 making applications. So the instability started from

15 the summer of 1999.

16 MR SHELDON: I wondered about that because striking

17 generally means you want to stay but under different

18 conditions, whereas if you want to leave you may as well

19 leave. There is no point in striking.

20 MR DUNCAN: Yes that is very true. So I would never

21 particularly have linked -- it was not a happy time and

22 the industrial action was just one other thing that made

23 people fed up. That was not the main factor I do not

24 think.

25 MR SHELDON: Let us deal at this point then with that issue

46



1 of staffing. You say in your statement that there was

2 no particularly acute staffing problem until the end of

3 1999. Is that right?

4 MR DUNCAN: Physically, but with the rider that the

5 instability was there.

6 MR SHELDON: So problems, as we will come on to look at,

7 were possibly agency staffing and turnover, but actually

8 numbers of bodies: it was only November/December 1999

9 that that became a problem?

10 MR DUNCAN: Roughly, yes.

11 MR SHELDON: And the problem became acute from that point?

12 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

13 MR SHELDON: Was it still acute when you left?

14 MR DUNCAN: It was desperately acute when I left but that

15 was six months ago.

16 MR SHELDON: Could you have a look at volume 26B please,

17 page 231. These are some minutes of a district

18 management meeting and it looks like from the top of

19 that page that you took the minutes of this meeting.

20 Turn if you would please to page 233, item 9.

21 Somebody, it does not say who, expressed the view that

22 the number of vacancies in Tottenham was having a major

23 impact on service.

24 "Total: seven on the frontline, two in the long

25 term. Dave had written an advert in May, but is being

47



1 held up by QP advert. Dave has spoken to Ann Graham.

2 She is very apologetic. Need to hurry it through."

3 Firstly can you remember who gave that opinion that

4 number of vacancies is having a major impact on service?

5 Would that have come from you?

6 MR DUNCAN: It would have come from all of us. This is

7 a summary of discussion, so if someone had disagreed

8 with that that would have been included in the minutes.

9 So effectively the managers in that group are saying

10 this is a problem. I cannot remember who particularly

11 said -- who started that discussion.

12 MR SHELDON: It looks like you have written an advert. Can

13 you remember what you were advertising for?

14 MR DUNCAN: We were advertising for social workers. The

15 problem was there were other services wanted to be

16 included in the same advert because of

17 cost-effectiveness.

18 MR SHELDON: You were waiting for Ann Graham to write her

19 bit to be added in. Why did she take so long, do you

20 know?

21 MR DUNCAN: I am sure she was working very hard as well and

22 it was one of those things.

23 MR SHELDON: Did you raise it with her as minuted here?

24 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

25 MR SHELDON: What was the outcome?

48



1 MR DUNCAN: She was very apologetic and she would hurry it

2 through. That would have been Ann's response, to be

3 honest.

4 MR SHELDON: It looks as if there may be something of

5 a serious staffing problem at this point mid-1999 if you

6 have nine vacancies and that is getting on for

7 20 per cent of your workforce and more on the frontline.

8 MR DUNCAN: (Nods).

9 MR SHELDON: That does not qualify as acute?

10 MR DUNCAN: Yes, I accept that. I think it is degrees of

11 relativity. What I remember now in the recent months in

12 Haringey did not seem so acute then. I suspect what was

13 also -- in the second part of that item is that we did

14 have the agency staff covering at least some of these

15 vacancies, which obviously relieved some of the

16 pressure, but in the summer of 1999 we were still hoping

17 to have a largely permanent workforce.

18 MR SHELDON: Perhaps some of the explanation of why you did

19 not see that as particularly acute would be provided by

20 volume 28, page 187. This is a briefing to the Leader

21 of the Council, Mr Meehan, and various others that you

22 can see listed at the top of the page.

23 This lists at paragraph 2.2 a number of factors

24 which Carol Wilson who is the author of this briefing

25 has identified as making recruitment difficult. We can

49



1 ask her about those and whether or not they are

2 anecdotal or whether she put any empirical research into

3 it. Do you recall there being any research done in 1999

4 by Haringey to find out what it was that made being

5 a social worker for your authority such an unpopular

6 option?

7 MR DUNCAN: Not a formal research, no. I started on

8 a series of recruitment and retention reports at this

9 time but it was an issue for all London boroughs, so

10 there was some research that was done through the social

11 work press that we picked up on. We talked to staff

12 ourselves, and other than that it is anecdotal.

13 MR SHELDON: Over the page:

14 "Current position: 23 social work staff have left

15 Children's Services since the beginning of December and

16 more resignations are expected."

17 That perhaps explains why nine vacancies did not

18 seem quite so bad back then. Just give us an idea of

19 the scale of that exodus. 23 out of how many?

20 MR DUNCAN: I think Carol is including residential care

21 staff in that. The Tottenham office would not have

22 coped with 23 people leaving, that is for sure.

23 MR SHELDON: So it is half, is it, roughly?

24 MR DUNCAN: Yes, more than half, I think.

25 MR SHELDON: But even if we put it in that wider context

50



1 that is an enormous number of people to go, is it not?

2 MR DUNCAN: Yes.

3 MR SHELDON: In about seven weeks, when we include Christmas

4 in that period as well?

5 MR DUNCAN: (Nods).

6 MR SHELDON: Why were they all going?

7 MR DUNCAN: I think the restructuring had a very major

8 impact. People did not want to be in a service that was

9 always restructuring, always cutting and what you have

10 to remember, which I would like to come on to, is that

11 also during the restructuring process we had the threat

12 of more cuts on top of cuts, which destabilised

13 everybody.

14 Because not only was that a problem at the time but

15 for me, looking beyond this particular crisis, I could

16 not see where Haringey was going to go, if there were

17 cuts on cuts and what the service was going to look

18 like. I think people picked up on that and just left.

19 They could not stand it any more. There were particular

20 issues for staff because they did not want to be in

21 bigger teams.

22 MR SHELDON: There are two elements to that answer.

23 Firstly, restructuring. Focusing on that first of all,

24 I thought Haringey was always restructuring.

25 MR DUNCAN: Yes. I quite agree.